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ABSTRACT
Can People T alk Politics?
A S tudy o f D eliberative D em ocracy
David Dutwin
Vince Price, Dissertation Supervisor
Recently, political deliberation has undergone intensive theoretical scrutiny.
While the amount of scholarship on deliberation has been on the rise, it has been limited
to a rational / instrumental paradigm focused on the importance of political knowledge
and deliberation as an instrument for producing informed public opinion. This
dissertation offers an alternative paradigm, called the communal / conversational
framework of deliberation, that instead underscores the importance of the enactment of
civic identity and the centrality of political conversation before, during and after
deliberation occurs. Through the exploration and analysis of four integral research
questions— who participates, what do they say, how do they say it, and with what
effect—these two frameworks will be compared and contrasted. The normative
theoretical principles widely assumed by scholars of deliberative democracy are tested,
using bivariate and multivariate analyses, content analysis, and close textual analysis
from data generated from a recent project in deliberative democracy. The results provide
broad support for the communal/conversational framework of deliberation. While it
shares importance with the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation with regard to
who participates and with what effect, the communal/conversational framework eclipses
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the rational/instrumental framework in affording an understanding and predicting what
deliberators say and how they say it. It is political conversation, rather than political
knowledge, that determines whether someone can in fact be sophisticated in how they
talk about politics.
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I n tro d u c tio n
In the beginning of 1999, just as Philadelphia’s mayoral primaries were moving
into high gear, the Philadelphia Inquirer began a project in political deliberation and
civic journalism. Over 500 individuals across the city gathered each month to
deliberate—talk politics— in order to define the most pressing problems for the city,
outline and consider the solutions to those problems, and ultimately frame the political
dialogue of the candidates around the concerns and issues they generated in their
discussions.
The designers of the project, all experienced in both civic journalism and prior
National Issues Forums deliberations run by the Kettering Foundation, had a simple plan:
In the first month, citizens would set the agenda by identifying the four or five of the
most important issues facing the city of Philadelphia. In the second month, the citizens
would create three choice frameworks, or public policy options, for each issue. While the
third month focused on refining these choice frameworks, the final month would have
citizens gather to argue for and against each choice framework, ultimately, it was hoped,
being able to settle on specific policy choices, directions, and increased political
information to use in confronting the candidates with their concerns.
In February, Chris Satullo, an editor for the Inquirer and key organizer of the
deliberative events, published a list of policy options based on the citizens’ discussions.
The response was less than positive. The participants, or at least a significant number of
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them, complained that the policy options, complied into three choice frameworks, did not
represent what occurred during their deliberations. Many of the citizen discussion
groups, in fact, tried but did not come to any consensus as to what policy options should
fall under each framework. Still others felt that the options published in the Inquirer
were never even discussed, let alone placed into some sort of framework. While the
Inquirer meant well, the result was that many citizens, told that this project was solely
designed so that their voices could be heard, felt that their voices had been usurped and
reframed into something quite different than what they felt they had said.
As someone who was involved in the project, who moderated, and who, as I will
detail, spent over a year studying its character and outcomes, I am confident that the
Inquirer had no motive other than to clarify what was said in prior discussions so that
future discussions could have refined focus. Why then, was there an uproar by some of
the participants over what the Inquirer said the public had said?
Answering this question is at the heart of this dissertation, and concerns a divide
between what many academics, political sophisticates and journalists define as
“deliberation” and what citizens actually do when they gather together in relatively large
groups to talk politics. On the one hand, there is the notion that political discussion or
deliberation elucidates policy options, is comprised of rational, argumentative dialogue,
and is done to give certain public policies the backing of the people, all while the people
become more knowledgeable and efficacious of politics. On the other hand, there is a
second inclination that political deliberation is a communal event where citizens gather
simply to talk politics, reify their role as citizens, act as citizens, and assert how the
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political process can and should move closer to citizens and their needs, where one need
not be politically sophisticated to talk and the talk need not be highbrowed.
It is important to note that these two styles of talking politics are not mutually
exclusive, and both have had some voice in academic research. As such, they can be
understood not as exclusive models of deliberation but rather as “expectation
frameworks” of the character of deliberation that takes place when citizens gather to talk
politics. Whether deliberation exhibits the properties of both or either framework is an
empirical question and one that has important implications for our understanding of
public opinion formation, the ability and character of citizen’s political talk, and our
conceptions of democracy itself. The goal of this dissertation is to explicate these choice
frameworks and their foundations in academic thought, as well as explore an actual event
in citizen political deliberation to explore their empirical tenability and the implications
of what occurs when citizens gather to talk politics.
Political deliberation is a specialized form of communication about politics. As I
will detail, the act of political deliberation had been narrowly defined by scholars as
something quite different than what truly occurs when citizens gather to talk politics. In
short, scholars have conceived of deliberation as a means of informing the citizenry, of
infusing the polity with informed, citizen-generated opinions on matters of public policy.
Deliberation is meant to produce a small subset of citizens who can represent how the
overall citizenry would act and think if they were all fully informed (Fishkin, 1991). The
perspective asserts that deliberation is the last step to an informed public and informed
policy. Furthermore, deliberation is understood to be a rational, quasi-argumentative
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discussion about public policy. In addition to the creation of sophisticated and informed
talk about politics, many scholars also believe that such talk can only be generated by
sophisticated and knowledgeable citizens.
In contrast to these expectations, this dissertation will argue for an alternative set
of expectations about political talk. The alternative framework envisages deliberation
instead as a communal act, a celebration of citizenship, an event that catalyzes public
opinion formation and reifies citizenship. The framework expects citizens to offer
narratives on personal experiences rather than overt debate on public policy choices. It
asserts the importance of talking politics over high levels of political knowledge, and
focuses on the centrality of citizenship rather than political sophistication and the
production of expertise.
This framework views deliberation as a performance of citizenship rather than an
instrument of political learning and policy decision-making. Importantly, I plan to
contrast this alternative framework to the current one by asking some rather far-reaching
questions of deliberation, and by applying these questions to a real project in deliberation.
This research gathers not only traditional variables of interest (“old” data, that is, data
variables that have been asked in previous explorations of deliberation) but also with
entirely new variables.
Chapter one will review the “rational/instrumental” framework of deliberation in
a summary of prior research. I then propose a “communal/conversational” framework of
deliberation, and show that such a model, though less well represented in empirical
research, has firm and extensive roots in a vast array of literature across a wide range of
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topics and fields. This review culminates in a set of alternative empirical expectations of
deliberative character, consistent with each framework.
Chapter two introduces the data used for this project. The study draws upon not
only traditional survey measures, but also content analyses of nearly every word spoken
in the Philadelphia deliberations. I detail the coding scheme that was applied to these
data and the variables it produced.
Chapters three through six each focus on a single “big” question. These questions
will be justified in the present and following chapter and are, in sequence: Who
participates and why? What do they say and how do they say it? Who says what? How
does it affect them? These questions are not complex, but they are central to scholars
concerned with deliberation. And more important, as I will detail, each framework
provides clear expectations pertaining to each question. Thus, investigating these four
questions leads to insights about the applicability of each framework. I examine the
tenability of the two frameworks, through these four questions, in light of the
Philadelphia experience.
Chapter three examines who participates in deliberation. Prior models of political
participation have focused on socio-economic status (SES) variables and political
sophistication variables (e.g. education, political knowledge, and political interest).
While it is likely that such variables do matter in predicting who participates in
deliberation, they need not be the sole focus in understanding who chooses to deliberate,
if deliberation is a communal and informal act of political talk, we should expect that
participation in deliberation is dominated by individuals who have a strong civic identity
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or sense of communalism. This chapter will show that although many of the variables
from the traditional framework of participation are found to predict participation in
deliberation, there is also substantial evidence from both quantitative and qualitative
analyses that the civic identity is a central motivator of deliberation.
Chapter four focuses on a descriptive analysis of deliberation, specifically, on
what people say and how they say it. The rational/instrumental framework of
deliberation views deliberation as an argumentative discussion on matters of public
policy, where individual’s values guide their public policy positions and arguments.
However, as the organizers of the Philadelphia deliberations learned, citizens tend to
focus on sharing their personal experiences and broad-ranging political values. When
public policy is discussed, it is couched in the language and the values of the community,
not the individual.
Chapter five asks who says what. It contrasts the traditional framework, which
claims that deliberation will be best predicted by levels of political sophistication, with
the alternative framework, which suggests that deliberative abilities are best predicted not
by sophistication but by prior levels of conversation and conversational skill. Prior levels
of conversation are indeed found to predict, not only how much one talks in deliberation,
but also the degree to which such talk is argumentative and the degree to which an
individual talks on a broad range of topics.
The final analysis is presented in chapter six and focuses on the effects of
deliberation. The rational/instrumental framework of deliberation has provided some
evidence that deliberation changes opinions, increases political knowledge, and increases

6

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

political efficacy. Deliberation is seen as a useful endeavor for the polity at large because
those who participate in deliberation stand in for those who do not. In addition to
reviewing the broad literature critiquing these claims, this chapter also presents new
analyses focused on conversation rather than knowledge and opinion change, finding that
deliberation increases post-deliberative political conversation. Rather than argue that
deliberation is important to the polity at large because of some sort of representative
status afforded to deliberative participants, the communal/conversational framework of
deliberation argues that increased levels of conversation brought on by deliberation create
a diffusion effect. As such, the polity is affected as the interest and vivacity of the
participants is diffused into their separate social networks.
The conclusion provides an overall assessment of the character and nature of
deliberation, based on these analyses. Although the rational / instrumental framework is
found to have some importance in determining who is most likely to participate in such
an event, the communal / conversational expectation frame is clearly most consistent with
how the deliberative participants actually talked politics. Citizens spoke about
community, about the civic values of accountability and responsibility, about the local
focus, and about public policy only in so far as it could be related to the communitarian
citizen’s needs and expectations. At its essence, the communal / conversational frame
defines politics at the personal level, through the eyes of a citizen and his or her “line of
sight” experience. People define politics as they encounter it, as something agreed to
amongst friends and neighbors. The citizens talked a certain brand of politics, one very
different than the “normative standard.” But as the conclusion will argue, the particular
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brand of deliberation spoken in the Philadelphia deliberations was no less important,
useful, or engaging than what normative theorists have hoped for.
The two expectation frameworks tested and investigated in this dissertation are
again not mutually exclusive, but are rather ends of a spectrum on a few select
dimensions of political talk. This dissertation is not, then, offering two models
competing in a zero-sum game for sole rights to explain the character, nature, and effects
of deliberation. Rather, each framework provides different expectations of how
individuals come to be deliberative participants, how individuals argue about politics, and
what individuals get out of the process. Each chapter is designed to study one of four
key characteristics or dimensions of political talk. Analyses within each chapter point to
different spots along the spectrum with regard to a specific characteristic of deliberation.
These chapters on the research questions are preceded by chapters detailing the data to be
used in the dissertation and theoretical justification for the two expectation frameworks.
In the end, this dissertation will show that how citizens talk politics, while very different
than predominant theoretical expectations, is vital to a legitimized and well-functioning
democracy and a key catalyst in the formation of truly public opinions.
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C h a p te r 1: F ram ew o rk s o f D elib eratio n
The theory of deliberative democracy has strong ties to models of the public
sphere and political thinking on rational political decision making. These Habermasian
and Rikerian roots, I argue, serve as the central theoretical influences with which modem
deliberative democratic theories are situated. The initial purpose of this chapter is to
detail these roots and review the theory of deliberative democracy as it stands today, as it
is this theory that models what should occur when citizens gather to talk politics. In
doing so, I will offer the current theory of deliberative democracy as having a dominant
perspective or expectation framework, one that at best is only marginally informed by
many related literatures, including within the field of communication gratifications
theory, research on political communication, and argumentation theory, and from related
fields, literature on everyday reasoning and critical thinking. By reviewing the
theoretically relevant literature of these other fields more closely, one finds that the
alternative framework I am proposing holds strong theoretical validity.
While the initial purpose of this chapter is to review the theory of deliberative
democracy as well as its theoretical roots, this chapter more importantly will make a case
for the alternative, communal/conversational framework of deliberation based on these
literatures and fields of research. In addition to creating a general case, I will explore the
divergence between the two expectation frameworks by again looking at four integral
questions with regard to deliberative democracy: Who participates in deliberation and
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why, what do they say and how do they say it, who says what, and how does it affect
them. Again, because deliberation is a communications process, these questions must be
central to understanding deliberation both theoretically and in practice. And, it is these
questions, as I will show, that have been the significant focus of scholars’ arguments thus
far in the theory of deliberative democracy.
Deliberation Defined
The place to begin is by providing a general definition of deliberation as
constructed by prior scholarship. Deliberation has its roots in rational democratic
thought, specifically Habermasian and other theoretical veins of the public sphere.
Habermas (1962/1993) envisioned a normative political discourse that was rational, equal
and interpersonal. This public sphere was characterized by quality opinion and
inclusiveness. The public sphere required a public space, including public manners,
habits, and talents, and producing a “rational and critical discourse among everyone
involved” (Carey, 1996, p. 381).
Two stand-out features in the way deliberation has developed as a concept are
thus first as an exemplar of public sphere dialogue and second as an instrument that
generates and places within democratic practice informed and rational citizen-based
public thought. With regard to the latter, the concept of deliberation has been defined by
deliberative scholars in light of its utility and place in democracy. Democracy, formally
defined, must include the right of every citizen to an equal voice and an equal chance for
that voicing. These are achieved through free, fair, and frequent elections (Dahl, 1998).
As such, a democracy must, in practice, allow for the freedom of expression, outlets for
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alternative information, sites for associational autonomy, and the principle of inclusive
citizenship (Dahl, 1998).
Deliberation is a practice designed to address these four characteristics. As I
review below, deliberation must exhibit equality, for this satisfies the principle of
freedom of expression. Deliberation is an outlet for alternative information, more so than
ordinary political conversation in that there is a greater chance of meeting individuals
with different information and different perspectives. Deliberation is a site for
associational autonomy, and one of the functions of political communication, and
deliberation specifically, is the provision of community contact. Finally, again based on
the principle of equality, deliberation provides for inclusive citizenship, where
individuals come to meet not as individuals but as citizens.
Deliberation, then, is “a conception of democratic politics in which decisions and
politics are justified in a process of discussion among equal citizens” (Gutmann and
Thompson, 1996, p. 161). Furthermore, it is a public discourse, employing practical
reasoning. Deliberation is a formalized discourse where citizens define political goals
and weigh the choices available to achieve such goals (Walton, 1996). Deliberation
contains mutual reason-giving (Gutmann & Thompson, 2000) and reasoned argument
(Knight & Johnson, 1994), and is a site where self-interests are overshadowed by
discussion of the public good (Bohman, 1996), guided by principles of reason and order
(Bessette, 1994).
In addition, deliberation creates more fully-informed citizens, creating wellconsidered opinions from which decisions of public policy can be made. Indeed,
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Fishkin’s (1991) entire argument hinges upon this premise. This is deliberation’s
instrumental function: To produce well-considered, stable opinions through the
combination of rational thought, reasoned argument, mutual reasoning-giving and an
environment of full information, leading to rational, democratic (e.g., citizen generated)
public policy decisions.
To say that deliberation is rational reflects the fact that deliberative practice is
normatively designed to mirror the Habermasian ideal in which the public sphere is
marked by rational thought, an equality of citizens and talk, and a fair, open, and engaged
process. The characteristic of equality or symmetry has been described as an absolute
necessity of deliberation, according to most scholars (Benhabib, 1996; Cohen, 1997;
Dryzek, 2000; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1962/1993; Mansbridge, 1983).
Formerly defined, deliberation should be equal in who participates and in how seriously
each individual’s comments are taken and the amount of discussion and/or silence
produced by each individual.
Deliberation has also reflected the Habermasian ideal of openness and
engagement (Gutmann, 1993). Citizens must be willing and able to shape and reshape
their opinions through deliberation (Bickford, 1996). Public reason-giving (Barber,
1994) and learning cannot occur without openness. In addition to openness, deliberation
must exhibit engagement, that is, agreement and disagreement so that consensus or
dissensus on political issues can be made public (Cohen, 1997; Barber, 1994; Knight and
Johnson, 1994; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Without engagement, of which agreement
and disagreement are crucial, there is no deliberation, simply the voicing of personal
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opinions to citizens who have no interest in hearing such opinions, only interest in
voicing their own.
Deliberation, as defined by deliberative theorists, also must contain reasoned
argument (Bessette, 1994; Gutmann and Thompson, 2000; Knight & Johnson, 1994).
Deliberation requires both reciprocity (Benhabib, 1996; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996)
and rational discourse. Deliberation is a process by which political decisions, both past
and future, must be justified and debated, where public policies are weighed and judged
(Gunderson, 2000). As modeled by deliberative theorists, deliberation is an argumentdriven endeavor. The concepts of reciprocity and mutual reason-giving, coupled with
persuasion, necessitate a form of discourse that is rational, logical, and rhetorical
(Gutmann, 1993).
Frameworks of Deliberation
As stated previously, this dissertation takes issue with the rational/instrumental
framework of deliberation that has been developed over the past decade following
mainstream thought on the public sphere and rational political decision making. While
thus far I have provided only a topical review of this framework, I will now begin to
describe that framework in detail as well as offer an alternative theoretical framework
designated the communal/conversational framework. While I have provided some
general attributes of the rational/instrumental framework in the previous section, I have
yet to provide a fully explicated description. To move toward specifics, and more
importantly, the development of empirical questions with which both the
rational/instrumental and the communal/conversational frameworks can be tested,
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compared, and contrasted, four central questions about deliberation are advanced and
each framework is depicted in light of these questions. The important point to be made
here is that the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation remains largely a
theoretical perspective with little empirical support. This fact underscores the importance
of developing and testing empirical questions with which the framework can be afforded
(or not) evidentiary validity. In what follows, I will offer justifications for the
importance of each question and review the rational/instrumental framework in light of
each question. In addition, a review of literatures relevant to deliberation will offer
evidence contrary to the rational/instrumental framework, and this same literature will
offer support for a communal/communicative framework of deliberation. In table la
below, a brief description of the two frameworks in light of the four major questions on
deliberation is provided:
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Table la : Two Frameworks o f Deliberation
Key Q u e stio n s of

Rational / In stru m ental

C o m m u n a l / C onversational

Deliberation
Who partic ipa te s an d why?

G roup re p resen ta tiv e of

Civic identifiers, a

th e polity, t o fo rm /a ffe c t

ce lebratio n o f citizens,

public policy

v a lid a tio n /e n a c tm e n t of
th e ir role a s citizens

What d o th ey say a n d how

Talk of public policy,

Stories o f th e com m unity,

do t h e y say it?

rational, a rg u m e n tativ e

a r g u m e n t not th e prim ary
fo cus

Who says what?

Knowledgeable citizens

C o m m u n a lis ts /
co n v e rsation alists

How d o e s it affect them ?

Increases knowledge,

Increases their

efficacy, an d creates w ell-

conversational levels with

co n sid ered opinions

o th e rs

Who Participates and Why?
For a number of reasons, the question of who participates and why is central to an
understanding of deliberation. First, if those who participate are meant to be a
representative subset of the overall polity, it is important to know whether deliberative
events attain representativeness. If the sample is not representative, it is important to
know in what way the sample differs from the general population and whether this
difference has important consequences. Any difference between the target population
and the sample also raises the question of whether there are specific reasons as to why
representativeness was not attained. Finally, any unrepresentativeness may have serious
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implications for what is said in deliberation and how it is said, in addition to what is
retrieved from the deliberative event.
Although there are a number of different conversations within the literature on
political participation,1 the rational/instrumental framework either ignores these
literatures entirely or focuses solely on traditional political science literatures and
variables, namely socio-economic and other individual level indicators of participation
including political knowledge and interest. A second class of studies, however, is also
directly relevant to deliberative participation as it is focused on communicative acts of
participation. This class includes the many different studies concerned with the spiral of
silence theory first developed by Elizabeth Noelle-Neuman (1993), as well as a handful
of studies that are specifically concerned with participation in a deliberative forum. In
addition, and most central to the communal/conversational framework of deliberation,
there are studies that focus on activists and other kinds of political participants that seek
to describe the motivations to participate in politically relevant activities. This last class
differs from the first two in its methodology which is only partially survey-based and
primarily ethnographic. This literature, however, does provide a rich description of the
civic-minded personality, affording the current study a starting point with which to
formalize many important aspects of the communal/conversational framework.

1Participation has some relation to social capital. Using factor analysis, Scheufele & Shah (2000) find
civic engagement (a measure o f three specific types of participation) to be one o f three different dimensions
of social capital.
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Perhaps the most pertinent study with regard to the rational/instrumental
framework is Verba, Schlozman, & Brady’s Voice and Equality (1995), which argues
that individuals do not participate in politics because they cannot, do not want to, or
because they were not asked. From these three explanations the authors create a general
typology of variables that might account for political participation, again falling into
three general categories: resources, motivations, and opportunities. Resources can
include available time, money, and skills. Motivations include political interest political
efficacy, strength of partisanship, and political information. Finally, opportunities refer
to recruitment networks, location within society, and the level of conversational links to
others.
It is important to note that Verba et al. (1995) studied only certain types of
participation, including voting, campaign work, contributions, contacts, protests, as well
as political affiliations and informal community activity. While their study does not
examine participation in political deliberations, it is nevertheless an important starting
point with which to gain an understanding of the important relationships regarding
participation in general. While there are differences in the number and strength of the
independent variables that relate to the various participation variables studied in Voice
and Equality, there are still commonalties across these variables that likely extend to
deliberation as a participation variable of interest.
Verba and colleagues (1995) find that participation is a matter of all three
categories (resources, motivations, and opportunities), and specifically find consistent
positive relationships, regardless of the model, between participation and education,
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family income, civic skills (stemming from prior social activity in the church,
organizations and career), political interest and political information. Other significant
positive relationships were evident in only some of their models, including political
efficacy, partisan strength, issue involvement, and institutional recruitment (e.g., from
churches and unions). Overall, Verba et al. argue for the commonality, but inequality of
participation. In other words, while participation was widespread, it was heavily
dependent upon socio-economic status and family and social upbringing. Money and
class, it seems, not only predict the amount of money individuals might later give to
politics, but effort and time as well.
The results found in Voice and Equality have been mirrored in a number of other
studies on political participation (Almond & Verba, 1863; Conway, 2000; Eveland &
Scheufele, 2000; Goel, 1980; Milbrath, 1972). There is, therefore, significant evidence
within the political science literature that participation in political activities will not be
representative but will instead hinge upon a number of factors including levels of
political sophistication as well as socio-economic factors. Yet many empirical studies of
deliberation and other deliberative events do not consider these factors significant enough
to take seriously, other than to offer incentives to minimize some of these potential
confounds to representativeness (Fishkin, 1996,1999).
Again, if the rational/instrumental framework is concerned with systematic
differences in participation at all, the focus resides in demographic variables and some
attitudinal and psychological variables, especially political knowledge, education, and
other SES variables. Noticeably absent in these studies is the inclusion of
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communication factors both as independent and dependent variables2. These include
political conversation (also called interpersonal discussion), attention and exposure to
media, specifically newspapers and television news, and participation measured as
attendance in a deliberative forum or even as simply the willingness to speak out about
politics under certain social conditions. However, a separate but equally informative
collection of studies on participation has been generated in recent years, many in
response to Noelle-Neumann’s (1993) spiral of silence theory, that have employed these
communication variables with much success.
As summarized by Katz (1981), the spiral of silence theory states that individuals
will suppress their opinions if they perceive themselves to be unsupported by others. It is
a theory that depends on the assumption that individuals use the mass media in their
search for support and that the mass media tend to speak monopolistically, as if with one
voice. There are a wealth of articles that follow up on some aspect of the spiral of silence
theory, which all tend to vary slightly based on the specific dependent variable of interest.
These differ in the conditions under which one would be willing to speak to another
about politics. Noelle-Neuman herself, and others after her, have set up their dependent
variable as the willingness to discuss politics to a stranger on a train. Although the

2 With the exception of Schuefele’s work on civic engagement, a summative measure o f general
participation including “going to a club or meeting,” “did volunteer work,” and “worked on a community
project,” (Scheufele & Shah, 2000) and general political participation (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000), where
newspaper use, but not television use, was found to have a significant, direct and positive effect on
participation.
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willingness to speak may not be a traditional form of political participation, certainly not
an institutional one, speaking out on politics is an important departure from the private
sphere into the realm of politics, even if it is not an officially sanctioned and sponsored
activity. Interestingly, regardless of these differences in the dependent variable, spiral of
silence studies tend to support the findings of Verba et al. (1995) in that education,
efficacy, interest, and political knowledge all significantly predict participation (e.g.
Lasorsa, 1991; Salmon & Neuwirth, 1990; Scheufele, 1999). However, the evidence is
far less consistent and depends on the specific dependent variable being tested. These
studies often find demographic variables to be insignificant predictors of participation
(Glynn, 1984,1997). Other studies looking at participation in deliberative forums find
similarly inconsistent results with demographic and SES variables, as well as for
knowledge and efficacy (McLeod et al., 1996,1999a, 1999b). Although these studies do
not provide an alternative perspective (other than underscoring that media exposure
should have some relation to participation), they do suggest that the traditional view of
participation may not specifically apply to participation in deliberation.
A third and final collection of literature regarding political participation,
comprising of in-depth studies of political participants including political and community
activists, does offer direction for an alternative perspective of deliberation, specifically
with regard to who participates and why. These studies suggest that participation in
deliberation may be most significantly affected not by political sophistication and SES
variables but by interest in one’s community and an identification with being a civic
minded citizen.
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One such study employed in-depth interviews and found three different narrative
genres of how individuals describe the generation of their own political activism: as the
result of some personal crisis, through moral discovery, or as a general lifelong
commitment (Teske, 1997). In explaining the source of their political activism, activists
often describe a struggle for meaning or purpose stemming from some personal crisis,
where activist involvement became a site for meaning and personal purpose. In such
situations, individuals used political participation as therapy that helped define who they
were as individuals. In contrast to the personal crisis narrative, where activism resolved
some inner crisis, the moral discovery narrative is generated from external facts and
events. Here individuals questioned their own personal worth and purpose in response to
substantive public events. Finally, many individuals claim to be active in politics
because of a lifelong commitment, often stemming from their earliest memories of their
parents’ activism of beliefs in the common good and participation toward creating and
reifying the common good.
Common among activists is a strong concern for the well-being of others and of
society. For many activists, this concern is generated from the values they hold most
dear, values of commitment and obligation to further the common good. Teske takes on
what he calls the government-centered view of rationality and participation with the
citizen-centered view. While he recognizes Verba et al’s (1995) position that civicminded rationales play a significant part in motivating an individual to participate, Teske
does critique the generalized political science tradition definition of participation as
something that is done to influence or inspire government action. Rather, Teske argues
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for a broader definition of political participation by relating it to the larger world of
politics, such as the furthering of social values, changing attitudes, upholding ways of
life, and having an influence in the social milieu. Furthermore, Teske is critical of the
view that participation is essentially irrational, that participation has costs that far
outweigh its benefits and rewards. Instead, he argues that participation is wholly rational,
but specifically for personal reasons. Participation for activists is the enactment and
further structuration of a personal identity. As such, participants follow quite rational
desires, including becoming the kind of person they want to be, instantiating qualities and
virtues they admire, playing a small role in history, ensuring that they leave behind a
certain type of story, and upholding their most deeply held value commitments through
their deeds and behavior.
Beyond activists, other studies seem to support the notion that even within the
general population participation may be importantly shaped by one’s political identity
and the enacting o f that identity. Matthews (1994), for instance, argues that people
participate in politics to gain greater control over an uncertain future, as well as a desire
to improve public policy decision making and to make the world and their communities
better places in which to live. An additional motivator is citizens’ recognition of the
importance of addressing deteriorating civic relationships and the wish to develop the
means and ability to work together more effectively.
Similarly, a number of scholars argue that participation requires, at the very least,
a sense of community identity, education generally and civic education more specifically
(Pateman, 1970). Rimmerman (1997) adds two additional elements, first, a belief by the
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individual that participation will add to the development of their identity, and second, a
belief that it is the duty of citizens to participate in their communities and become
involved in the decisions that affect the quality of their lives.
As might be expected, the civic identity is not exclusively constructed prior to
participation. In fact, the amount of participation in one’s youth is a strong predictor of
the later development of the civic identity, including both a sense of gratification and
responsibility (Youniss, McLellan, & Yates, 1997). Indeed, Verba et al. (1995) found
that two of the strongest predictors of adult political participation are participation in high
school government and high school membership in non-athletic clubs. Furthermore,
political activities in youth appear to engender political activity in adulthood through the
inculcation of a number of participation’s antecedents, for example, political efficacy
(McAdam, 1988). In addition, it appears that any communal activity can have positive
effects on adult participation, including religious participation, extracurricular activities,
and close familial relationships (Smith, 1999).
It is very important to note that Verba et al. (1995) also provide support of a
communal/conversational framework of communication by focusing on civic
gratifications as motivators of political participation. Verba and colleagues theorized
three potential gratifications: policy, civic, or material. In giving reasons for voting, 93
percent of respondents provided civic gratifications as the most important. For
contacting a government official on a matter of national concern, 87 percent cited civic
gratifications. These findings led Verba et al. to claim that civic motivations are an
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essential part of the makeup of political participation in America. Other political
scientists have agreed (Cheung, Chan, & Leung, 1999; Funk, 1998; Unger, 1991).
Finally, a number of scholars have provided typologies of political participation.
It is interesting to note that few have included in these typologies a description of
civically identifying individuals (see Kaase & March, 1979; Milbrath, 1972). However,
Verba and Nie (1972) did find six different types of participatory citizens: inactives,
voting specialists, parochial specialists, communalists, campaigners, and complete
activists. Communalists are described as those who enjoy taking initiative for the
community, performing acts with broad social outcomes and only moderate amounts of
conflict. While not engaged in politics to the level of campaigners, communalists
consistently engage in at least two of the five communal activities surveyed by Verba and
Nie. Communalists are highly involved, hold a high degree of personal political skill,
information, and efficacy, but do not exhibit high levels of partisanship or issue
extremity. They are most distinguished from other types, according to Verba and Nie, by
their high level of civic-mindedness.
Focusing on communalism, the alternative model of deliberation I am proposing
here argues that the civic identity will be a primary if not the most important factor in
determining who participates in political deliberation. The civic identity is an identity
that is defined or given further structure through the enactment of participatory actions,
where such participatory actions gratify the need of individuals to contribute to the
collective good, to uphold the values of community and concern for others. Thus, factors
which directly measure the civic identity should be more extant in participators of
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deliberation than non-participators. This also suggests that the participators should
mirror the characterization of communalists reported in Verba and Nie (1972). This
means that participators will exhibit many of the features predicted by the
rational/instrumental framework, namely, high levels of political knowledge and efficacy.
Thus any analysis of deliberative participation is not expected to show strong support for
the alternative framework and little for the traditional model. Since these two are in this
case empirically related, I expect any study that tests for variables within both
frameworks will find roughly similar support. Expectations specific to the current project
will be explicated in greater detail in chapter three.
W hat Do They Sav and How Do They Sav It?
If there is an expectation that those who choose to participate in deliberation are
systematically different than those who decline to participate, there will, in all likelihood,
be implications for what is said and how it is said. Furthermore, what is said and how it
is said is a benchmark of whether the discourse found in deliberation is generally rational
and argumentative, as opposed to narrative and communal, in addition to whether the talk
is public policy-based or instead grounded within the community and individual
experience. This question is, in short, central to an investigation of the presence of both
models in deliberation.
Principles in the Rational/Instrumental Framework of Deliberation
As mentioned earlier, the current expectation framework of deliberation is
situated upon Habermasian principles of rationality, equality and engagement. Such
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principles, and others, have been more or less directly adapted from conceptions of the
public sphere to deliberation, as detailed below.
Deliberation, as mentioned, is “a conception of democratic politics in which
decisions and politics are justified in a process of discussion among equal citizens”
(Gutmann and Thompson, 2000, p. 161). Deliberation is essential in order to provide
citizens a vehicle (instrument) with which to become politically engaged and to provide
autonomy to the political process. Furthermore, deliberation is a public discourse that is
marked by goal-directed practical reasoning. Citizens take the opportunity to define
political objectives and to weigh the various means that purportedly achieve such goals
and objectives (Walton, 1998). Through deliberation, citizens may create collective
action, or, at least, “reencounter, reevaluate, and repossess” their own and other’s
opinions (Barber, 1984). Deliberation is contrasted with two other kinds of discourse:
private discourse, that is, discourse marked by consensus in homogeneous collectives
(Habermas, 1962/1993), and technical discourse, a discourse characterized by limited
rules of what constitutes valid evidence, presentation and judgment (Goodnight, 1982).
Rather, deliberation is a discourse marked by mutual reason-giving (Gutmann &
Thompson, 2000) and reasoned argument (Knight & Johnson, 1994), where self-interests
are transformed into public goods (Bohman, 1996). It is, in short, part private discourse
and part technical argumentation (Goodnight, 1982), a discourse that blends the formal
and informal, guided by principles of reason and order (Bessette, 1994).
Deliberation has a number of central normative characteristics. As mentioned, the
first is that it be guided by the norms of equality and symmetry (Benhabib, 1996; Cohen,
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1997; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1962/1993; Mansbridge, 1983).
According to the Habermasian ideal, this means, in essence, checking one’s personal
attributes at the door, entering deliberation as equal to others in stature and respect.
Equality ensures that everyone has a chance at self-determination and association.
Equality is essential if deliberation is to achieve autonomy: Without equality there is no
“people,” just a select few who speak for all.
Deliberation also requires that citizens provide reflexivity or public reciprocity
(Benhabib, 1996; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). That is, citizens must publicly provide
reasons for supporting or opposing any publicly stated political position. Deliberation,
according to Barber (1984), is required when “some action of public consequence
becomes necessary and when men (sic) must thus make a public choice that is reasonable
in the face of conflict despite the absence o f an independent ground of judgment” (p. 122,
original italics). Reciprocity creates conflict, for it requires that citizens justify their
reasons in the face of opposing political perspectives. As such, ultimately, some
positions may be found to be based on purely moral grounds (Gutmann & Thompson,
1996). However, through reciprocity, citizens are encouraged to at least understand the
positions of others empathetically, to understand, in the absence of independent grounds
for judgment, that many opposing points of view are credible.
Political actions, it is widely argued, should only arise through forethought and
discussion. However, many citizens may have only loosely held or poorly informed
positions on political issues, if any at all. By making public reason-giving a tenant of
deliberation, citizens are able to encounter the reasons of others in order to become more
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fully informed. As argued by Benhabib (1996), deliberation is necessary because no one
single individual can foresee every perspective, nor will any single individual have all the
information pertinent to any given political issue. Thus, deliberation is a form of
discourse featuring fully explicated public reason-giving, containing a number of
attributes, including the articulation of interests, persuasion, the exploration of mutuality
and disagreement, affiliation and affection, self-expression, opinion reformulation and
reconceptualization, and community building (Barber, 1984).
In deliberation, citizens accomplish two things simultaneously: they impart and
receive information while formulating and reformulating their opinions. But because
such actions occur within the realm of politics, discussions in deliberation are on topics in
which truth is unobtainable. Deliberation is discourse about how we should proceed
collectively and politically. As such, past facts must be framed as pertinent to future
policy. According to Aristotle, deliberative rhetoric is discussion on topics based on
practical knowledge where truth is unattainable, and is less a science that an art
(Kennedy, 1991). It is a discourse where we “take others into our deliberations” to get a
basis for making decisions that are more informed than if generated in vacuo.
Deliberation requires that practical knowledge is made pertinent to the topic at hand, and
by doing so it achieves its two functions of imparting information and (re)formulating
opinions.
What then, are the goals of deliberation? As suggested, some of its goals are in
fact inherent in deliberation itself, that is, to provide information and (re)formulate
opinions. In addition, through the essential contact deliberation provides with others,
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deliberation builds community as we encounter others, their positions, and attempt to, if
not agree, come to understand why such positions, perhaps in conflict with our own, are
taken by others (Barber, 1984; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). In this sense, a principal
outcome of deliberation is the instantiation of community through intimate
communicative contact with others (Mill, 1886).
Deliberation may also achieve “a consensus on action” on a number of different
political issues (Cohen, 1997). Most theorists have come to realize, however, that the
more likely outcome is consensus on where people stand, where they agree and where
they disagree (Barber, 1984, Knight & Johnson, 1994; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). In
this regard, it is hoped that, at the very least, deliberation will reduce the number of
dimensions upon which citizens disagree (Knight & Johnson, 1994). Instead of
mediating or transforming conflict, deliberation, it is hoped, minimizes or accommodates
conflict through a process of reciprocity and what Gutmann & Thompson call the
“economy of moral disagreement.”
Viewed normatively, then, deliberation should contain the following
characteristics. First, deliberation should exhibit openness and engagement (Gutmann,
1993). In other words, citizens should be willing and able to shape and reshape their
opinions through deliberation (Bickford, 1996). The value of autonomy discussed earlier
(Gutmann & Thompson, 1993) is clearly synonymous with the principle of openness.
Public reason-giving (Barber, 1994) and learning, two central telos of deliberation,
cannot occur without openness.
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In addition to openness, deliberation must exhibit engagement, or more
specifically, agreement and disagreement so that consensus or dissensus on political
issues can be made public (Cohen, 1997; Barber, 1994; Knight & Johnson, 1994;
Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Without engagement, of which agreement and
disagreement are crucial, there is no deliberation, simply the voicing of personal opinions
to citizens who have no interest in hearing such opinions, only interest in voicing their
own.
A second principle of deliberation made by deliberative theorists is that it contain
reasoned argument (Bessette, 1994; Gutmann and Thompson, 2000; Knight & Johnson,
1994). Deliberation requires this principle to exhibit both reciprocity (Benhabib, 1996;
Gutmann & Thompson, 1996) and rational discourse (Habermas, 1962). Deliberation is a
process by which political decisions, both past and future, must be contested and
justified, where public policies are evaluated and judged (Gunderson, 2000). As modeled
by deliberative theorists, deliberation is an argument-driven endeavor. The concepts of
reciprocity and mutual reason-giving, coupled with persuasion, necessitate a form of
discourse that is rational, logical, and rhetorical. However, deliberation is not wholly
argumentative. While distinct from private and technical argumentation, deliberation
utilizes elements of both discourses. In short, it is part informal conversation and part
political argumentation. Like Aristotle’s conception of political dialogue, deliberation
will contain arguments about the nature of the present political reality, a vision of the
normative future political reality, and ways to realize the future given the present
(Gunderson, 2000). However, the principle here of reasoned argument is relatively
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diverse from author to author in terms of the level of sophistication possible by
individuals in deliberation. For example, Walton (1998) argues that deliberation is meant
to define political objectives in addition to discussing the various means by which a
polity can meet such goals. Based on this interpretation, deliberation may not have to
discuss the finer points of public policy so much as simply, and minimally, define the
public’s objectives. On the other hand, deliberation has also been defined as discourse in
which public policies are fully explicated through public reason-giving, the articulation of
interests and persuasion (Barber, 1994). In general, however, deliberative theorists claim
that deliberation is an argument-driven endeavor. The concepts of reciprocity and mutual
reason-giving, coupled with persuasion, necessitate a form of discourse that is rational,
logical, and rhetorical.
A third principle of deliberation according to deliberative theorists is equality and
symmetry (Benhabib, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996;
Habermas, 1962/1993; Mansbridge, 1983). That is, deliberation should not only be equal
in who participates but also in how seriously each individual’s comments are taken and
the amount of discussion and/or silence produced by each individual. Of the principles
thus far, this principle is the most easily and directly measured by the degree to which
minorities and perceived minorities speak as compared to majorities, as will be done in
the present project.
With regard to what is said and how it is said, the rational/instrumental framework
of deliberation can thus be characterized by the principles of equality, openness and
engagement, and rational/reasoned argument. The communal/conversational framework
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does not openly contradict or oppose the notion that deliberation should exhibit equality
and openness. Nevertheless, whether deliberation is open and equal is an empirical
question and one that surprisingly enough has yet to be tested. Given that the present
project is fully capable of testing these principles and that such principles are relevant to
the rational/instrumental framework that is being challenged and tested in this
dissertation, these two principles will be explored empirically in chapters four and five.
Where there is conflict between the two expectation frameworks is with the
principle of rational and reasoned argument. The communal/conversational framework
stipulates that such reasoned and rational argument will not be a primary feature of
deliberation, but will instead focus on personal narratives and communal issues. Given
the centrality of the reasoned argument principle, it is paramount here to review literature
that has explored individuals’ abilities to argue in group settings. This includes
literatures on argument, conversation, and everyday reasoning. As will be evident, these
literatures call into question the ability of citizens to argue on public policy with much
sophistication, and instead suggest that deliberation will be characterized by discourse
only partially reasoned, generally argumentative, and highly experiential, consistent with
the communal/conversational framework presented in this dissertation.
Argumentation
Argument in conversation is a complex state of reason-giving in the form of
assertions, announcements, and invitations to agreement that are given some kind of
response, either an acknowledgment, agreement, disagreement, or counter-assertion
(Coulter, 1990). The assertions made by speakers can vary from simple expressions of
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thought and feelings to complex statements containing arguments tailored to the specific
social context (O’Keefe, 1988). According to this literature the arguments in deliberative
utterances can exhibit a number of features. Based on a Toulminian model,
argumentative utterances can contain a claim, and, at the very least, data for that claim,
although a number of other elements can come into play, including warrants that help
describe the relevance of the data to the claim, and qualifiers, which state under what
circumstances a claim is valid (Toulmin, 1958). There are also different types of data, or
evidence for the claim. Evidence can be a simple co-occurrence of facts, or correlation of
events, through assumption or analogy (Kuhn, 1991; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca,
1969). Evidence can also take the form of facts or anecdotal evidence such as stories and
narratives (Baesler, 1997; Fisher, 1987; Schiffrin, 1990).
Responses, too, extend in complexity beyond simple agreement and disagreement.
Responses can contain counter-arguments or rebuttals, pointing out causal insufficiencies
or necessities (Kuhn, 1991). Jackson and Jacobs (1980) describe argument in terms of
such claim and rebuttal “adjacency pairs.” Disagreement in adjacency pairs can occur
from either withholding agreement as to the truth of the claim (propositional
disagreement) or because the claim is otherwise inappropriate (performative
disagreement). Given the speaker’s assessment of the rhetorical situation, she or he can
initiate a range of strategies designed to avoid disagreement. Argument can be viewed in
two ways, as a specific dialogic act that includes at least one protagonist and one
antagonist, or as a larger process that may not contain an antagonist, although in this
second sense, arguments are usually still framed with an antagonist in mind (Antaki,
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1994; Jacobs, 1989; Meyers, 1998). Argument, then, is “both system (regularized,
observable patterns of interactive argument) and structure (the virtual unobservable rules
and resources undergirding argumentative interaction)” (Meyers et al., 1991).
Although many of these insights into the nature of argumentation were derived
from close textual analyses of argument in practice, a number of qualifications make it
unlikely that such elements would be present in deliberation. First, the “text” in which
such argumentative attributes were examined are different from deliberation. Kuhn
(1991) essentially prodded her participants to provide evidence, causal theories, counter
arguments and rebuttals, for example, asking of each participant “someone disagrees with
you...what might they say to show that you are wrong?” (p. 146). In another example,
the textual artifacts were “decision-making discussions,” typically on non-political
hypothetical situations (see Meyers, et al. 1991). Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969)
and Toulmin (1958) studied primarily jurisprudential discourse, a more technical style of
discourse than deliberation. While the insights of these authors should not be
understated, most argumentation theory and research has not yet investigated the
tendency to provide such argumentative structures in citizen-based political deliberations.
The possible exception is Antaki (1985), who, in studying open-ended, semi-structured
interviews about political issues, found that individuals do in fact make arguments using
data, claims, and warrants. However, even for his group of elite deliberators (university
professors who were members of their own political party), the discourse was
characterized by causal explanations that on average contained only a few paths
(essentially, the number of distinct data used for each claim).
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Indeed, the literature on argumentation suggests that most citizens have at best a
generalized argumentative/reasoning ability. Not only do people tend to be
“unexceptionally capable” when it comes to argumentation, they also tend to have
relatively equal abilities across individuals. Although the studies are few, a number of
scholars find similar patterns when it comes to the ability o f individuals to use rhetorical
language, argumentation, or reasoning abilities, that is, that these abilities formulate
mostly during adolescence but flatten out in adulthood. Clark and Delia (1976), for
example, found a general improvement over time in children’s ability to use persuasive
strategies, but that these abilities leveled off starting around the ninth grade. Other
scholars have found similar results with education levels on reasoning abilities (Gettys
and Engleman, 1983; Perkins, 1985). Although there are few studies with which to make
an assessment, the studies reported thus far suggest that most adults are similarly capable
at producing the type of reasoning and rhetorical statements that might occur in
deliberation.
Additionally, individuals seem to be similarly capable at a level that can be
described as average at best. Antaki (1985), as mentioned, reported a study in which
university professors who just formed a new political party in England talked politics in
open-ended semi-structured interviews. An analysis of the transcripts found that multiple
causation (more than one type of information used to support or refute a single claim)
was frequent but also rarely greater than two. Given the elite level of those who
participated in the study, it is unclear at what level average citizens might argue.
However, if we take the positive but unremarkable level of the university professors as a
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ceiling, a citizen’s ability to argue should be average at best. Another perspective is
provided by Ritchie (2000), who argues that the overall level of individuals’
argumentative abilities is unexceptional based on a critique of the findings reported in
Kuhn (1991). Similarly, prior experiments on reasoning tasks suggest that members of
decision-making groups play passive roles, failing to elaborate poorly warranted claims
and rarely exposing poor judgment (Gouran, 1986; Gouran and Hirokawa, 1986).
The literature on argumentation, in sum, provides a great deal of evidence for a
number of argumentative models that people may or may not use with frequency in real
life. As my critiques of the models presented in this section should make apparent, there
are many reasons to believe that individuals rarely if ever reach the normative standard of
reasoned argument. Furthermore, as I have noted, none of the studies of argumentation
reviewed here use deliberation as their textual artifact or as the setting for their artifacts.
Such studies thus provide a useful starting point but only go so far toward shedding light
on what actual deliberation by ordinary citizens would look like. Nevertheless, all
indications are that deliberation will not be significantly marked by rational,
argumentative discourse on matters of public policy, given that studies of situations
where such features were more likely to occur did not display such attributes.
The communal/conversational alternative to a rational framework of deliberation
is one that focuses on narrative elements (Fisher, 1987). According to Fisher,
communication is guided by four main principles: 1) humans are storytellers, 2) the
paradigmatic mode of communication is good reasons, 3) good reasons are guided by
history, biography, culture and character, and 4) rationality is defined by whether a
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narrative contains good reasons and consistency. The narrative paradigm is important
because it claims that individuals need not possess sophisticated, expert knowledge and
argumentative abilities. All that is required is a logic of good reasons, what he calls
narrative fidelity and probability.
Other scholars also provide support for the principle of narration. In a study of
the relative effects of story and statistical evidence, Baesler (1997) found, contrary to
expectations, that story evidence was as persuasive as statistical evidence, while being far
more readable and personable. Furthermore, Schiffrin (1990) finds that stories are a
primary argumentative force in providing testimonials for various positions and opinions.
As such, story-based evidence may be far more pervasive in face to face political
dialogue than more rational policy-based argument.
Conversation
The literature on conversation further calls into question the reasoned argument
principle of the rational/instrumental model. Wardaugh (1985), for example, claims that
ordinary conversation is marked by the acceptance of uncertainty and contradictory
information, and that interlocutors in conversation more often than not implicitly accept
what others say. Such realities are incompatible with a high level of argumentative and
reasoning ability, which would instead hold that individuals challenge contradictions and
critique others’ statements carefully. In addition, Eisenstat (1984) offers three different
and contrasting styles of potential conversational discourse: serious public discourse,
sociable interaction, and the legendary style. The legendary style, argues Eisenstat, is
prevalent in group discussions. This style is characterized by the blending of facts and
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interpretations into a dramatic and satisfying narrative. From the conversational
perspective then, we would further expect deliberation to be characterized by both
generalized argumentative ability and the use of narration.
In addition, the conversational paradigm offers a number of important maxims.
Grice (1975) specifically posited the cooperative principle and the maxims of manner,
relation, quantity and quality. The maxim of manner dictates that utterances avoid
obscurity, ambiguity, and are brief and orderly. The maxim of relation states that
utterances be relevant to the ongoing exchange. The maxim of quantity indicates that
utterances are only as informative as is required for the purposes of exchange, and the
maxim of quality states that conversationalists do not say what they believe to be false.
McCann and Higgins (1992) take these rules further still, providing a list of
conventions undertaken by interlocutors. Specifically, communicators take recipients’
characteristics into account, try to be understood, give neither too much nor too little
information, are relevant, appropriate to the context, and convey the truth as they see it.
On the other hand, recipients also take the communicator’s characteristics into account,
determine the communicator’s intent, take context into account, and try to understand the
message.
These “rules” of conversation appear parsimonious considering the nature and
goals of deliberation. Part normative and part garnered from observation, the rules
facilitate the creation of close contact among citizens, reciprocity, and an economy of
moral disagreement in deliberation. By being relevant, appropriate, and by conveying
their perceived truth, citizens must be accountable and open to each other in attempting to
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provide fair reasons for their positions. Together, the maxims and principles suggest that
individuals will provide only a minimum level of reasonableness required for their
arguments. The maxim of quantity, for example, argues that people will not provide
unnecessary information. Nevertheless, people will try to stay on topic and be relevant to
the topic, as stated in the cooperative principle and maxims of relation and manner.
However, other aspects of conversation imperil the attainment of the normative
features of deliberation. Implicit in talk are a number of tendencies, according to
Wardaugh (1985). These include the tendency to accept uncertainty and contradictions,
to go along with others, to accept statements implicitly at face value, and to accept others
as they wish to appear. Such tendencies are troublesome if the goal of deliberation is to
explore issues thoroughly. Indeed, deliberation must resist these tendencies, and instead
challenge and explore uncertainties and contradiction and resist the inclination to accept
statements at face value.
Thus, the literature can call into question some principles of the
rational/instrumental framework but not others. Specifically, while participants will in all
likelihood be reasonable and relevant (leading to openness and engagement), the
literature on conversation calls into question the ability of citizens to engage in rational
argumentative deliberation.
Reasoning
Social psychology offers a different tack on deliberation from research on
conversation and argument, for while these two latter areas of study are concerned with
what is said, social psychology is primarily concerned with what is thought, or what
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occurs within the mind. Instead of the ability to argue, social psychologists are more
concerned with the ability to reason. Of course, because it is not possible to test directly
what occurs in the mind of an individual3, social psychologists must operationalize what
they want to study, and in most cases that means looking at the spoken or written word,
that is, arguments and conversations. As such, the general argument in the literature on
reasoning is no different that that o f argumentation and conversation.
Studies on everyday reasoning and logic have to some extent explored the ability
of citizens to argue in everyday conversation and other texts. This literature suggests that
while elements of reasoning will be evident in deliberation, they will not be ubiquitous.
Scholars have defined two kinds of reasoning: formal and informal. Given the
“conversationality” of deliberation and indications of general and rather unsophisticated
argumentative features, it is likely that informal or everyday reasoning is prevalent in
deliberation. Galotti (1989) argues that everyday reasoning takes place on “ill-defined
problems” (p. 334), that is, problems that lack at least one of the following features:
baseline information, legal moves or operations, or fully specified goal states.
Deliberation, as with political discussion in general, is often lacking pertinent information
and is afforded only vague end-states. Furthermore, deliberation and everyday reasoning
have both been described as situations in which problems are not self contained, where
there are typically several potentially valid answers and no established procedures for
solving any particular problem. Furthermore, as with many political issues, everyday

3 In this sense, “opinion” is similarly a phenomenon that can only be measured indirectly (Schiffrin, 1990).
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reasoning takes place under conditions in which there may not be a “best” solution
(Galotti, 1989). Reasoning is integrally linked to argumentation as it is the “primary
interactive activity” (Meyers et al., 1998, p. 263) of argumentation. The central question,
then, is whether citizens can achieve deliberation marked by critical discourse that is
logical and reciprocal under such conditions.
A number of scholars challenge the notion that people engage in rational
argumentation where opinions become shaped and reshaped in the context of
accountability and reciprocity. Joseph Schumpeter (1942) was perhaps the most vocal
opponent of the idea that citizens can engage in sophisticated political talk. Schumpeter
argued that citizens are generally “impatient of long or complicated argument” (p. 249)
and believed that, for the average citizen, “mere assertion, often repeated, counts more
than rational argument” (p. 257). Even if citizens are given accurate and relevant
information, their ability to deliberate in a rational manner may be unaffected. As argued
by Schumpeter (1942), irrational decision making will still persist even in the face of
education intended to teach individuals to use information in a deliberative
communication environment. Based on his own survey-based research on the selfreported willingness and ability of citizens to engage in public discussion, Scheufele
(1999) ultimately agreed that, with regard to political deliberation, “an informed and
rational citizen does not exist” (p. 25). Furthermore, Braine (1978) argued that “people
regularly omit premises, and rarely fully explicate the validity of positions they hold” (p.
19). Individuals often access and use only a fraction of the knowledge they possess on
any particular topic (Perkins, 1985) and fail to explore hypotheses thoroughly when
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exploring a range of topics (Gettys and Engleman, 1983). Individuals also “selectively
misperceive socially supplied political information,” due in part to the pressures of the
social context, a context that often supplies one sided, incomplete, and only partially
pertinent political information (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987). To complicate matters
further, misinformation in conversational and argumentative contexts may be presented
with absolute certainty. Indeed, there is evidence that those who are wrong are often
more certain than those who are right (Fishcoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1977). Research
suggests that people “overweight” influential individuals, increase their commitment to a
position in response to counterfactual evidence, and continue to preserve beliefs after
support for them has been totally discredited (Perkins, 1985). In his own research,
Perkin’s findings “offer no reason to view students as especially competent at informal
reasoning” (p. 567). In short, as argued by Perkins, “once the reasoner has evolved a
simple mental model with no ostensible flaws, he or she is not likely to critique the model
deliberately or consider alternative models” (p. 568). Like the literature on
argumentation, then, the literature of reasoning suggests that individuals will not exhibit
highly rational or well reasoned arguments in deliberation.
Thus, with regard to what deliberative participants say and how they say it, the
literature on argumentation, conversation, and everyday reasoning strongly suggests that
the principle of reasoned and rational argument, especially on public policy issues, will
not likely be a common feature of deliberative dialogue. Instead, the communal nature of
the participants (if they are indeed found to be civic identifiers) should lead to discussions
marked by individual experience and communal narratives. Although argument and
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overt reasoning should still be present in deliberation, they will likely not be prevalent
features and indeed utterances containing such features should be in the minority.
Who Says What?
While the previous question looks at deliberation as an aggregate phenomenon,
the question of who says what refocuses on the individual level. This question is
important because the rational/instrumental framework states that individuals with high
levels of political sophistication will be best able to offer concise and rational arguments
in deliberation. The rational/instrumental framework also again stipulates that
individuals will be roughly equal in how much is said. Again, the
communal/conversational framework does not offer any contradiction of this later
principle but does take issue with the first, arguing instead that those who are most
practiced in political conversation will not only talk more often in deliberation but on a
wider variety of topics and with greater sophistication.
Equality
Perhaps the most basic facet of deliberation that demands further exploration is
the degree to which some individuals speak out and others do not. The predilection to
speak is an important gauge of the equality principle of deliberation. At the heart of the
equality principle is simply the requirement that individuals be given an equal
opportunity to contribute to the deliberation at hand. Yet equality is not only granted by
the structure of deliberation itself. It is also a gradually unfolding process in
conversational practice that can be affected by both individual and social factors. The
political power of the individual is not exerted by simply showing up at an organized

43

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

deliberation, but is rather measured by how much that person contributes (Sanders,
1997). As such, investigating whether there are systematic variations in the proclivity to
speak is a central and critical research question. Furthermore— assuming that variations
do exist— which factors account for them? There is, for example, variation in the
individual factors that prior research has tied to the self-reported willingness to speak,
such as knowledge, education, and personal opinion positions. There are also social
factors, factors that only come into play when one encounters others in political dialogue.
From conversation analysis to survey-based research on political talk, factors such as
perceived self-placement on an issue in comparison to others have been found to affect
the willingness to speak.
In exploring the tenability of the principle of equality, it is crucial to uncover the
proclivity of individuals to speak out in deliberation. If some individuals speak out
significantly more than others, or if the conversation is dominated by a select few,
deliberation in practice may not attain this principle. If so, it is useful to not only find the
disparity but to be able to explain the disparity based upon a range of individual
characteristics. Furthermore, it is important to understand the social characteristics that
might affect the disposition to speak.
The equality principle is most important when considering the concerns raised by
Sanders (1997). Sanders claims that “real deliberation is likely to under represent exactly
those who need representation the most...Even if these people show up, they are likely to
be seen as the least persuasive, to be discounted more frequently” (p. 349). Furthermore,
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deliberation may give rise to prejudice and privilege if such individuals lack an effective
voice.
A similar criticism has been levied by Young (1996) and Bohman (1996). Young
argues that persuasiveness is a concept that has been culturally constructed, and as such,
is suspect to hegemony by the majority. Our sense of what is persuasive, argues Young,
is what is most logical, rational, and dispassionate. As such, certain types of individuals,
those who are most likely to talk with these characteristics, will be seen as more
persuasive. Scholars are most concerned with racial and gender differences in this
regard. Bohman (1996) makes a similar argument by outlining three types of inequalities
in deliberation: opportunities, resources, and capabilities, otherwise termed political,
communicative, and public capacities. Cultural imperialism places inequalities on
cultural or political capabilities, as the arguments of minorities must be expressed in the
language of the majority.
These concerns, however alarming, do not bear the weight of empirical evidence,
but rather stand merely as theoretical possibilities. As stated by Dryzek (2000),
The force of all these criticisms of deliberation remain something of an open
question pending sustained empirical investigation of the degree to which the
claims about what actually happens in deliberation actually do describe reality.
Are particular kinds of people in reality better than others at arguing in rational
terms?...Is an individual’s capacity to deliberate really directly proportional to
social standing? (pp. 59-60).
Thus, we see the importance of exploring the question of equality, even if the alternative
model of deliberation I am proposing here has no qualm with this tenet of the
rational/instrumental framework of deliberation. Again, the divergence between the two
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expectation frameworks with regard to who says what lies in whether there are individual
discrepancies in the level of sophisticated talk and where such differences reside in terms
of individual level data.
Argument in Deliberation
Although the previous question raised concerns over whether individuals argue
and argue well in deliberation, the present question looks at the differential capabilities of
argumentation in deliberation between individuals. Just as knowledge, education, gender,
and other variables may significantly determine disparities in the overall amount of
deliberative talk, similar disparities may also exist with regard to the degree to which
individuals are capable of sophisticated discourse. With a general (if not just short of
complete) lack of prior empirical data, however, we cannot be certain of these potential
relationships without further study. However, as prior literature makes clear, there are
again two main suspects with regard to the ability and proclivity to argue in political
deliberations. The rational/instrumental framework argues that only those high in
political sophistication, as measured by knowledge, interest, and education, are proficient
and prolific in deliberation. The communal/conversational framework, on the other hand,
stipulates that it is not knowledge and education that predicts deliberative capabilities, but
rather deliberation, in a sense, in and of itself. Put another way, political conversation
should be a powerful and important predictor of further political conversation, especially
deliberation.
The first argument, that more sophisticated individuals, typically measured by
levels of knowledge, education, or interest are more capable of deliberation or
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argumentation is indirectly supported by a number of studies. More interested people,
those in “issue publics,” clearly have more knowledge and, some argue, are thus more
able to use their factual knowledge in political conversation (Judd and Krosnick, 1989;
Wegman, 1994). Another argument for this possibility contains three premises. First,
people with less neutral stances on political issues are generally more likely to offer their
opinions to others (or, individuals ambivalent toward a political issue have less reason to
voice an opinion on that issue). Second, attentive public and issue public members are
far more likely to have non-neutral opinions on a topic (Krosnick & Telhami, 1995).
Finally, members of the attentive and issue publics are those, in comparison to the rest of
the public, high in education, knowledge, and interest (Krosnick & Telhami 1995). By
reversing the order of the premises, the argument can be made that individuals high in
knowledge, education, and interest will be more prolific in deliberation. A different but
also relevant argument for the relationship between sophistication and deliberation comes
from studies of informal reasoning. Perkins, Allen, & Hafner (1983), for example, find
that everyday reasoning, what they call a “make sense epistemology,” is dependent upon,
in addition to other variables, a large store of knowledge and the ability to utilize such
knowledge. Similarly, Galotti (1998) found in her review of the literature that everyday
reasoning is based on three factors, including breadth and depth of knowledge, low bias
in searching for arguments, and finally, a sophisticated integration of knowledge.
Politically knowledgeable individuals, then, should not only speak more
frequently because of their larger repertoire of knowledge and ability to apply it to
deliberations, but should also exhibit a wider range of utterance types. They should
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create utterances that exhibit well reasoned opinions, containing the three elements of a
deliberative opinion, factual, evaluative, and preference statements (Ehninger &
Brockriede, 1963). But in addition, knowledgeable (as well as educated and highly
conversational) individuals should also provide “modifiers” that is, single element
insertions including bits of relevant knowledge, agreement tokens, and supporting
narratives. Since they have more concretized or crystallized opinions (Tesser, 1978) they
will be more willing to agree or disagree with the various positions taken by others. Such
individuals are also generally more fluent in public speaking, presenting to others, and
taking part in collective decision making (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, & Nie, 1993).
Second, given the greater breadth of their knowledge, these individuals will also be better
able to insert relevant facts into a conversation. While individuals low in some forms of
knowledge may still be knowledgeable on some topics, highly knowledgeable individuals
have greater breadth of knowledge, and are thereby able to contribute to the dialogue on
many more of the topics under consideration.
Other sophistication measures have also been shown to be associated with various
measures of talk. Cognitive complexity, a measure strongly associated with education, is
significantly related to levels of appeal justification (essentially, the use of persuasive
rhetorical communication) and the number of data found in such justifications (O’Keefe
& Delia, 1979). Education, Emler and Frazer (1999) argue, should be strongly correlated
with the volume and complexity of information exposure and role taking opportunities in
conversation.
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In addition, Scheufele (1999), as mentioned, defines two types of political
discussion, opinion expression and political talk, both of which can arise in deliberation.
Opinion expression was predicted by the perception of popular support, education,
personal issue stance, and age, while political talk was associated with high political
knowledge and political participation. Finally, such factors not only affect how one
argues, but also the likelihood that one will argue at all. To cite one study, Lasorsa
(1991) found, using survey-based data, that political outspokenness had substantively
significant associations with education, age, newspaper readership, opinion certitude,
self-efficacy, and political interest.
On the other hand, there is some evidence to suggest that such variables might not
have significant impact, at least in the realm of informal reasoning. Perkins (1985) found
that postprimary education levels had little impact on informal reasoning. Perkins
specifically asked participants in his study to consider a number of public issues “not
demanding extensive knowledge” to develop positions and supporting arguments. The
dependent variables of interest were the number of sentences, lines of argument,
objections, explanations, and judges ratings of the arguments made. While IQ was a
significant predictor of these measures, age and, more importantly, education were not.
In other studies, everyday reasoning achieved weak associations or null effects to various
measures of intelligence (Ceci & Liker, 1986; Wager & Sternberg, 1986). While some
evidence supports the sophistication to deliberation argument of the rational/instrumental
framework, the evidence is far from substantive and convincing. In short, it is indirect
evidence at best, and inconsistent as well.
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The communal/conversational framework argues that political conversation rather
than political sophistication is a precursor to deliberative capability. Consider the
argument for the importance of deliberation: Virtually every deliberative theorist has
argued that deliberation is essential in order to formulate opinions and preferences
(Barber, 1994; Benhabib, 1996; Fishkin, 1991; Fishkin & Luskin, 1999; Gutmann, 1993;
Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Deliberation imparts information and exposes individuals
to a broad spectrum of opinions (Benhabib, 1996). Deliberation encourages the
articulation of interests (Barber, 1984). Deliberation, in short, provides individuals the
opportunity to form and hold articulate opinions. Seen as one form of political talk, this
argument can be extended to all sorts of political talk. As such, it seems more than
reasonable that the more individuals talk about politics, the more articulate their interests,
opinions, and knowledge become, and thus the more capable they are at voicing their
interests, opinions, and knowledge in future political discussions.
Indeed, the vast literature on critical thinking supports this argument (see Paul,
1992). And many political theorists agree. As Lasch (1995) notes, those who talk about
politics will exhibit more structured and organized arguments during deliberation,
because individuals high in political conversation have had more opportunities to utter
their opinions and defend them in public:
It is only by subjecting our preferences and projects to the test of debate that we
come to understand what we know and what we still need to learn. Until we have
to defend our opinions in public, they remain...half-formed convictions based on
random impressions and unexamined assumptions (p. 170).
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Again, this is the argument made by Dewey in The Public and Its Problems
(1954): Communication with others begets more articulate communication. As Dewey
states, “No man or mind was emancipated by being left alone” (p. 168). In fact, Dewey
argues not that knowledge creates the ability to speak, but instead that “knowledge is a
function o f association and communication” (p. 158, italics mine). Although there is little
empirical evidence one way or another on this claim, researchers do find, at least in the
same discussions, that initial utterances are sometimes crude but are often followed by
more sophisticated utterances, as the speaker’s opinions become more concretely formed
(Scott & Lyman, 1968). Furthermore, Lalljee and Evans (1998) and Emler (1990) found
a strong association between the organization of attitudes and political conversation.
Additionally, Robinson and Levy (1986) found that political conversation was a
significant predictor of comprehending political information from the media. Thus, it
may be political conversation, rather than political sophistication, that is most important
when it comes to the ability to effectively argue in political deliberations.
Chapter five, then, will focus primarily on two principles of deliberation, equality
and reasoned argument. As such, the focus will move away from analyses on the
character of deliberation and toward individual propensities to speak and argue on many
topics in a deliberative setting, providing a number of tests of both the principles and
expectation frameworks of deliberation presented here.
How Does It Affect Them?
The final question, how does deliberation affect those who participate in
deliberation, has been of substantial interest to researchers within the
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rational/instrumental paradigm. This question is in fact the primary reason why this
framework is “instrumental,” since it posits that deliberation serves as an instrument by
which participators can become fully informed citizens and thus deliberation, as a
deliberative poll, can serve as an instrument by which a fully informed public opinion can
be cultivated (Fishkin, 1991,1996). Despite claims of substantive opinion change,
knowledge gains, and efficacy gains, studies of deliberation within the
rational/instrumental framework suffer from a number of methodological criticisms. The
communal conversational framework offers a different account of effects, stating that the
most important effect of deliberation is to catalyze conversation, creating a two-step flow
of communication starting with deliberators and ending with other members of the polity.
Prior Empirical Findings of Deliberative Effects
Perhaps the most powerful effect of deliberation found thus far is that it
substantively improves political knowledge (Fishkin and Luskin, 1999). In eight o f the
eleven knowledge questions asked in their survey, participants in Fishkin’s National Issue
Forums increased their aggregate score as little as 6 percent and as high as 58 percent.
However, these findings do require some qualification. Despite recording as much as 58
percent improvement, the median question improvement between pre- and post-survey
questions was seven percent. Also, the study design upon which this evidence is based is
limited on a number of issues. First, the design did not include a control group and as
such there was no empirical evidence that the participants improved any differently than
non-participants. Second, many of the answers to the questions asked in the surveys
could be found in the briefing materials given to the participants. Thus it might not
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necessarily be the actual deliberative act that accounted for the reported improvements in
knowledge. In addition, Fishkin did not report whether the items adequately scaled
together, and thus whether a scaled measure exhibited a significant increase in knowledge
in aggregate. Last, the battery of knowledge questions were identical from pre- to post
panel waves, raising the concern that prior exposure inflated the numbers found in the
second wave of the panel. Separately these concern do not carry much weight: Together
they question the validity of the findings.
Confirmatory evidence comes by way of the present project. An earlier report on
the Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact project showed knowledge to be significantly
and positively associated with participation in deliberation (Labrie, 2000). This finding is
of particular importance in that the study design did not suffer from the concerns just
raised with regard to the NIC. First, the panels in the present project did not contain
identical knowledge questions. And although the surveys of this project did not ask
significantly more knowledge items than did the surveys of the NIC, the items were
scaled together to produce on overall test of knowledge, aiming for breadth rather than
specific single items. In addition, rather than simply measure the amount of pre- to post
panel change that occurred, Labrie's analysis compared participants to non-participants,
specifically to individuals who declined to participate. Finally, the surveys themselves
were conducted almost one year apart from one another, minimizing the chance that the
first test affected the second. Given the same consistent findings despite serious
differences in their respective designs, the conclusion to be drawn by the data is that
deliberation indeed improves a citizen’s level of political knowledge.
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A second effect of deliberation found by Fishkin is concerned with political
efficacy. Fishkin argues that efficacy should change since deliberation is designed not
only to improve knowledge and potentially induce opinion change but also to change
attitudes, specifically, political attitudes toward political objects. Fishkin finds weak but
consistent findings for all but one question regarding political efficacy.4 Fishkin and
Luskin did not report any attempt to scale the separate efficacy items together.
Additionally, there is some question in my mind as to the direction of deliberative effects
on efficacy. The simple explanation for a positive effect, of course, is that deliberation is
an empowering practice, enhancing citizens’ perceptions that they are part of an active
polity. Certainly, this explanation has strong face value. However, in a rich textual study
of political conversation, Eliasoph (1998) found, in a sense, just the opposite.
Deliberation, she found, was marked by the “cynical chic.” Indeed, the more public the
setting, the less efficacious and proactive citizens seemed to be. Without invalidating
Fishkin’s findings, Eliasoph’s research does provide a counterhypothesis, suggesting that
deliberation can actually decrease efficacy by creating a “collective cynicism.”
Finally, Fishkin and Luskin report consistent net and gross opinion change in the
participants of the NIC. Again, however, there are many challenges to these findings.
Despite nearly four days of deliberation, Fishkin found that only 25% of relevant
opinions changed. Given the instability of political opinions, that is, the existence of
nonattitudes (Converse, 1964), and the lack of a control group in Fishkin’s quasi-

4 “I have no say in government,” “Officials care about what I think,” “Politics are too complicated (not
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experiment (Tringali, 1996), it is unclear whether the participants would have changed
their positions without having deliberated at all. Another concern was the Hawthorne
effect, that is, that drastic changes in social conditions of the participants may have
introduced uncontrollable effects in the experiment. Scholars have argued that the
abundant attention paid to the participants (a free plane trip to Austin, free lodging, and
national media attention) necessarily changed them in ways that could not be controlled.
In the words of Adair (1996), participants
know this is a novel experiment, and that its success depends on their behavior.
They will be highly sensitive to cues to guide their responses. Will the evidence
they are to judge be truly balanced, or will subtle expectancies be transmitted? In
short, will they respond normally “on stage,” independent of any bias, or be
susceptible to the pressures known to produce social artifacts? (p. 16).
It should also be noted that many o f the effects Fishkin found were short lived.
The study called for a survey of the participants a few weeks and also a few months after
the deliberations. The majority of the effects Fishkin found were in the short term:
When surveyed later many individuals fell back to their pre-deliberation levels (Rasinski,
2000). Thus, although Fishkin and colleagues have produced a substantive amount of
evidence regarding the effects of deliberation within the rational/instrumental framework,
these effects are still in question because of the rather large body o f methodological
concerns raised regarding his research.

significant),” “Politicians are out o f touch,” and “I have worthy political opinions.”
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Communal/Conversational Deliberative Effects
The effects found by Fishkin were generated in the first place from a particular
conceptualization of deliberation and specifically of how deliberation serves a democratic
function. I have typified this perspective as the rational/instrumental framework of
deliberation. In brief, Fishkin’s (1995, Fishkin and Luskin, 1999) rationale for such
effects is an outgrowth of the following premises designed to justify deliberation as an
important democratic practice. Americans know little about politics (Converse, 1964;
Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1987, Price, 1998). This is important because
democracy has long been premised upon an informed and engaged citizenry (Dahl,
1998). Fishkin argues that deliberation is a panacea for democracy, then, primarily by
informing the public. But of course, deliberation cannot occur in numbers large enough
to create an informed public. What, then, is the solution? Deliberation must somehow
extend beyond its participants if it is to in any way significantly influence the democracy
in which it is situated. Fishkin’s answer is two-fold. First, given the general
representativeness of its participants, polls of participants, post-deliberation, can provide
us with the opinions of the larger public as if that larger public was indeed fullyinformed, infused with knowledge through deliberation. Second, Fishkin envisages
deliberative events as magnets for media coverage, and in this way, the discussions of
actual citizens (hopefully) can be summarized to the larger public.
Both of these “extensions” of deliberation are premised on the oft-cited
expectation of deliberation to produce “better answers” (Gunderson, 2000) or citizenbased political decisions (Barber, 1994; Benhabib, 1996). What has never been pointed
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out, however, is how this assumption of “group decisions” is in conflict with notions of
what conversation is supposed to do. This model sees conversation as an “end-practice”
of democracy, in the face of many indications that it may in fact serve best as the first
practice.
The communal/conversational expectation framework of deliberation, in contrast,
views public opinion as a communicative process (Price, 1992), and considers
deliberation to be not an end.(the last act before decision-making) but a mean, that is, a
process which improves the ability to make political decisions. As stated by Price and
Roberts (1987),
Others give us an idea of what range of opinions will be acceptable; they help us
to rethink our own views. Discussion shapes not only evolving public opinion but
private opinions as well...Opinions must be seen as developing over time. They
are the ongoing product of discursive activity...Opinions are formed through a
continuing dialectic between thought and behavior (p. 789).
Thus if deliberation is seen as a formalized type of discussion, we can view deliberation
as having a role at any place in the formation of opinion. Opinion formation is a
continuous process in which deliberation can serve at any point to refine views and
inform citizens, where “decisions” are not made but through which opinions become
more refined.
A potential problem with this view is that it does not extend to those who do not
participate. However, there is one possible way the opinion formation process may
extend beyond the deliberative event, one unlike the two methods posited by Fishkin, the
deliberative poll and media coverage of deliberative events: Increased conversation in the
polity at large, spurred on by those who participated in deliberation. As the common
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maxim goes, answering one question often leads to many more. Deliberation is an event
where citizens come into contact with many other citizens, giving participants a unique
and immersive chance to be exposed to the diversity of opinions and information held by
others, opinion and information to which they may not have ever been exposed. “People
do not necessarily end up seeing eye to eye on a conversational topic after debating it,”
argue Price and Roberts (1987), “but they come away from discussion with a better
understanding how other people think” (p. 798).
Ultimately, deliberation can be a major event in one’s political life. Is there any
better instance in which we could hope for conversation to produce further political
conversation? Deliberation can and should serve as an event that gives the polity
something to talk about. If conversation is seen as a means and not an end, such an effect
satisfies important central normative requirements of democracy, for it can help catalyze
the formation of public opinion. Placed within the setting of a political campaign, the
effect can further be enhanced since political campaigns themselves serve as events
where political conversation is highly stimulated5 (Waldman, 2000).
Why would we want to infuse the polity with greater conversation? Of course,
because conversation leads to greater knowledge and more opportunities for opinion
formation. Indeed, conversation, as opposed to the media, has been found to account for
as much as half of the political knowledge held by individuals in self-reported surveys
(Robinson, 1967). As mentioned in the introduction, political conversation is an

5 At least near election day.
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important part of democracy, leading to the formation o f public opinion, a political
education, communal contact, and political information. Considering that the overall
levels of political conversation of Americans is low (Robinson, 1976; Troldahl & Van
Dam, 1966; Waldman, 2000), anything that might increase its frequency would be
welcome.
Deliberation As a Trigger of the Two-Step Flow of Political Conversation
The communal/conversational framework of deliberation posits that deliberation
is important to democracy as a significantly effective means of stimulating political
conversation and thus serving as a catalyst to opinion formation.
This raises the possibility that deliberation sets up a two-step flow (Lazarsfeld,
Berelson, & Gaudet. 1948) of political communication within the American electorate.
The two-step flow of communication, as defined by those who first posited its existence,
is a feature of mass communication where ideas flow from media to opinion leaders and
from opinion leaders to less active segments of the population (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, &
Gaudet, 1948). Thus in order for the two-step flow to occur in deliberation, those who
deliberate must be or act like “centrals” (Weimann, 1982) in a political communication
network. Participants must leave deliberation and act as “opinion-givers” (Robinson,
1976) to those who did not participate.
Although there has been much debate on the two-step flow model of
communication, its basic premise has held in many different studies (Robinson, 1976;
Weimann, 1982,1994). Weimann (1982) found that “most of the flow of information is
carried out by centrally located individuals” (p. 768), even when controlling for
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demographics and other variables (Allen, 1969). In any case, the concerns raised with
regard to the two-step flow do not effect the present study,6 which will in chapter six
present a test of the alternative model of deliberation specifically with regard to levels of
post-deliberation conversation leading to a two-step flow of political information.
Discussion and Summary
Deliberation is a formalized and immersive form of political communication, the
most intense form of political talk across a broad perspective of political contact (see
Waldman, 2000, p. 58). Deliberation has been defined in light of Habermasian principles
of equality, openness, and rationality, leading to what I have been calling the
rational/instrumental framework of deliberation. This model has characterized
deliberation as a normative dialogic act leading to an informed public and rational
citizen-generated public policy decisions. While I have spent considerable space
providing literature that calls into question the rational/instrumental framework, I have
spent less time developing the alternative communal/conversational framework, other
than to provide literature that supports the likelihood of the civic identity as a precursor to
deliberation and literature that supports the potential power of conversational practice in
creating deliberative discourse and conversational deliberative effects. However, there
are additional rationales for this conversational model, which I discuss below.

6 The first of these problems (Weimann, 1982) is ignoring direct flow, meaning the flow straight from news
to non-opinion leaders, which o f course is not a concern for deliberation, and second, ignoring different
stages in the diffusion process, including awareness and interest. Deliberation compresses these steps into
one overarching event.
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According to research on political communication, political talk of any kind a)
has the ability to aid in the formulation and reformulation of public opinion, b) provides a
political education, c) affords communal and political contact, and d) diffuses political
information and opinion. The first of these, advanced by a number of scholars, is that
political communication and deliberation help formulate and reformulate opinion. Lasch
(1995) argues that individuals cannot have informed opinions without first talking.
Before political talk, individuals only have half-formed and vague opinions. Similar
arguments have been made by other scholars (Cooley, 1909; Manin, 1987). Cooley
argued that political contact brings “enlargement,” that individuals are broadened by
coming into relation with others. Even Presidents have come to understand the
importance of political talk in this regard. President Wilson, for example, argued that an
individual “cannot be said to be participating in the making of public opinion at all until
he has laid his mind alongside the minds of his neighbors and discussed with them the
incidents of the day and the tendencies of the time” (in Schudson, 1998).
According to Kim, Wyatt and Katz (1999), the main function of political
communication is to afford citizens to “bridge their personal experiences with the
political worlds out there” (1999, p. 362). This provides some rationale for why we
should even care whether in a democracy there is political talk. According to Mill
(1886), only ordinary citizens could effectively and rightly express their own concerns:
“There must be discussion to show how experience is to be interpreted,” Mill argued.
“Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and
arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it” (p. 27). Thus,
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political conversation is necessary to expose one to both opinions and arguments. It is
necessary so that citizens can transform their experiences into political language and
political concerns.
Other scholars have argued similar positions from different perspectives. For
many, public opinion is defined as a communicative process, where opinion is not merely
an aggregation of individual opinions but a communicative process where “disparate
ideas are expressed, adjusted, and compromised” (Price and Roberts, 1987 , p. 784).
These authors hint strongly at the role deliberation can play as a special form of
communication when they argue that “public opinion is not a simple matter of cognition.
It occurs within groups of communicating people, who together determine what the issue
is, why it is a cause for public concern, and what can be done about it” (pp. 782-783).
“In politics communication makes possible public opinion,” argued Cooley, “ which,
when organized, is democracy” (1909, p. 85).
Political communication, along with deliberation, then, is the primary method by
which opinions are formed and refined. A second function of political communication,
that it provides a political education for those who engage in it, is related to the first.
While most deliberative theorists argue that education must be changed to help
individuals better deliberate, the implication of Lasch’s (1995) position on argumentation
is that it is argument itself that provides this education. Communication is a performative
art. Without denying that including more instruction on debate and discussion within the
schools is an important change to help citizens better talk about politics, the best
education in performative arts comes from practice itself.
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A third function of political communication, and especially deliberation, is that it
provides communal contact with other citizens. As the first function suggests, political
communication “spreads the word” of what other ordinary citizens are thinking. As a
primary activity by which apolitical community is established (Barber, 1984), citizens
“think together” (Price and Roberts, 1987).
Finally, political communication and deliberation serve to spread political
information. As mentioned in the Introduction, if we are so concerned with the lack of
information in the polity, and we strongly believe that conversation imparts information,
then we must see communication as a most important democratic activity. The notion
that communication imparts information has received, as mentioned, strong support
(Benhabib, 1996; Barber, 1984; Fishkin and Luskin, 1999; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996;
Labrie, 2000).
A communications perspective of deliberation then, shares much with the wellestablished rational/instrumental framework, but differs significantly in that it defines
deliberation as a process rather than an event which produces opinions and political
decisions. Rather than an end, deliberation serves individuals no matter where they are in
the opinion formation process. If someone has little experience with an issue,
deliberation can provide that person with the basis on which an opinion may ultimately
be formed. But that formation does not end with deliberation. As wholly embedded in
the process, deliberation is but a stimulant of public opinion, one that, if successful, will
ensure even greater and further discussion after formalized deliberations have ended.
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The communal/conversational perspective is not, of course, in complete contrast
to the normative theoretical literature that has been produced in the past decade. The two
frameworks simply exhibit different expectations along similar lines of thought with
regard to deliberation. The models do differ in significant ways with regard to each of
the four questions presented above. While the rational/instrumental framework posits
that individuals who participate in deliberation do so so that they can affect public policy,
the communal/conversational model states that individuals join deliberations largely to
enact a civic identity, a role as citizen. As to what individuals say and how do they say it,
the traditional model centers on talk of public policy, talk that is largely rational and
characterized by reasoned argument. The alternative model instead claims that
individuals will talk about community issues largely with stories of personal experience.
Furthermore, the alternative framework stipulates that conversationalists are most likely
to speak up in deliberation and speak up in a sophisticated manner, in contrast to
knowledgeable and otherwise politically sophisticated citizens, as posited in the
rational/instrumental framework. Finally, the rational/instrumental framework argues
that deliberation is an instrument with which to create informed citizens, and through the
use of polling, informed public opinion. The communal/conversational framework
argues instead that deliberation will produce more conversive citizens, leading to higher
levels of conversation within the polity. For each area of focus, each chapter, the two
models stress differential levels of importance and centrality. The centrality of rational
argument in one framework is not met with the complete lack of argumentation in the
other. Rather, argument is subsumed under personal narrative, akin to Fisher’s (1987)
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argument that narrative still contains valid inference forms and elements of
argumentation.
Although there have been studies of deliberation with regard to its effects, there
are surprisingly few studies of deliberation as a whole and of course none that have
specifically tested the tenability of the principles upon which the rational/instrumental
framework is based. As such, it was necessary to step back and develop these central
questions to which deliberation could be effectively studied and from which an
assessment of the expectation frameworks could occur. This chapter has discussed each
framework in light of these questions, based not only on the literature of deliberative
democracy but on other relevant literatures including argumentation, conversation
analysis, everyday reasoning, and communication theory. These literatures suggest that
many of the tenets of the rational/instrumental framework may not hold in real
deliberative practice, while there is significant evidence for the communal/conversational
framework of deliberation within each of the four questions I have posited. While the
tenets of the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation may not be prevalent, the
literature nevertheless suggests that they will still be part of deliberation, just under a
different guise, with a different intensity, and for a different purpose. Thus this chapter
had detailed an alternative framework that is not in complete contrast to the
rational/instrumental framework, but rather, again in accordance to what the literature
suggests, refocuses the tenets of the rational/instrumental model into a different frame.
The goal of this dissertation is to test the two frameworks in light of the four
questions detailed in this chapter. Each question will be addressed in a separate chapter,
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followed by a summary chapter assessing the two expectation frameworks and
deliberation as an effective democratic practice. Of course, one must have data with
which to test these questions and frameworks of deliberation. The following chapter
details the data I use for this project, specifically with regard to their generation,
limitations, and general character.
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C h a p te r 2: D eliberative D ata
To fully explore deliberation requires a wide range of diverse data, including data
at different levels of analyses and data designed for different types of analyses. To
explore who participates, it is necessary to have data on all who were asked to participate
in order to make a comparison of participants and nonparticipants. To answer what is
said and who says it requires, furthermore, data on what was said. Finally, the question
of with what effect requires follow up data on the participants of a deliberative event.
For perhaps the first time, all these data were collected in a joint project called Citizen
Voices and The Philadelphia Compact.
Citizen Voices / The Philadelphia Compact
In December 1998, The Philadelphia Inquirer announced a new exercise in public
journalism called Citizen Voices. The Inquirer invited readers and their friends to
participate in the project and published clip-out registration forms in the newspaper. The
main purpose was to have citizens of Philadelphia gather at monthly deliberative forums
to help set the agenda and inform the democratic process for the upcoming 1999
Philadelphia mayor’s race.
In conjunction with this project, the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the
University of Pennsylvania, funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, began a side-by-side,
collaborative project called the Philadelphia Compact. While the goal of the Inquirer
was simply to obtain a sizeable number of participants for Citizen Voices, the
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Philadelphia Compact aimed to produce a group of participants broadly representative of
the city’s population. Participants in the Philadelphia Compact, therefore, were recruited
through a telephone survey, using random digit dialing. The brief survey described the
project and invited all respondents to join. Those who said they were interested in
participating were mailed registration forms, which had to be completed and returned in
order to register as a participant.
In late January, 1999, Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact held their first round
of neighborhood forums, which ranged in size from 10 to 30 participants and focused on
sorting out which issues citizens thought were the most important to Philadelphia.
Moderators at each of the 30 neighborhood forums presented participants with a
hypothetical situation: It is the year 2010, and Philadelphia has just been named the most
livable city in America. How did it get that way? The discussion was free ranging and
diverse, and designed to push participants to uncover the four or five most important
issues with regard to improving the city of Philadelphia as it existed in 1999 to how they
envisioned it in 2010. At the end of these forums, as was the case with all subsequent
forums, Philadelphia Compact participants were paid $10 plus the cost of transportation
and/or childcare.
In February, a second round o f neighborhood forums was conducted, this time
focusing on framing the five issues that citizens agreed in January were the most
important facing the city of Philadelphia. These issues were neighborhood quality, jobs,
education, crime, and government services. Participants were divided into groups, each
focusing on one issue. The goal in February was to define different “choice frameworks”
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for each issue. Participants were specifically asked to create a list of three issues or
concerns pertinent to their specific issue. Moderators gave individuals a chance to voice
their concerns, which were duly written on whiteboards. After a lunch break, participants
returned and broke into smaller groups within their issue to discuss commonalities they
saw in the quite long and detailed list of concerns they had created in the morning
session. As they created a list of two to four common “choice frameworks” they began to
identify specific features of the framework, including the key arguments for and against
each choice, the values undergirding the choices, and the steps that must be taken to
address the problems inherent in each choice. As the larger groups got back together
each small group had a representative talk about the two to four groupings of concerns, or
choice frameworks, that they had created. Finally, the larger group then decided upon
three choices from the two to four choices presented by each smaller group as their final
choice frameworks. For example, the education group created the following three action
choices: scrap the system, sharpen the mission, and repair the connection. Under “scrap
the system” were several general action steps, including a) clarify the mission of the
schools, b) use the available resources to accomplish the mission, and c) hold students
and adults accountable in a genuine way for results. Specifically, this choice called for
establishing rigorous standards for what students should learn, ending social promotions,
making local businesses partners in education, seeking additional resources from
corporations, foundations, and universities, and refocusing of resources on academics and
away from human services and other social needs (which would be shifted to agencies
that specialize in such matters). One key argument for this choice was that schools exist
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to teach children to learn. Teachers are not social workers or police officers but are,
rather, educators who should remain focused on educating children. Each choice then,
had different arguments and different actionable steps that might be taken to improve the
state of education in Philadelphia.
A larger forum in March allowed all Citizen Voices and Philadelphia Compact
participants to hear a number of experts, ranging from journalists to policy analysts, talk
about concerns with crime in Philadelphia. Representatives of the February group also
gathered to refine the choice frameworks for each of the five key issues they had
identified.
Finally, an “issues convention” was held in April. Prior to this convention
participants were sent informational materials including statements made by the
candidates on each issue discussed at the convention and key statistics relevant to the city
of Philadelphia and the issues facing the city. At this final pre-primary-election event,
citizens were divided into small groups, each again focusing on one of the five key issue
areas. Here in the issues convention citizens finally got the chance to argue and
deliberate with each other on the value of the various choice frameworks developed in
prior meetings. Participants discussed the benefits and weakness of the actions and
arguments central to each choice. After a lunch break, each group developed questions
for the candidates. These were used in a subsequent televised candidate debate (among
five democratic contenders who remained on the ballot for the primary), as well as in the
Philadelphia Inquirer as special Citizen Voices features in the editorial section. The
primary election was held in mid-May, 1999. Citizen Voices continued throughout the
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general campaign in the fall as well, but the focus here is solely on the primary election
phase of the project.
A number of data were gathered throughout the project. In December, 1998, a
brief, RDD screening survey was conducted (W=2600) in order to recruit participants for
the Philadelphia Compact. One English-speaking adult (age 18 or older) per household
was interviewed. LHK Partners of Newtown Square, Pennsylvania conducted the
surveys, using interviewers who were trained prior to calling and monitored during the
interviewing. Roughly two thirds of respondents indicated that they were interested in
possibly participating, after receiving a brief description of the project. If they expressed
interest, citizens were sent registration forms in the mail. Only those who sent back the
forms (and, of course, subsequently showed up to at least one of the forums) became
members of the Philadelphia Compact.
In January, a follow up survey was conducted with 819 respondents who had
earlier been contacted during the recruitment. Included were all those who did finally
register as members of the Philadelphia Compact (n=317), plus random subsets of people
who said they were willing to participate but did not send back the registration forms
(n=302); and of those who were unwilling to participate (n=282). At the same time, an
independent RDD sample of 1002 English-speaking adult residents of Philadelphia were
surveyed for purposes of comparison. Also included in this baseline survey were those
who signed up for Citizen Voices through the Inquirer (n=306). Unlike the brief
screening survey used in the recruitment, this survey contained measures of citizens’
interest, knowledge, trust in government, efficacy to politics, issue positions, media
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exposure and political conversation, perceptions of others’ opinions, and many other
variables.
The survey was again conducted by telephone, and was fielded between January 4
and February 28,1999. Each interview generally averaged 30 to 35 minutes in length.
Generally, numbers selected for the sample received up to 15 calls if necessary for a
contact, and some monetary inducements were used, if necessary, to encourage
participants to complete the survey. The cooperation rate (defined by the American
Association for Public Opinion Research as COOP4) was 42%.
After the election, a follow-up survey was conducted and was successful in
recontacting 51% of those who participated in the baseline survey, including 46% of
RDD respondents (n=457), 61% of Citizen Voices (n=188), 53% of the Philadelphia
Compact (n=168), 65% of those who were willing but did not participate («=196), and
53% of those unwilling to participate (n=150). The survey repeated a majority of the
questions included in the baseline survey as well as additional questions pertaining to the
mayor’s race (e.g., advertising awareness, feeling thermometers on the candidates, etc.).
In addition to the pre- and post-panel surveys, paper and pencil surveys were
conducted after each monthly forum. In January, participants were asked general openended questions on their overall satisfaction of the project. The February survey included
media exposure, political conversation and efficacy batteries as well as a battery of
questions on the importance of various issues facing the city of Philadelphia. In March
the pencil and paper format was used to tap into participants sentiments on the
effectiveness of a number of different policy alternatives the city might take to combat
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crime. The April survey included an extensive importance battery on a wide range of
policy alternatives. Each survey also contained open-ended questions on the satisfaction
participants had with the process as well as garnering input as to the effectiveness of the
process and discovering what participants learned, enjoyed and did not enjoy throughout
the process. Except for the April Issue Forum, only Philadelphia Compact members were
asked and required to answer these surveys. Nearly every Philadelphia Compact
participant who attended any given forum filled out the survey. In addition, nearly onethird of the Citizen Voices participants of the April Issues Convention filled out the April
pencil and paper survey.
Finally, the project also employed court reporters to record the February and April
forums, providing thousands of pages of transcripts of citizens deliberations. Additional
insight was also drawn from newspaper accounts of the project.
The data available for analysis from the Citizens Voices / Philadelphia Compact
project are as follows: a) a baseline survey of deliberative participants, individuals who
initially signed up but did not attend, individuals who expressed interest but did not sign
up, individuals who refused, and a RDD sample of Philadelphia residents, b) a post-panel
wave survey of these same groups, c) verbatim transcripts of the February issue framing
session and the April issues convention, and d) pencil and paper surveys from each of the
four events, as well as newspaper coverage of each event. This wealth of data makes it
possible to research each of the four questions detailed in previous chapters. Who says
what and why can be explored by comparing participants with nonparticipants across a
range of variables, in addition to exploring open ended questions of why they participated
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and what they got out of the process. What is said and how is it said can be investigated
by looking at the text itself. This question can be investigated in greater detail,
furthermore, if relevant variables are developed from the text through the application of a
coding instrument to the text. Indeed, the only way to effectively answer the third
question—who says what—is by combining individual-level survey data with individuallevel data generated from the text. The final question regarding effects can of course be
investigated though pre- and post-panel wave information of both participants and non
participants. In summation, the data generated during the project are extensive, but not
complete without applying a coding instrument to the text to generate variables pertinent
to what is said and who says what. As the next section details, this instrument was
developed over some time and based on a number of different literatures, again
employing theories of deliberation, argumentation and conversation.
A Coding Instrument for Deliberation
Because few have looked at the dialogue of deliberation through an empirical
lens, there was little textual precedent from which to develop a coding scheme of
deliberative text. Even if there were a significant literature on coding deliberative events,
limiting the formation of the present instrument from these articles might fall into a trap.
I have detailed this same trap with regard to traditional literatures on deliberation, namely
the relative lack of influence from related literatures like argumentation theory and
conversation analysis. And, developing an instrument solely from theoretical literature
would surely miss a number of nuances found within the text and likely be unreliable.
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Therefore, the coding instrument created for this project was influenced by a
number of literatures, specifically those reviewed in prior chapters. In addition, the
scheme was significantly influenced by the handful of models and/or prior coding
attempts made to similar texts. The first of these is Gunderson’s (2000) modeling of
deliberation as prescriptive, empirical and speculative, based on a similar division by
Aristotle. These terms provide a good basic starting point from which to begin an
operationalization of deliberation, as they roughly divide into the defining o f the present,
the stating of a normative future, and claims of how to get from the present to the future.
The first of these, the defining of the present, can be further broken down into two
elements. Because deliberation is dialogue of public policy, defining of the present can
be made with or without a claim that such a present political reality is problematic and in
need of change. Thus, Gunderson’s theory served as the foundation for creating four
types of statements made in deliberation: a (present) reality claim, a (present) problem, a
future vision, or a solution (a statement that links the present to a normative future). I
start with Gunderson as it is the “central” element in the present scheme.
An alternative model is the Toulminian model based on the claim, data, and
warrant (plus other elements). However, this model was not used directly for a number
of reasons. First, a general version of the Toulminian scheme was applied to the text
without producing any notable results. The problem, one that would guide all of my
efforts at coding the text, is the gap between theory and reality. While it makes great
theoretical sense that argument is comprised of elements such as claims and data, not all
deliberation is argument, and furthermore, the lines between what is argumentative and
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what is conversational are often vague. Finally, the Toulminian scheme itself seemed too
vague for the text: Nearly every statement could be seen as some sort of claim, and it
was often unclear whether a statement (data) was really supporting a claim, and worse
still whether there were any clear cases of warrants. In short, the model did not work but
did point my efforts toward a better scheme, for it indicated first that a successful scheme
must be comprised of argumentative and conversational elements, and second, that the
type of claim, not merely whether something was in fact a claim, was the most important
distinction to be made. Gunderson’s scheme seemed to provide three types of claims,
which I extended to four. In addition, Gunderson’s model was developed not with
argument but with political deliberation (again, as originally conceived by Aristotle) in
mind, thus providing a closer fit from a theoretical standpoint.
For the same reasons, other strictly argumentative schemes did not seem to fit the
text well, including, for example, the well known framework of Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca (1969). Again, their scheme was developed out of studying jurisprudential texts,
not political deliberation. The framework also “suffers” from being too argumentative
and not able to capture specific deliberative moves, both argumentative and
conversational. Rather than using either Toulmin (1958) or Perelman & OlbrechtsTyteca (1969), Meyers et al. (2000) built their scheme on selective ideas from these
authors as well as additional authors (e.g. Jackson and Jacobs, 1980).
However, one aspect of both the Toulminian scheme and the Perelmanian scheme
is prevalent in all of argument, that is, the frequency and necessity of support for the
claims put forward by discussants. But from a coding perspective, the difficulty is still in
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defining what types of statements truly support specific claims. In the text, support
statements were often implicit, calling into question whether the speaker was really using
information for such a purpose. The trick in making things clearer, paradoxically, was in
making them more vague by taking note of Ritchie’s (2000) discussion of knowledge and
argumentation.
Ritchie’s main claim toward argumentation was to recall that argumentation is
dependent upon knowledge. A simple enough statement until one problematizes the
concept of knowledge and how it is used in argument. Ritchie, following a number of
philosophers before him asked where the line is drawn between knowledge and belief.
The typical answer is that knowledge is “true belief, held on valid grounds” (p. 2). What
then, is true or valid? As science developed, truth became known to be not something a
priori, but something observable and built upon evidence, as much as such evidence
could be garnered. Of course, in the social sciences, the quandary is in whether things
are observable, and many have challenged what is even meant by the term observable. In
the end, Ritchie argues that the difference between knowledge and belief is itself just a
belief, what he calls the “belief about beliefs” (p. 6). Similar arguments have also been
made by Schiffrin (1990).
Of course, it is nearly impossible to tell in actual discourse whether someone is
supporting a claim with actual knowledge or just a belief (if such a separation is truly
possible). From a coding standpoint the most reasonable option then was to not even try.
Attempting to do so in the present project lead to unreliable coding variables. Instead, I
decided to call support for or refutation of claims a more, general term, “linked
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information,” ranging from pure, unadulterated belief to the most statistical and technical
evidentiary support. O f course, it is still possible to further define linked information as
separate types, something I will discuss with contributions from other scholars later in the
chapter.
In addition to Gunderson (2000) the present coding instrument was also
influenced by the conversational argument literature (Meyers et al., 1991; Meyers et al.,
2000). The conversational argument paradigm takes a structurational perspective of
argument as embedded in social interaction and is thus reflexive of the rules of social
interaction. Conversational argument also has the benefit of having been tried on actual
discourse, although that discourse was quite limited and very different than political
deliberation. In short, the conversational argument coding scheme was applied to
discussion over hypothetical situations and how the actors in those situations should act
based on the information given on decision-making task discussions (see Kogan &
Wallach, 1964, and Stoner, 1968 for details). The conversational argument paradigm
contains five main elements; arguables, reinforcers, promptors, delimitors, and
nonarguables. Arguables are further defined as potential arguables (essentially, claims),
reason-using arguables (elaborations and responses), and reason-giving arguables
(amplifications and justifications). Reinforcers are essentially agreements while
promptors comprise of objections and challenges.
While useful, their scheme is still unlikely to fit on actual deliberation because it
was again designed to be applied to a different kind of text, although their text appears
much more similar to deliberation than do the texts used in other schemes. Additionally,
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the frequencies of such codes in the research so far suggest that their scheme needed to be
modified to provide a little more parity between variables. Assertions, for one,
comprised of 45 percent of all statements in Meyers et al. (1991). Amplifications,
elaborations, and objections, combined, tallied only one percent of the discourse. The
fourth of their five general categories, delimitors, accounted for only two percent of the
text. Clearly, some respecification of the scheme would improve its fit to conversational
argument, let alone deliberation. The first adaptation made was to break up assertions
into a number of categories. Luckily, as previously argued, the four primary
argumentative elements provided thus far (reality claims, problem definitions, future
visions, and solutions) are four types of assertions. As for the rest of the conversational
argument scheme, a number of elements make theoretical sense and in pilot testing
appeared frequently enough in the text. These “secondary argumentative elements”
include agreements and disagreements, process statements, and elaborations.
Further support for these elements is also provided by Coulter (1990). Coulter,
who defined argument as a collection of “assertoric sequences,” breaks such sequences
into eight primary elements: assertions, counter-assertions, reassertions,
acknowledgments, disagreements, agreements, pre-announcements, and backdowns.
Again, these elements alone do not work as the primary elements of deliberation, as they
are wholly argumentative and not at all conversational or collaborative. However, many
of these fit with elements provided by other scholars, as Coulter provides a number of
assertion types, agreement, and disagreement. A review of the text found no backdowns
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and few argumentative pre-announcements. Reassertions were also found with some
frequency, as they are a type of elaboration, or continuation of a prior self-made claim.
These models of argument and conversational argument, then, provide a number
of elements that seem to be evident in deliberation, including claims (which are divided
into reality claims, problem definitions, future visions, and solutions), elaborations,
linked information, agreements, disagreements, and process statements. In addition, I
added a code for statements that qualify, that is, statements which include both
disagreement and agreement of a claim, as these seemed frequent enough in the text to
warrant its inclusion.
Overall, the coding scheme is designed to measure various elements of argument,
conversation, and other features of deliberation. These elements include different types
of claims, information in support of claims, secondary statements (agreements, etc.), and
process statements (questions, etc.). The scheme is designed to capture key features of
deliberative dialogue, and ultimately to test the tenability of the traditional and alternative
models of deliberation presented in previous chapters. This includes of course being able
to test whether the principles of deliberation are in fact present in deliberation, especially
reasoned argument since the alternative framework takes issue with whether deliberation
in fact holds to this principle.
Of the three principles, openness is the worst situated to be studied in the present
project. As discussed earlier, this principle is primarily assessed indirectly by the amount
of opinion change made before and after deliberating. After studying the text, it became
clear that “direct” measurement of such change based on the texts would be impossible.
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People, in short, just don’t provide any consistent evidence during deliberation that their
opinions are open and changing. Thus, the coding scheme does not try to capture any
dimension of the openness and engagement principle. As mentioned, this principle can
and will be studied with other means, including qualitative analysis of the text.7
For engagement, a few additional variables were created. First, because
moderators were used in the project, as with all actual political deliberations, one
potential coding strategy was to count the number of times an individual directly engaged
with a moderator. An additional measurement might be to count the types of responses
made to other participants. As the primary utterance level variable of interest (as will be
discussed shortly), this variable, though created to help inform the principle of
engagement, became a larger description of the types of utterances made in deliberation.
The first type of possible utterance is one in which the participant makes no connection
with others but instead raises an issue that prior to that utterance was not discussed. This
is called an agenda-setting utterance, or initial utterance. The only other possibility to the
initial utterance is an utterance that responds to someone else. To further refine
responses to others, such instances were divided into responding to the utterance
immediately prior to the present utterance, responses to utterances made before the
immediately prior utterance, and, again, responses to the moderator. To complete the

7 Specifically, the April Issues Convention morning session contained three sections: introductions,
deliberation, and a conclusion which included a summarization of the arguments as well as discussion on
what was learned and how individuals thinking changed. This last section, of course, is o f great interest in
investigating the openness principle.

81

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

variable I added, based on my review of the text, a code for utterances that were
interrupted or otherwise cut-off. In addition to coding the types of utterances, the notion
of elaboration was divided into two codes based on experience with the text and to
further get at the concept of engagement. Instead of having one code for elaboration—an
instance where a participant raises additional information on a topic or argument
advanced in a prior utterance— this concept was divided into two different codes,
elaboration and self-continuation. Elaboration, as a response variable and thus a
secondary argumentative statement, can either attempt to provide the information asked
for by the interlocutor, or can not do so at all. Not doing so can occur either because the
participant has no other additional information to provide or because the participant is not
fully trying to satisfy the query of the interlocutor, and thus is not truly engaging with
him or her. So, though not a perfect measure of engagement, the distinction between
elaborations and self-continuations (where the participant does not provide new
information when encouraged to do so) seemed important and fruitful.
The second deliberative principle, reasoned argument, is of primary interest to the
present study. However, at this point the coding scheme has in place only four claim
types plus linked information as codes from which to gamer information on this principle
of deliberation. Specifically, the scheme does not yet provide information on what such
claims are about. This is true in two senses, first, on the topic that is being discussed, and
second, on the level of focus upon which each claim is made. For example, are
participants arguing for public policy options or are they arguing about more general
political claims? What genres of claims are there? To capture these qualities the coding
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scheme details the degree to which each argumentative statement reflects a type of focus.
In contrast to the specifics of public policy is the generalities of value claims. Wamick
(1981) points out a rich literature that contrasts discourse using facts compared to
discourse that references values. Furthermore, the prevalence of value argumentation
was formally underscored by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) in their theory of
argument. Thus, a code for value argumentation was inserted into the coding scheme to
measure the prevalence of this kind of argumentation. The final three possibilities were
derived straight from a close reading of the texts. These included focus at the street /
individual level, management / structural level, and the level of vague action. At the
street / individual level, problems, future visions, and solutions are concerned with things
where agency resides on the street, or with the individual (for example, “teachers need to
spend more time one-on-one with a child”). A similar description can be made of the
management / structural level (for example: “the problem with education is that schools
are crumbling down around the students (structural)). Finally, vague action was designed
to capture statements in which actions were described in the most general of terms (for
example, the solution statement “schools need to get better”).8 In contrast to these levels
is the public policy level, where a citizen advocates or otherwise discusses a primary
statement with regard to explicitly changing public policy, including the relative strengths
and weaknesses of various issues and legislative actions.

8 For more details on the rules used in the coding scheme, see Appendix E.
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The third principle of deliberation, equality, like openness, can not be directly
researched with content analysis, although content analysis is a crucial element of an
overarching research strategy that involves coding at the individual level and combining
such data with the surveys conducted on the participants in the Citizen Voices /
Philadelphia Compact project. As such, any variable in the coding scheme may be of
some importance to testing equality. The most important empirical question with regard
to equality is concerned with the relative amount of discourse produced by minorities
versus majorities. To answer this question, all that is needed are variables measuring the
amount of text provided by each individual. Such variables will be matched up to survey
variables like race and gender, as will other variables in the coding scheme designed for
this project.
At this point it is important to clarify the different measurements of the amount of
text produced by each individual and how they were constructed. A handful of articles
have been concerned with the problem of at what level a text can and should be
investigated. Of course, text can be coded in aggregate, as was done by Hart & Jarvis
(1999) in their analysis of the NIF deliberations. Their scheme segmented the text into
2500 word clusters, which served then as the unit of analysis. A second option is to
analyze deliberation based on its overall topic, as was done by Gamson (1992). Of
course, neither of these two options is useful for the present project. What is needed is
something more specific. One obvious option is to code at the level of an utterance, that
is, the beginning and ending of a specific speaking turn (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca,
1969). These can be as short as one word or go on for many pages. Thus, although
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certain elements might be useful at the utterance level, this level does not get specific to
the degree necessary to actually capture the elements contained in the coding scheme thus
far. The solution offered by a number of scholars (Auld & White, 1956; Hatfield &
Weider-Hatfield, 1978; Murray, 1956) and utilized by Meyers et al. (1991,1998,2000) in
the conversational argument paradigm is to code at the thought statement level, that is, a
level underneath that of the utterance, a unit that begins and ends with each complete
thought. Not only did Meyers et al. show that coding for thought statements can be
highly reliable, the team also successfully coded their variables, including those I use in
the present analysis, at the thought statement level. Ultimately, to test the principle of
equality and to explore other empirical questions, the data will have to be aggregated to
the individual level. Once aggregated, there are three variables that measure the amount
of speaking made by each individual: total number of lines of text,9 number of utterances,
and number of thought statements.
The final principle, reasoned argument, will be measured using the variables
already discussed as well as one new variable that looks at the level at which linked
information and reality claims were made. As I have argued earlier, assessing
argumentative and reasoning abilities is difficult given the indirectness of the concept.
However, it is safe to say that some measure of the concept can be attained simply by
counting the number of times each individual makes a primary argumentative statement
as compared to other types of statements. But still, this measure would give no indication

9 Lines o f text, measured by quarter lines, is as accurate as counting words spoken, but proved to be much
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of whether individuals vary in their ability to provide sophisticated argumentative
elements. Of course, we already have one code that may get at that: focus. On the face
of it, public policy oriented claims are far more sophisticated than statements made only
vaguely. As such, a contrast of these two types of statements may yield some
information as to individuals’ abilities to produce sophisticated argument. However, I
also constructed a second variable dealing with the type of information used in reality
claims and linked information, especially with regard to the level of complexity found in
each instance of these statements. This type of variables has previously been advocated
by Wegman (1994), who found that factual supportive statements range from general to
specific and often include personal experience. As such, the variable distinguishes four
types of information: specialized, experiential, general, and global. Specialized
information is information that contains statistics, other quantitative information, or
exhibits a high level of understanding of policies or other political phenomenon.
Experiential information is linked information based on first or third person experience
and is situated as a story. At the other end of the spectrum is global information, that is,
information that is expressed in fully black and white terms, all or nothing, rather than
statements which reveal a more nuanced perception of the world, as is the case with
generalized information.
In addition to these codes were a handful of additional codes deemed useful to the
analysis. In exploring the text, it was clear that on many occasions individuals made

less time consuming for the coders to compile.
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statements that clearly exhibited a relevance to other speakers’ utterances, as predicted in
the literature on conversation. These were coded as relevancy statements. In addition,
those who did not possess information pertinent to a given topic may still have been
relevant to it by asking questions about the topic. Thus, queries were added to the
framework, both questions asking for additional information and questions asking for
specific actions (e.g. solutions). Finally, there were statements which clearly were not
relevant or did not significantly further discussion on the topic at hand. These were
coded as conversational tangents.
Finally, specific codes were introduced to capture statements of role with specific
interest to accountability and consubstantiality as value statements specifically tied to the
civic identity. A table of the final coding instrument is provided below.
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Table 2a: The Coding Instrum ent

Argum entative Elements

Primary Statements

Utterance Type
Initial

Reality Claim s (P re se n t A rg u m en t)

R esp o n se to Im m ediately Prior O th er

Problem D efinition (P re se n t A rgum ent)

R esp o n se to N o n -p rio r O th er

F uture Vision

R esp o n se to M oderator

S olution (Links P rese n t an d F uture)

In terru p ted

Linked Inform ation Claim s

Secondary Statements

Primary A rgum entative Focus

A g re em en ts

V ague A ction

D isag reem en ts

Value

Q ualifiers

S treet / Individual

Continuing Statements
S e lf-c o n tin u a tio n s

M an ag em en t / S tructural
Public Policy

E laborations
S eco n d ary S ta te m e n ts to M oderator

Linked In fo rm atio n/C laim Types
S pecialized

Conversational Elements

E xperiential

Relevancy S ta te m e n ts

G eneralized

D eliberative M eta-T alk

Global

Inform ational Q uery
S olution Q uery

Topic

N /R s (Not R elevant)

Role
Efficacy S ta te m e n ts
A ccountability S ta te m e n ts

In addition to the variables listed above, the coding instrument also required
coders to note the gender and career of individuals if any in fact provided such
information at any time during the deliberations. Another variable added near the end of
the pilot phase was coherence, a variable where the coders were asked, based on their
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own overall sense of the utterance, to rate the utterance from 1-10 on its overall degree to
which it transmitted its points in a clear and concise way. Finally, agreements,
disagreements, qualifiers, and linked information were linked to the original statement to
which they were referring.
All told, the coding instrument designed here attempts to balance simplicity and
complexity. Part argumentation and part conversation, deliberation is an extremely
difficult text to code. Deliberation, like language in general, is truly a game that has no
set rules and a multiplicity of possibilities (Wittgenstein, 1958). Any given utterance by
any given speaker could move in any number of directions; it could respond to any prior
utterance, or completely ignore anything that was said before and move onto an entirely
new tangent. Of course, deliberation has norms, and they do not exist in mere theory.
First, deliberation, as we have seen, is guided by norms of conversation. Argumentation
is similarly led by norms, norms people learn though experience. In this sense,
deliberation is extremely unforgiving to code, for it has no finite number of statement
types available to its participants. Although conversational argument may appear by
some prior theorizations and coding attempts to be relatively uncomplicated, Meyers et
al. (1991) worry that,
A second possibility is that group argument is quite complex but that difficulties
inherent in measuring it lead to conclusions of simplicity...The verbal interplay
between members in groups, as well as frequent interruptions, tangents, and
members’ movement within and between different lines of argument, creates
difficulties for coherently coding a single argument from its beginning until a
final outcome is reached (p. 62).
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However, as with any coding scheme, the key to its success lies in the successful
application of theory to practice, where concepts aren’t just dreamt onto the text but are
actually broadly evident in the both theory and text. I believe the present scheme
balances between the necessary complexity of deliberative practice while being firmly
entrenched in theory, and is well designed to explore many of the principles detailed
earlier.
Implementation of the Coding Instrument
Of course, the other issue with regard to the relative complexity of the coding
instrument is the attainment of intercoder reliability. Attaining reliability is not just a
statistical necessity. Without it, the concepts proffered to be captured by the instrument
are nothing more than figments of the mind, without any evidence that they exist in the
text. During the final few months of the yearlong pilot testing of the coding instrument, I
began testing reliability with a fellow graduate student, as up to that point my instrument
had been nothing more than my own conglomeration of ideas and former theory. The
initial results were clearly unsatisfactory, without any formal test of reliability. However,
the experience led to additional modifications and further specifications of many of the
instrument’s rules and variables. At that point, two undergraduates were recruited to help
attain final reliability and to aid in coding the text. After three weeks of training, the
instrument underwent reliability testing among three coders. After three practice runs,
the results of the third and fourth tests became stable, the third attaining the results in
table 2b below.
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Table 2b: Reliability Scores

_________________________S am ple

A lpha

U nitization

.91

U tterance Type

.91

C o h ere n ce

.75

T h o u g h t S ta te m e n t Type

.7 6

A g re e/ D isagree To:

.95

Linked Inform ation Type

.8 4

Linked to:

.71

Focus

.75

As is evident in table 2b, the reliability estimates for unitizing the text into
thought statements reached .91, results that mirror those of the conversational argument
project (Meyers et al., 1998,2000). Every variable attained acceptable levels of
reliability, using Krippendorf s alpha.10
As mentioned earlier in the project, the text coded for this project was generated
during the morning session of the deliberations that took place during the April Issue
Convention of the Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact project. Omitted were the
introductions and conclusions; the text of interest is formal deliberation, and as such only
the deliberative section of the text was included, as described in the prior chapter. This
deliberative event was divided among twelve group discussions, eleven of which had
court reporters transcribing the text. This text includes 1788 utterances and 3301 thought
statements. The text took over one month to code, a total of approximately 100 labor

10 Reliability for role are not included because the variables did not occur with enough frequency to get a
large enough N for testing.
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hours. The size of the text may seem large, but considering that there were about 155
participants,11 an average number of thought statements to individuals is just over 21.
Given a roughly parametric distribution, this number was deemed satisfactory for the
analyses that were conducted, descriptive and otherwise.
Missing Cases
One consistent problem with the analyses of the current project was the loss of
cases due to the many independent variables and the rather (traditionally) high number of
missing cases associated with certain variables. Overall, the analysis in chapter three
could have included 1135 individuals. However, 92 cases were lost due to respondents’
failure to provide an income, and 149 individuals refused to answer whether they had any
children. Overall, the multivariate analysis reported in chapter three employed 706 cases
using listwise deletion. A number of analyses were performed replacing missing cases
with means. Such analyses showed no substantive differences to the final analyses.
The problem of missing cases was more acute in the analyses of chapters four and
five. Unfortunately, the true number of actual cases for the analyses of these chapters is
not known, due mostly to poor bookkeeping of attendance of the deliberative forums.
There were two places where attendance of the April issues conventions were recorded.
First, attendance was taken at the event itself. When participants arrived at the event,
they were required to sign up at the front door, at which point they were given a speaker
number. This was subsequently entered into the survey data by matching up the

11 As will be detailed in the next chapter, it is not possible to know the true number o f participants, given
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participant’s name in the attendance sheet to their name in the survey. This gives rise to a
number of potential missing cases. First, the Philadelphia Inquirer continued to recruit
citizens for the project after the baseline survey had been conducted. As such, there were
individuals who participated in the April Issues Convention with no survey data with
which to match up their speaker numbers. A second possible source of error was due to
the structure of the event itself. Although participants were confronted with a sign-up
table at the entrance to the event, the main entrance was not designed tightly enough to
ensure that everyone had signed in. The result was that some individuals were not given
a speaker number and subsequent name tag until afterward, making it extremely difficult
to figure out who those people were in the transcripts.
The second place attendance was recorded was in the transcripts themselves.
Most court reporters were present from the very beginning of the morning of the April
Issues Convention session. During that time everyone who participated introduced
themselves by their speaker number. As such, even if a participant never spoke during
the actual deliberation, his or her speaker number should have been recorded in the
transcripts. Thus, a list was compiled of every speaker number mentioned in the
transcript. The problem here was that the transcripts had more numbers than were
recorded on the attendance sheets. An attempt to match up the two types of attendance
revealed a further problem. From a potential 189 numbers in the transcripts and 181
cases in the survey, there were 59 cases in the transcripts without survey data and 14 with

discrepancies between the text and the survey.
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survey data and no transcript information (although they were on the attendance sheet,
see Appendix G). Luckily, of the 59 cases in the transcripts with no survey data, 24 were
found to be typographical errors made by a coder (out of the 3301 thought statements that
were coded, an unremarkable number of errors. Of course, the coding instrument was
extensively checked for these and other potential errors). An additional 9 cases were
found to be almost certainly typographical errors by the court reporters. For example,
during an interaction between the moderator and speaker 11, the actual speaker became
“speaker 111” and then immediately returned to speaker 11 in the transcripts. “Speaker
111” did not exist in the survey, and thus, the safe assumption was made that speaker 111
was nothing more than a typographical error made by the court reporters.12 This leaves
twenty unaccounted cases in the transcript without survey data. Many more of these
might have been typographical errors, but there was not enough information to make this
judgment or to otherwise account for these cases. In all then, some 32 percent of the
overall potential cases were listed as missing. For this reason, two checks for missing
data were conducted. First was a means test of cases with compete data to cases with no
survey data on the transcript coding data (N = 20, see Appendix G). No significant
differences were found. Second, a multiple imputation procedure was applied to each of

12 Remember, court reporters are not exactly trained to record a group where 20 or so different people
might speak up at any moment, and indeed, very often many utterances were spoken in an overlapping
fashion. And, court reporters had to find the speaker number sticker affixed to the participants chest before
they could begin to write down what they said.
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the regression analyses reported in this chapter. Again, no significant differences were
detected. Results of these procedures is reported in Appendix G.
Finally the models in chapter six contained a high number of missing cases due to
panel attrition. O f the 1130 participants in the analysis who responded to both time-one
political conversation questions (friends and family, and others), only 688 individuals
answered such questions in the post-panel wave. In comparison, the National Election
Studies (NES) have averaged a response rate of just under 90 percent in the past seven
presidential elections (Luevano, 1994). However, the difference here is not altogether
surprising given the more localized election and the use of telephone rather than inperson interviews. Still, the response rate is by no means exemplary, and produces a
sample that, on average, is more knowledgeable, interested, conversational, and educated
(see Appendix H) than the overall population of Philadelphia residents. Luckily, there
were no significant demographic differences, with the exception of age. Even then, full
panel participants were only two years, on average, older than those who did not
complete the final panel (46 vs. 44 years of age). Differences in political sophistication
variables across panels have been noted in the NES surveys, most notably a difference in
political knowledge (Traugott & Morchio, 1990). The differences here are only slightly
worse than most NES surveys. Because missing cases were present in, as much as any
other variable, the dependent variables, imputation techniques on the data were not
employed.
While the issues with missing cases are substantive enough to report, the analyses
performed in each chapter do not provide any evidence that these issues constitute a
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significant challenge to the validity of the analyses. The issues with missing cases here
do underscore the importance in future projects of keeping immaculate records of
individuals who come in and out of the deliberative process in addition to striving for
response rates above what is now considered average.
Summary
The Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact project provides a rich opportunity
with which to study deliberation in practice and makes available a unique chance to test
the principles and tenets of the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation as well as
the alternative communal/conversational framework I have presented. The coding
instrument is designed to capture key elements of deliberation and is based on prior
deliberative literature, literature on argumentation and conversation, and the actual
deliberative texts used for this project. Certainly, these data, both textual and survey
generated alike, afford the opportunity to research any number of research questions.
However, this project will remain focused on four primary questions which are designed
to not only provide an overall picture o f deliberative dialogue but also to compare and
contrast the two frameworks of deliberation presented here. Of course, each one of these
questions itself leads to a number of hypotheses that must be detailed, investigated, and
reported, the primary objective of the following four chapters.
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C h a p te r 3: P articip atio n in D elib eratio n
The vast majority of studies on political participation have focused on
“traditional” variables including SES measures and measures of political interest,
knowledge, and involvement. O f course, these variables have significant influence on the
wide range of politically participative activities, and if one were interested in political
participation in general, one would most certainly begin by exploring how age, income,
education, gender and race, in addition to political interest, knowledge, efficacy and
partisanship, affect participation as both a general and specific phenomenon. However,
as important these measures are, the most important variables may not be so
generalizable across different types of participation, but rather are specific to the nature
of the particular type of participation in question, as is the case with income, which is a
powerful predictor of monetary donations to a campaign.
If deliberation is indeed more conversational, more communal, and less
argumentative, rational, and policy-based than currently thought in the predominant
literature, it is reasonable to expect that who participates in deliberation can be best
delineated not by variables associated with sophisticated argumentation and rationality
but communal variables.

Although the primary focus of political participation has been

on the traditional political sophistication variables of education, interest, and knowledge,
this chapter will explicate and argue for an alternative framework positing the importance
of individuals’ civic identity and interest and frequency in political conversation.
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Formally stated, the civic identity or civic-mindedness, that is, the degree to which an
individual’s personal identity is characterized by interest in the public good, the
community, and the political welfare of others on a local level is not only a substantively
significant predictor of whether one decides to participate in deliberation but also
dramatically colors what the deliberations look like, that is, what is said and how it is
said.
Civic-mindedness is a central part of the identity of many Americans today. And
as this chapter will argue, the civic identity is a strong motivator that impels people to
various forms of participation, especially deliberation, and significantly shapes what
deliberators speak about and how they speak. Deliberation provides an outlet for civic
identifiers to carry out what they perceive to be the essential American act: to speak on
the public good. As such, the dialogue produced from the civic identity is public minded.
Rather than being strictly ‘rational,’ Socratic, or argumentative on matters o f public
policy, deliberative discourse is marked by mutual reason-giving, a shared search for the
public’s goods, goals, and responsibilities. While there are certainly elements of
argumentation, what individuals ‘argue’ about is not the issues in a traditional sense, but
about the very nature of reality. Individuals have a role to play as participants in
deliberation. In deliberation participants enact a role that includes a) stewardship to the
city and those in it, b) citizen responsibility, c) enjoyment in engaging with others
politically, d) belief that they can make a difference, e) interest in hearing others’
opinions more than having their own voices heard, and most importantly, f) searching for
the public good. The participants very clearly enact a role of citizen, a role that is
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predicated on specific “agencies,” including the power to speak for other citizens, the
right to define the public good, the right to spell out each actor’s (e.g., other citizens,
politicians, etc.) political responsibilities, the responsibility to listen to other citizens, and
the right to be heard by elites.
This chapter will explicate this argument by first reviewing some prior research
on political participation and civic-mindedness (Verba et al., 1995). Second, I will
provide evidence from regression analysis that the participants in the 1999 Philadelphia
Compact / Citizen Voices project can be differentiated from other citizens not only with
traditional predictors of political participation but with additional variables related to the
civic identity. Third, I will detail a number of characteristics of the civic identity through
not only the regression analysis but also analysis of open-ended survey items and a close
textual analysis of the discourse generated by the participants in the project.
Literature Review
As detailed in chapter two, the literature on political participation is diverse. In
addition to political science studies on traditional types of participation (e.g., monetary
and time donations to campaigns), a number of studies have looked at more
communicatively oriented participatory variables, including political conversation with
others, especially in perceived minority-status situations, as well as survey-based
willingness to participate in deliberation. Finally, there are studies that approach the
issue from the other side, focusing on the political activist and investigating the reasons
why such individuals participate over and above other less participative citizens. Since
chapter two offered a general review of these literatures with the specific intent of
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detailing the relevancy to both the rational/instrumental and the communal/conversational
expectation frameworks of deliberation, the present chapter will represent these
literatures only to detail the variables important to these models and thus the variables
that will be used in the analyses of this chapter.
As mentioned in chapter two, the most important study with regard to political
participation is Verba and colleagues Voice and Equality (1995), which argued that
individuals participate based on their levels of motivation, opportunity and skill. The
most consistent predictors of participation were a number of SES variables, education,
political interest and political knowledge. Verba et al.’s findings are generally supported
by a wealth of other studies on participation. In a study of voting and contacting public
officials, Vedlitz and Veblen (1980) found strong positive relationships between these
two forms of participation and education and interest, with education serving as a
stronger predictor of voting and interest as the better predictor of contacting a
government official. Indeed, in line with Verba and colleagues (1995), most studies tend
to find education to be a substantively significant predictor of participation (Conway,
2000; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; see Goel, 1980, p. 112 for a comprehensive but
outdated list of studies supporting the relationship between education and various forms
of political participation). Why education? According to Almond and Verba (1963),
there are eight sources of this relationship. Compared to less educated individuals, the
more educated person 1) is more aware of the impact government has on the individual 2)
follows politics and election campaigns more closely 3) is more knowledgeable about
politics, 4) has a wider range of political opinions, 5) discusses politics more frequently

100

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and with a more diverse set of people, 6) has a greater sense of political efficacy, 7) is
more likely to be a member of social organizations, and 8) believes other people to be
more trustworthy. Indeed, there are many reasons why the bulk of studies on political
participation, spanning the sixties (Almond & Verba, 1963) to the nineties (Brady,
Schlozman, & Verba, 1999) find education to be the most important predictor of political
participation.
Another important SES variable, income, is often found to have a strong
relationship to participation, especially to forms of participation that “require high self
esteem or that require financial well-being” (Goel, 1980, p. 114). While the positive
relationship between income and participation becomes attenuated for most basic forms
of participation, for example, voting (Jensen, 1960; Lane, 1959), income exhibits a strong
linear relationship to more costly forms of participation like attending meetings and
joining political clubs (Milbrath, 1972). According to Conway (2000), there are three
general explanations for the relationship between income and political participation.
First, in comparison to low income individuals, more affluent individuals do not have to
focus as much attention on the necessities of life. Second, citizens with higher incomes
live in environments that tend to stimulate interest in politics, creating more social
pressures and opportunities for political participation. Finally, income is likely to relate
to a number of personality characteristics that also tend to relate to participation, for
example, a personality that holds an “emphasis on purposive activity and personal
competence, and a tendency to pay attention to events outside their immediate
environment” (p. 30).
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A third important demographic variable with regard to participation is age.
Despite what one might expect, age has a positive relationship with certain types of
participation and a negative relationship to others, mainly to the most effortful types of
participation bordering on and including many forms of political activism (Barnes &
Kaase, 1979). In addition, the effect of age differs for different generations (Miller &
Shanks, 1992). While older Americans tend to be less educated, older Americans with a
specific level of education tend to participate more than younger Americans (Conway,
2000). Also, while some studies report a curvilinear relationship, with those in their 40s
and 50s attaining the highest level of participation (e.g., Campbell, 1960; Lipset, 1960),
others report a basic linear relationship (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954).
Regardless of the shape of the relationship, age tends to exhibit a strong positive
relationship to most forms of political participation.
Two final demographic variables, gender and race, have also been found to have
important relationships to political participation. Although the reasons for lower voter
turnout among blacks need no review here, what is important is that while the gap has
decreased between whites and blacks (from twelve percent to five and a half percent from
1968 to 1996), the gap remains (Conway, 2000). As for gender, a gap has consistently
existed. However, that gap was four percent in favor of men in 1968 and is now two and
a half percent in favor of women (Conway, 2000). As for other types of participation, the
gap in race remains, and cannot be fully accounted for with other related SES variables
(Verba et al., 1995). Despite outpacing men in voter turnout, women still lag behind men
in many other types of political participation, for example, affiliation with political
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organizations, contact with government officials, and campaign contributions (Verba et
al., 1995).
In addition to these five important demographic variables, there are a wealth of
other variables that have been found to relate to political participation. These have been
usefully categorized by a number of scholars. Again, Verba et al. categorize variables
related to political participation in terms of opportunities, resources, and motivations.
Milbrath (1972) categorizes these variables into environmental stimuli, personal factors,
political setting factors, and social position factors. Goel (1980) describes the variables
related to participation as demographics, personality determinants and attitudinal
determinants. Among personality determinants Goel lists sociability, ego strength,
authoritarianism, psychic needs, alienation, achievement, motivation, empathy, morality,
and future orientation, to a name a few. Community integration has also been posited as
an important predictor of participation (McLeod et al., 1996,1999), especially
concerning voting (Pomper & Semekos, 1991). These variables will not be reviewed
here given the lack of ability of the data used for this project to operationalize such
measures. Instead, only variables used in the analyses conducted in this chapter will
receive attention. Secondly, these variables, namely political knowledge, interest,
strength of party identification, and political efficacy, have a long history o f effects with
regard to participation.
Again from Verba et al. (1995), a number of these variables, specifically,
knowledge, interest, and strength of party identification, are termed engagement
variables, that is, variables which demonstrate that an individual is highly engaged in the
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political process. As already mentioned, political interest and knowledge were
consistently significant and positive predictors of participation across most of the studies
in Voice and Equality. Partisan strength, on the other hand, was only significant in some
of their models. Despite relatively stable and significant relationships between many of
these variables, and to the demographic variables listed earlier, they still, nonetheless,
have separate and significant effects on participation. Using structural equation
modeling, for example, Scheufele & Shah (2000) find political interest to be a significant
predictor of participation, but only indirectly through media use and social trust.
Perhaps one of the most comprehensively explored attitudinal variables studied in
American politics, political efficacy has been found to have a somewhat inconsistent
relationship to political participation. Efficacy can and has been measured a number of
different ways, generally as internal (one can personally make a difference) and external
(the system is responsive to me) efficacy (Craig & Maggiotto, 1982). Both have been
found to have a significant relationship to participation in multivariate analyses (Almond
& Verba, 1963; Lane, 1959; Milbrath, 1971; Verba & Nie, 1972). Of all the variables
reviewed here, efficacy has the least clear direction of causality, as participation has been
shown to affect efficacy perhaps as much as the other way around (Eldersveld, 1956).
Regardless, efficacy was a significant predictor of participation in some, but not all of the
models presented in Verba et al. (1995).
As mentioned in chapter two, the spiral of silence theory provides a different
perspective on participation in deliberation through its investigation of whether
individuals are willing to participate in political conversation under perceived minority

104

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

opinion status. Although not a direct measure of participation by any means, the
relatedness of the measures as two kinds of socialized political conversation makes it
important to review the associations found in prior studies of the spiral of silence. One
scholar who has studied the spiral of silence to a significant extent is Carroll Glynn.
Although a number of her studies, like many on the spiral of silence, do not employ
multivariate analyses that include the variables I am interested in for this project (e.g.,
1984), her 1997 study does explore individual’s willingness to express their opinions
both to personal referent groups defined by the respondent and to generalized others
(“people in town”). None of the demographic measures in either setup predicted opinion
expression, although opinion intensity and fear of isolation were significant in both
models.
Rather than separate opinion expression by its target (e.g., referent groups as
compared to townspeople), Scheufele (1999) defined two different types of political
discussion, opinion expression and political talk, both of which can arise in deliberation.
Opinion expression was predicted by the perception of popular support, education,
personal issue stance, and age, while political talk was associated with high political
knowledge and political participation. Thus, there appears to be some evidence that the
type of talk is affected by different factors. In addition, there is some evidence that such
factors not only affect how one argues, but also the likelihood that one will argue at all.
To cite one study, Lasorsa (1991) found, using a survey-based study, that political
outspokenness had substantively significant associations with education, age, newspaper
readership, opinion certitude, self-efficacy, and political interest. Similarly, Salmon and
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Neuwirth (1990) found gender and education to have indirect effects in one’s willingness
to talk to strangers about political issues. Both perceived community concern and
personal concern have significant direct effects of the willingness to speak, as did a
knowledge measure specific to abortion, the topic used as the focus of the study.
In addition to studies on the spiral of silence, a handful of studies have used
survey data to explore the willingness of individuals to participate in a deliberative
forum. In one study (McLeod et al., 1996), attending a deliberative forum served as one
dependent variable in a multivariate setup, with another defined as institutional activities,
specifically, voting and contacting a government official, thus serving as a useful contrast
between the two types of participation. Interestingly, demographics were highly
predictive of institutional participation but not for attendance in a deliberative forum.
However, all other independent variables showed similar levels of significance and
direction. Specifically, McLeod found that media use variables and community
integration variables were significantly associated to participation, including newspaper
use, television use, and conversation (interpersonal networks). All were positive with
roughly the same beta coefficients (@ .2).
While McLeod’s 1996 study did not include many traditional antecedents to
participation, his later 1999 study included political knowledge, interest, and efficacy.
Again contrasting institutionalized participation with participation in a public forum,
McLeod found very different results. While every variable in the model achieved either
significant direct or indirect effects with institutionalized participation, newspaper use,
political knowledge and efficacy did not have any significant impact on participating in a
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deliberative forum. Television use had a weak indirect effect (through interpersonal
discussion), while interpersonal discussion and political interest had strong and positive
direct effects.
Finally, a third contribution from McLeod et al., (1999) also contrasted traditional
forms of participation with participation in a deliberative forum. Again, demographics
failed to attain significant relationships to participation in a deliberative forum while age,
education and income had substantively significant relationships to institutional
participation. Issue discussion was a strong predictor for both types of participation,
while media use was insignificant for both types of participation.
McLeod’s studies raise a more general question with regard to deliberation: What
are the primary causal variables that propel one to communicate or remain silent on any
given subject? One particular model of this process is provided by Grunig’s (1977,
1983). His probabilistic model of communication behavior is based on four different
theoretical concepts. According to the model, active or passive communication behavior
can be determined by each individual’s degree of problem recognition, level of
involvement, constraint recognition, and referent criterion13. Thus, individuals are more
likely to engage in a communication behavior if a) they perceive the topic on which the
behavior is situated to be a problem that b) they care about and that c) they perceive
themselves to have the efficacy to affect.

13 Referent criterion refers to knowledge o f a solution carried from previous similar situations. There are
few instances o f this variable being significant toward participating in a communication behavior.
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A final literature of potential insight with regard to political deliberation is the
literature modeling different types of political participators reviewed in chapter two.
Based on these few studies (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Milbrath, 1971; Verba & Nie, 1972)
a number of features seem likely. Clearly, participation in deliberation is more
demanding than voting and interpersonal political communication. Additionally, it is
likely that communalists belong to or have participated in some community
organizations. It is not clear, given their average to low tolerance for political conflict,
whether they often try to persuade others to vote in a particular way. Just like
communalists are differentiated from campaigners in that they participated in less
conflictual activities, it appears reasonable that their style of political conversation is less
conflictual as well, something that will be explored in the next chapter.
With regard to the communal/conversational framework, the most important
literature, reviewed in chapter two, concerning activists and communalists. According to
Bellah’s famous study (1985), communalists are, in a sense, bilingual, in that they speak
like ordinary citizens when it comes to politics, but also speak in a secondary voice not
possessed by other citizens, that of the civic citizen. As reviewed in chapter two, the
civic identity denotes an individual whose personality or identity contains the dimension
of civicness. As such activities that fulfill or enact this dimension are seen as rational
activities for that individual. While these studies do not provide specific variables for
which to investigate in the present study, they do suggest that civic identifiers hold a
strong sense of commitment to their communities and those who reside in them. It is
likely, also, that their civic sense significantly affects decisions to participate in politics
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and affects how they perform political activities, from reading newspapers to talking in a
deliberative forum.
Although I have reviewed three very different types of literature on the subject, a
number of commonalties exist, leading to clear expectations in trying to determine who is
likely to participate in a deliberative forum. First, education seems to be a consistently
important factor in whether an individual will participate, no matter what type of
participation is involved. Additionally, income appears to be a relatively consistent
predictor. While almost always substantively significant, age is a positive predictor of
political participation but a negative predictor for activism and the potential to protest.
Since participation in deliberation does not require the same intensity as protest but rather
more closely mirrors mainstream forms of participation, age should have a strong and
positive relationship to participation in a deliberative forum. Given the reversal in the
gender gap in terms of voting, but its persistence in other higher forms of participation,
there likely will be null effects for gender if participation in a deliberative forum is seen
as a “moderate” form of participation. And while racial gaps still exist in all types of
participation, such gaps may not exist in a multivariate setup where SES and attitudinal
differences between races are controlled.
Other variables appear important as well, across studies, such as political
knowledge and interest, although knowledge is not always a significant predictor in
survey-based studies of the willingness to participate in a deliberative forum (McLeod, et
al., 1999). Verba and Nie find communalists to be high in interest, knowledge, and
efficacy. However, efficacy has not been a consistent nor particularly strong predictor,
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although it has shown some relationship to many forms of participation. Nevertheless,
Verba and Nie find that communalists differ from every other group in their study in
achieving high marks of political efficacy.
The Studies
Given this review of political participation, deliberation would seem a unique
kind of enactment of the civic identity, whether or not a participant’s identity is centrally
constructed with civic concerns. Unlike voting, contact with government representatives,
and most other traditional measures of political participation, deliberation requires more
time and repeated contributions of opinion and information. Deliberation has a greater
cost than voting or writing a letter to a member of Congress, and thus requires that the
individual perceive and believe in the benefits that deliberation can provide. In short,
deliberation, more than any other type of traditional citizen-based participation, requires a
high level of interest and information, skill and motivation.
Deliberation also provides unique opportunities for the enactment of the civic
identity not available in other types of participation. First, deliberation provides an
opportunity to engage with other citizens who in all likelihood are also deliberating for
the enactment of their own political identity. Second, deliberation is an opportunity to at
least talk about if not on some level enact the public good. Third, as a citizen-based
activity, deliberation is a communicative practice that socially constructs community.
Many types of participation are private acts (e.g., voting, writing letters) while many
social acts are designed for elite purposes, for example, volunteering for a candidate in a
political campaign. Deliberation may be the one politically participative act that is truly
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by the people and for the people, the very enactment of political community. Finally,
deliberation is uniquely civic as compared to other types of participation in that it is an
opportunity to reify the very values that entail the civic identity. In other words,
participation in deliberation allows citizens to not only act out that personality but also
talk about that personality: Citizens can deliberate either on or based upon the very
social values, attitudes, and ways of life that define their own personality.
The question, though, is not just whether deliberation is an opportunity for such
enactment, but whether, and how, citizens take advantage of deliberation as an
opportunity to play out one’s civic identity. Furthermore, given variables that adequately
represent aspects of the civic identity, does civic-mindedness lead to a higher likelihood
that one will join political deliberations if asked? With these general questions in mind,
three different analyses were designed and carried out in the present study. The first, a
regression analysis, was designed to determine the degree to which civic identity or
communality related variables, for example, political interest, conversation, and
knowledge, predict participation in the Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact project.
The regression analysis was also designed to incorporate a number of variables which I
argue reflect aspects of the civic identity.
The second analysis took a different tack. A close textual analysis was performed
as an inductive method of exploring the ways in which the civic identity is reflected in
the actual discourse. Here specific genres or markers of the civic identity were explored,
to address whether individuals enter deliberation with a particular role in mind, that of a
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civic-minded citizen. As such, what commonalties existed across conversations with
regard to the enactment of this personality?
Finally, a number of open ended survey questions concerning the quality and
character of the deliberations that took place were tabulated and codified with regard to
role. These questions provide a unique opportunity to explore the reasons or
gratifications for participating, in the words of the actual participants. Combined, these
analyses provide strong evidence not only that the civic identity is a powerful motivator
to participate in politics and deliberation, but also provides insight to the kinds of goals
and motivations that color and guide the deliberations themselves.
Regression Analysis: The Civic Identity and Participation
Using the baseline survey, the analysis employed logistic regression to compare
those who participated to those who had the opportunity but declined to participate. As
such, only those who were asked to participate are included in the analysis. The analysis
was designed with variables that prior analyses have shown to have significant
relationships with participation. In addition are a number of variables that, as I will
argue, are significant aspects of the civic identity and its relationship to this project. The
dependent variable in the logistic setup is of course coded 0 and 1,1 being that the
individual in question did participate in at least one forum. Descriptions of the
independent variables are detailed below.14

14 There are many variables that, based on prior literature, likely have significant relationships to
participation in a deliberative forum. These include other forms o f participation, like voting. However,
these variables were not included in the survey from which this project’s analyses are derived.
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Income, Education, Gender, Race, Age: As reviewed above, these demographic
variables serve not only as important control variables in a multivariate setup but also
have exhibited significant relationships to a number of different forms of participation.
As mentioned, I expect education and age to be significant positive predictors. Income is
less clear, given the lack of prior analyses studying a participative communicative act
with income as an independent variable. Similarly, given the shrinking gaps in gender
and race, such variables will likely have null effects on participation. Income (M = 1.76,
SD = .7) was measured in the survey trichotomously, below $30,000 (1), $30,000$75,000 (2), and above $75,000 (3). Education (M = 3.2, SD = 1.24) is scored
continuously from those who did not attend high school (1), to high school diploma,
some college, college degree, and finally, post-graduate work (5). A dichotomous
variable for African-Americans (M= .39, SD = .49) was included for race (no other
minority group had an significant enough N for inclusion in the analysis). Gender (M =
.49, SD = .5) was also scored dichotomously (male = 1). Finally, age (M = 45, SD =
15.6) was scored continuously.
Number o f Children, Employment Status, Neighborhood Participation: Verba et
al. (1995) define resource variables of participation as variables that can limit the amount
of participation due to time, money, or civic skills. The difficulty in time variables, as
detailed by Verba and colleagues, is that while individuals high in income may have the
ability to pay others to do many time-consuming tasks (e.g. gardening, cleaning), thereby
freeing up their own time, these same individuals may be more affluent because they
spend more time and energy accumulating wealth. In addition, civic skills, the authors
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argue, are necessary resources for participating in politics, skills inculcated from
activities like attending meetings where decisions are made, planning such meetings,
making speeches and presentations, and writing professional letters. Furthermore,
education can be seen as a general measure of civic skills, as the activities listed above
are most certainly related to job status and thus education.
As for the current project, there were few variables beyond education that
appeared to be representative as resource variables. These included number of children,
employment status and a battery of neighborhood participation variables15. Similar to
Verba and colleagues’ dilemma about how to interpret time variables, these three
variables are difficult to interpret. Likely, a higher number of children would have made
it more difficult to attend the Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact forums, despite the
provision of some childcare. As for employment status, full time status might be
interpreted as having the money and status necessary to want to participate in a
deliberative forum, but those not employed or part-time almost certainly have more time
to give toward participation. Perhaps the most difficult variable to interpret is
neighborhood participation. Those on the high end of the scale reported more
involvement in things like community centers and town watch programs. As such, it
would seem such individuals would be higher in civic skills and interest in getting
involved in community affairs. However, such individuals also give more of their time to
such activities, and may therefore have less time to give to a deliberative forum.
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Number of children was measured dichotomously as either none or any (M = .39,
SD = .49). Employment was also measured dichotomously (M = .69, SD = .46). Finally,
neighborhood participation (Chronbachs alpha = .6, M = 1.77, SD = 1.36) was developed
as a summative scale from five different items (see Appendix A for the questions used in
all scales in the analysis) and thus ranges from 0 to 5.
Political Knowledge, Interest, Strength o f Party ID: As reviewed earlier, these
three variables have been shown to have significant effects in a number of studies, and
comprise the core of Verba et al.’s motivational variables. Political knowledge
(Chronbachs alpha = .72, M = .69, SD = .21) is a scale averaging 12 items and ranges
from 0 to 1. Political interest (Chronbachs alpha = .74, M = 6.81, SD = 1.41) is an
additive scale that ranges from 1 to 8. Partisan strength (M = .43, SD = .5) was
constructed by dichotomizing a five point ideology scale, coding strong liberals (1) and
strong conservatives (5) as 1 and other individuals 0.
Political communication, Attention to media about politics, News use, Efficacy:
While the present survey did not have variables with which to mirror Grunig’s (1983, see
chapter 1) model, a number of variables are pertinent to the theoretical underpinnings of
his model, including efficacy (constraint recognition). In addition, political conversation
and attention to politics can be seen as variables that reflect a general level of
involvement in politics.

13 See Appendix A for all details on the scales used in this analysis: neighborhood participation, knowledge,
interest, conversation, and news use.
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Political communication (Chronbachs alpha = .69, M = 2.18, SD = 1.11) is a scale
derived as the average of three items. Given their history of differential effects, attention
to newspaper news (M = 2.93, SD = .94) and attention to television news (M = 2.93, SD
= .89) concerning the race for mayor were not combined. Each ranges from one to four.
Two news-use scales are based on factor analysis of six items. The first scale represents
the use of news for engagement (Chronbachs alpha = .6, M = .35, SD = 26) purposes
(e.g., to engage others in conversation) while the other is focused on the spectacle
(Chronbachs alpha = .61, M = .63, SD = .26) of the race (e.g., to learn who is ahead and
behind). Each scale was averaged and ranges from 0 to 1. Finally, efficacy (Chronbachs
alpha = .64, M = 2.07, SD = .84) was developed as a scale based on six items and ranges
from 0 to 4.
Role variables: Perception o f neighborhood quality, Years in neighborhood, Want
to stay in Philadelphia or move out to suburbs, Age x Years in Neighborhood: Finally, a
number of variables were included in the analysis as reflective of some of the aspects of
role that I argue citizens would act out in deliberations about the problems facing the city
of Philadelphia. First, and similar to Grunig’s (1977) argument that active
communicators must first see a problem in order to engage in communication about it, I
included a scale of five items that measure a respondent’s perception of the quality of
their own neighborhood (Chronbachs alpha = .72, M = 1.31, SD = .47) that ranges from 0
to 2. In the language of the civic identity, a problem must first be recognized in order for
an activist to take on a role in trying to ameliorate the problem. Thus, participants may
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be likely to have lower assessments of the quality of their neighborhoods than non
participants.
Perhaps most directly related to the civic identity and how it relates to this
particular project is the question of whether respondents want to stay in Philadelphia or
move out to the suburbs (M = .67, SD = .47). Rather than fleeing to the suburbs (a place
with lower crime, better schools, and generally higher quality neighborhoods than in the
city of Philadelphia), those with a civic sensibility not only recognize a problem but are
intimately involved in the public good and the belief that they can successfully affect a
problem. As such, civic-minded people, I argue, will be significantly more likely to want
to stay in Philadelphia to work the problem rather than run away from the problem.
Finally, I included two variables, years as a resident in Philadelphia and an
interaction term between age and years as a resident. Because years as a resident (M =
7.1, SD = 2.98) was poorly distributed, the original continuous variable was transformed
into a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 11, with each one unit increase denoting 5
years of residency until the eleventh step, which includes all residents living in
Philadelphia for over 60 years. I believe these variables are important because the civic
identity likely has a time element, although scholars can’t seem to agree upon exactly
how age relates to activism and participation. Generally speaking, there is somewhat
consistent support that older Americans are more participative. In addition, years as a
resident is a particular sort of age: It is the time an individual has had to recognize the
problems facing the city. How should this type of age relate to the civic identity?
Certainly, it takes some amount of time for any individual to recognize the problems and
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the character of those problems unique to Philadelphia. But is there a point at which
individuals lose their sense of efficacy, loses their will to try to fight to fix such
problems? Certainly there is reason for a loss of motivation in the city of Philadelphia, as
the problems particular to this city, that is, high wage taxes, loss of population and its
manufacturing base, urban flight, high crime and deteriorating neighborhoods and
schools have been increasing for decades. Some residents may simply feel the problems
are too entrenched, after years of seeing them develop, to talk their way out of them.
Thus, in all likelihood there should be a significant interactive relationship between age
and years as resident: The main effect of age should be linear and positive, whereas
years of resident should modify age such that older residents with moderate length of
residency will be most likely to participate.
Results
As prior research has shown, many of the variables in the model have substantive
relationships to one another, raising concerns that a) there will be significant
multicollinearity in a multivariate analysis, and b) that relationships of the dependent
variables to the independent variable will be significantly different in a bivariate analysis
as compared to a multivariate analysis. Thus, I report the bivariate correlations between
all the variables in the model in table 3a.
Table 3a: Correlation M atrix o f Participation Analysis Variables
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Given the rather large N in the analysis (approximately 1050 per bivariate
association), it takes a rather small association to achieve statistical significance.
Considering the large number of independent variables in this analysis, it is expected that
correlations under .1 to .15 may not show up as significant relationships in the
multivariate analysis. Even using this range as a cutoff (rather than the .065 level above
which relationships become significant), the relationships between independent variables
and participation are still largely as expected. Among the demographic variables,
education achieves the strongest association to participation (r = .31). Income also attains
a relatively strong association to participation (r = .19). As for the opportunity variables,
none achieves a relationship to participation over .10 (or under -.10). However, two of
the resource variables display the strongest associations to participation among all the
variables in the model, knowledge (r = .36) and interest (r = .34). Among the
communication variables, newspaper exposure mirrors the strength of knowledge (r =
.36), while television exposure also shows a significant relationship to participation (r. =
20). News use and efficacy just make the more stringent cutoff, with associations to
participation around .15. Finally, the variable tapping the desire to stay in Philadelphia,
as expected, exhibits a moderately strong relationship to participation (r = .19).
Despite the large number of strong associations to participation, even stronger
relationships exist between independent variables, as the prior literature suggests.
Clearly, the two variables that exhibit the strongest associations with each other are
knowledge and interest. Not only is the correlation between these two variables
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substantive (r = .48), but associations between knowledge and income (r = .40), education
(r = .32), newspaper exposure (r = .45) and television exposure (r = .32) are quite strong,
as are the relationships between interest and conversation (r = .36), newspaper exposure
(r= .63), and television exposure (r = .51). The good news is that one should expect these
relationships assuming the constructs are valid. The bad news is that such strong
correlations, when controlled for in a multivariate setup, will likely significantly alter a
number of relationships between the independent variables and participation and increase
the standard errors of many of these variables, making significance tests more stringent.
Nevertheless, the very purpose of running a multivariate setup with this rather large list
of variables is to see which variables, controlling for all others, remain in significant
association to participation, given that few prior studies have done so.
Even with such strong associations between independent variables, the
multicollinearity statistics in the regression analysis are not intolerable, with variance
inflation factors ranging from 1.09 to 2.15. Among the independent variables, age
exhibits the least tolerance (.466), unsurprising given its strong expected association with
years as a resident (r = .58, tol. = .566). Of course, other low tolerance levels were found
among income (.603), knowledge (.625), interest (.574), and attention to newspapers
(.566) and television (.679). Given that for these variables the standard errors are inflated
by a factor of approximately 1.5, many of the expected relationships to participation are
likely to be somewhat attenuated.
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Table 3b: Logistic Regression Analysis:
Participation in Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact
V ariable

B

S.E.

Exp(B)

B

S.E.

Exp(B)

Incom e

-.2 5

.16

.7 8

- .2 9

.16

.75

G en d er (1 =M ale)

- .2 8

.18

.75

- .2 8

.18

.76

.31***

.09

1.3 7

.30***

.0 9

1.35

E ducation
Age

.02*

.01

1.02

.06***

.02

1.06

Black

- .0 4

.20

.9 6

- .0 7

.20

.93

N e ig h b o rh o o d P articipation

- .0 4

.07

.9 6

-.0 5

.0 7

.95

N u m b er o f C hildren

-.11

.21

.90

- .1 8

.21

.83

E m ploym ent S ta tu s

.44

.24

1 .5 6

.35

.24

1.42

2.27***

.62

9 .6 9

2.28***

.62

9.80

.24*

.10

1.2 8

.24*

.11

1.27

.1 0

.18

1.11

.11

.19

1.11

Efficacy

-.0 3

.10

.9 7

-.0 3

.10

.97

Political C onversation

.21*

.09

1.23

.20*

.09

1.23

.40**

.14

1.4 9

.40**

.14

1.49

A tten tio n to T elevision

- .1 4

.14

.8 7

-.12

.14

.88

Use o f News: E n g ag em en t

.77*

.38

2.1 5

.81*

.40

2.25

.12

.42

1.12

.11

.42

1.12

- .1 7

.21

.8 4

- .1 8

.21

.83

-.16***

.04

.8 6

.11

1.06

.69***

.19

2 .0 0

.0 6
72***

.19

2.05

-.0 1 *

.00

.99

C o n sta n t

-5.64***

.78

-6.94***

1.0

Model x2

196***

200***

.32

.33

K now ledge
In terest
Ideological S tren g th

A tten tio n to N ew sp ap ers

Use o f News: S pectacle
N e ig h b o rh o o d D escription
Y ears R esid en t o f P hiladelphia
W ant to S tay/L eave P hiladelphia
Years R esid en t x Age

P seu d o R2
N

***p < .001

70 6

**p < .01

*p < .05
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Table 2b provides results of the logistic regression on participation in Citizen
Voices / Philadelphia Compact. Overall, the model provides a good fit, with a Nagerkill
R2 of .33. This is in the range of similar analyses on political participation (Verba et al.,
1995) and above what has been found in prior analyses using hypothetical measures of
participation in a deliberative forum (McLeod et al., 1999).
O f the four demographic variables in the model, only age exhibits a significant
relationship to participation. In addition, education is a substantively significant
predictor, with an odds ratio (Exp(B)) of 1.37. Similar to the demographic variables, the
resource variables used in this analysis do not show any significant relationships. Due to
inflation in its standard error, income did not achieve significance, and in fact changed
sign from its bivariate association with participation. In general, then, the demographic
variables displayed results expected based on prior literature.
None of the opportunity variables displayed significant coefficients. This
however, was not entirely unexpected, given the overall low Pearson correlation
coefficients between these variables and participation.
However, two of the engagement variables, knowledge and interest, did show
positive relationships to participation. Knowledge in fact is by far the strongest predictor
in the model, with an odds ratio of 9.80. Despite its strength as a predictor, leaving
knowledge out of the equation does not radically alter the relationships of the other
variables to participation.
The next set of independent variables, concerned with news and conversation,
also exhibit compelling results. As perhaps might be expected, attention to newspaper
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stories concerning the Philadelphia mayor’s race exhibited a significant positive
relationship to participation. On the other hand, attention to television stories was not
only insignificant but signed negative as well. Furthermore, those who participated in the
deliberative forums are significantly different from nonparticipants in how they use the
news, namely in that they use news to increase their ability to stay engaged in politics but
not because of the spectacle of politics. It is perhaps unsurprising that participants are
different than nonparticipants in that they are more likely to get news from a less
spectacle-driven, more information rich medium (newspapers) and say that they use news
precisely fo r information and conversational motives. Political conversation was also a
significant predictor of participation.
Finally, two of the three role variables and the interaction between age and years
as a resident displayed significant relationships to participation. The participants
exhibited a strong desire to stay in Philadelphia rather than escape the city to the suburbs.
Indeed, the odds ratio of this variable was around two (depending on whether the
interaction was included in the model), the third strongest ratio in the model. Although
years as a resident was significantly negative, as I have argued the interpretation of this
variable is difficult if not impossible without testing an interaction between it and age.
The graphing of this interaction is shown in figure 3a. As is expected given the positive
main effect of age on participation, the older one generally gets the more likely that
person is to participate. However, that relationship is modified by years as a resident
such that the less one has lived in Philadelphia the more likely they are to participate.
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Thus, older individuals with little time residing in the city have the highest probability to
participate, in fact, a probability over .8 (for an admittedly small group of individuals).

Probability o f A ttending A D eliberative Forum
1.00

.80

I “
.40

20

.00
25

SO

75

Ag»

Figure 3a: Probability of Attending a Deliberative Forum

Regression Analysis Discussion
Again given the moderate to high level of multicollinearity between independent
variables, it is not surprising that more variables did not show a significant relationship to
participation. Indeed, most of the variables are signed as predicted. Certainly, the overall
picture of the model is that of the participant as a member of the active public.
Participants are not only more educated but also far more knowledgeable and interested
in politics than average. If one’s identity is represented by what one talks about, the
participants in the project clearly identify with politics. Participants not only prefer to
talk politics more than nonparticipants, but actually use news to gain information with
which to converse, and are more likely to use a medium that provides them that ability—
newspapers—to the less information-rich medium of television.
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A number of different models were tested using various forms of political
efficacy, with little results. Again, however, efficacy has not been a consistent predictor
of participation in prior research. The difficulty with efficacy in this and many other
models has been in developing survey items that effectively and precisely measure the
kind of efficacy that would motivate participation. While the first step toward developing
more precise measures was put forward by Craig & Maggiotto (1982) with the separation
of internal and external efficacy items, the present survey did not employ these items.
Given the items employed, it is indeed difficult to determine how one would expect civic
individuals to differ from other individuals. For any of the items included in the survey,
participants might be expected to differ from nonparticipants regardless of their answer.
For example, disagreeing with “city government is usually inefficient and wasteful” or
with “city officials don’t care much what people like me think” might indicate a positive
view of politics and one’s ability to affect politics, thus reflecting a civic-minded
individual. On the other hand, agreeing to these questions might also indicate a “squeaky
wheel” mentality, where citizens recognize a problem and perceive deliberation to be one
way to contribute to a solution. Regardless, no combination of efficacy items or scales
produced a measure that significantly differentiated participants from nonparticipants.
Although political knowledge is usually a strong predictor of other forms of
participation, it has not always exhibited such a relationship in studies that ask about the
willingness to participate in a deliberative forum. In this test of actual participation,
however, knowledge was by far the most substantive predictor of participation. I would
argue that this result is due to the specificity of questions asked in the knowledge battery
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with regard to local politics. While most politically aware individuals would score well
on a general national politics test (for example, the types of political knowledge scales
reviewed in Price, 1998), only those in tune with local concerns would score well on the
knowledge test used in the present survey.
Perhaps most interesting is the strength with which the dichotomous “want to stay
in Philadelphia or move to the suburbs” question distinguished participants from
nonparticipants. This relationship is important in developing the argument that
participants are members of a group of individuals who identity with civicness in that it
links participants— individuals who admittedly participate in deliberation to help solve
civic problems— with a desire to commit themselves to be involved or connected to the
entity under which civic problems exist: the city itself. As I will show in later analyses,
this variable suggests not only that participants are committed to help fix the city’s
problems, but in fact see themselves as stewards to the city, individuals responsible for
the character of the community in which they live. Participants, in other words, are not
only civic-minded; their very personalities center around a commitment to living a civic
life.
Indeed, the outcome of the regression analysis mirrors exactly what would be
expected of communalists (Verba and Nie, 1972). Again, compared to the five other
types of participatory citizens, communalists are above average in their interest in
politics; the most efficacious with the exception of complete activists; the most
knowledgeable with the exception of complete activists; unremarkable in terms in
partisan strength, the desire for conflict, and the extremity of their issue positions. Of
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course, they are the most civic-minded of all groups. With the exception of efficacy,
which I argue largely is due to poor measurement, the results of the analysis perfectly
resemble the attributes of communalists16.
Clearly, participants are different from nonparticipants in many important ways.
They are by far much more engaged, interested, and knowledgeable of politics. They are
committed to a life of doing what they can politically and for the community. Given the
differences established between participants and nonparticipants, the question with regard
to deliberation that one might ask is the degree to which these differences in the identities
of participants and nonparticipants significantly alters the ways in which they deliberate
and on what they deliberate. O f course, this question cannot be answered given the data
at hand. However, it is possible to explore the ways in which those who did participate,
those with a strong sense of the civic identity, did deliberate. Simply asked, perhaps, but
this question is increasingly complex in its answer. W hile later chapters will explore this
question with regard to rationality, equality, and the character of argumentation, the
following analyses will continue to focus solely on the civic identity and how it can be
characterized by the discourse of deliberation.

16 While not reported in the final results, a model was tested that included the degree to which respondents
tend to disagree in their political conversation with others and a number of importance measures for a
number o f different issues. In line with what one would expect for communalists, participants were not
significantly different than nonparticipants in these two measures o f conflict and issue extremity.
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Close Textual Analysis: Aspects of the Civic Identity
Like many qualitatively driven analyses, the present analysis explored the texts
inductively, although given what is known from prior analyses and the above regression
analysis, it was expected that a number of dimensions of the civic identity would be
exhibited in deliberation. First, given the strong attachment of participants to the city of
Philadelphia, it was expected that such attachment would be evident in the participants’
discourse. Second, it was expected—despite the failure of the efficacy items to
differentiate participants from nonparticipants— that there would be a significant amount
of evidence in the texts of the efficaciousness of the participants. Not only has prior
research on activists provided evidence of their belief in their own problem solving
abilities (Teske, 1997), but research on communicative action has also posited and shown
strong empirical support for belief in such abilities (Grunig, 1977,1983).
In general, however, the research performed in this close textual analysis was
inductive: Through an exhaustive reading and rereading of the text it was hoped that a
number of different dimensions of role and the civic identity would become apparent.
What I found was indeed further evidence that deliberation is an opportunity for civicminded citizens to play out a role they relish, that of discussing and defining the public
good. Again, such talk has drastic implications for the ways in which participants
conversed and argued, something to be tackled in later chapters. What was telling and
will be talked about in this chapter is the degree to which participants perceived their own
role as citizens and the role of others in democracy to further the public good.

128

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

As with other elements of this project, my initial close textual analysis
specifically investigated the April issues convention transcripts, although all available
transcripts were explored, providing largely the same results. The most fruitful part of
the forum was the opening segment in which moderators asked the participants to share
why they chose to deliberate on the topics being discussed (e.g., crime, neighborhoods,
government, education, or jobs). However, revealing and insightful comments were
scattered all around the discourse, and can be generalized to four dimensions of the civic
identity. The first set of comments reflect a perceived role of stewardship. Participants,
in short, held some attachment, some sense of responsibility, to citizens in their
community, neighborhood, or to future generations of Philadelphians.
I am interested because the future of our young people is the most important thing
to consider as citizens of the City (Speaker 131).
I was a reading specialist and I am very interested in all children because they're
the future of our race (Speaker 66).
When it was happening here, oh, that's typical -- urban, suburban - but now, that
it's happening, the reality is if we don't fix it here and we can be the ones to help
turn it around (Speaker 48).
As I have grown, I learned to better myself and I feel as though I owe it to the
children under me to try to change and help them so they can turn themselves
around and get better in life (Speaker 123).
The comment above made by speaker 123 in fact is reflective of not only
stewardship but of the next dimension of the civic identity, responsibility to place.
Citizens expressed not a responsibility toward others in their community but a sense of
responsibility to a geographical location ranging from the city of Philadelphia to a
specific neighborhood.
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I live in Center City and I am probably what I would describe as the typical
stakeholder....everybody has a stake in what happens with the schools in this City
(Speaker 124).
And for the first time in a long time, and I love this City, my wife and I have been
talking about moving out of the City because o f the education. That scared me
and I felt like a coward (Speaker 48).
Actually I started her out in parochial school and I felt like that's not right. I went
through the system (Speaker 147).
Speaking of flight to the suburbs, I lived in the city from ... 1966. I work in the
city, two of my three sons live in the city. I’m deeply committed to the City of
Philadelphia politically and emotionally (Speaker 106).
I love this town. I don’t want to move and that’s why I’m here (at this
deliberative forum) (Speaker 200).
Like the first stewardship comment, many participants felt responsibilities to the
next generation of Philadelphians. These statements reflect the degree of responsibility
participants feel not only to their own children and family but to the children of the
community around them. Similarly, participants clearly feel a strong sense of attachment
to the city, and comments like those of speaker 106 seem to link the attachment and
commitment to the city found in the regression analysis with the very core of the civic
identity.
Participants not only exhibited a sense of responsibility to the city, but to its
public schools, their neighborhoods, and their communities as well. The first two
responsibility to place examples are particularly illustrative. In the first, speaker 124
describes his/her attachment to the city as a “stakeholder,” that is, someone who is not
just a resident, nor a resident with simple strong affect toward the city, but a resident
who, qua resident, recognizes and feels the weight of responsibility as someone who not
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only reaps the rewards of communal life but also has a requisite function in the quality of
that community.
In the second comment, speaker 48 admits that the thought of leaving the city
seems cowardly. Citizens living in a city have a private choice, to stay or to move to
what is in most respects a higher quality o f life in the suburbs. And, as has been well
documented throughout the years, a significant percentage of people making this decision
choose to go to the suburbs. And in some respects, why shouldn’t they? There are
usually little private costs to doing so, and little if no sense of communal costs or guilt in
doing so. The move, for most people, is a private decision and others respect it as such.
But for civic identifiers, there is evidence that they do feel a communal guilt, a cowardly
feeling, in leaving the city for the suburbs. For these citizens, it is not a private decision
devoid of pressure from the collective. They feel the presence of the collective and feel
responsibility toward it. For these individuals, there are perceived public costs, and the
decision is certainly not a strictly private one. In a sense, civic-minded individuals are
activists, whether they are committed to any one particular cause or not. They are
activists for the city, for the community, for the idea of community.
In addition to a sense of responsibility to other citizens and their general and
specific communal locations, participants did make a number of efficacious comments, or
comments that reflect personal problem solving abilities (PSA). While some individuals
participated with the hope that deliberation would empower them to change things, others
clearly believed in their own personal or citizen-wide efficacy, with or without
deliberation; deliberation in this case often is seen as a catalyst to empowerment.
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When I got the call here where I could put my two cents in and be a part of the
solution, I said here we go (Speaker 177).
I'm here today because I've decided, even at this age, to be a part of the solution
because we cannot have this problem continue (Speaker 98).
Yes, three, and two are upstate. But my own children, all had a good education
and got it from the School District of Philadelphia and I know it can be turned
around - that's my feeling. We have good teachers and good principals, and I
think Dr. Hombeck should be given a chance to finish his plan. You notice they
wanted to get rid of him a short while ago. But I'm very hopeful and glad to be
here today (Speaker 66).
Basically, I'm here to see what can happen, what can we do to make it better or
what can be done? I know something can be done (Speaker 271).
Whatever piece that we decide to put on that engine that it's only a piece of
rebuilding that engine. That we are not, all of us here, whatever decision we
come up with, it's not going to replace the system by the time my tenth grader
graduates (Speaker 46).
I like the fact that it makes citizens stakeholders and that they recognize not only
that they can affect the quality of life, but justice by participating in not only
what’s happening in their house, but in this community (Speaker 104).
What, then, are these citizens empowered or efficacious toward? It is the very
essence o f the civic identity which engenders these individuals with efficacy toward
government and community change. As is clear in the following statement, if only more
individuals held to the civic identity, such efficacy might reach a critical mass where
change and improvement would be virtually assured:
If you look around the room and see how diverse we are and how interested we
are. If we were to take that diversity and interest back to our communities, to our
companies, to our friends and relations, and engender in them the same kind of
interests, then we would accomplish what we seem to be setting out to do. And if
we hold our elected officials accountable, as we hope to do with this process, and
not have it end after the election or after the inauguration, then we will start to
make the quality of life better for us and the next generation. So that is what is so
crucial, that we keep it going (Speaker 131).
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The participants also recognized the wealth of potential in every citizen to affect
change. The participants differed in terms of their recognition of a difference between
themselves and ordinary citizens. While some, like speaker 131, seem to give evidence
to a recognition that the participants, those with the civic identity, are different than
ordinary citizens, others were less willing to recognize that they were any different than
any other citizen. For such individuals, the respectful and intelligent dialogue that took
place in the deliberative forums was evidence of the people’s efficacy and ability:
I don’t believe they should be elected so much. But I think we’re going to have to
get some different people in there who are more cognizant of what the average
person wants. I mean, we look around this table and we have some average
people, basically, and I don’t think that average people are stupid. I think that we
need some average people on these boards so, when you make decisions about
stadiums or where it’s going to be, when you make decisions of whatever, the
professional people, they haven’t done such a good job in some of these things
(Speaker 153).
[About the deliberative forum] There was a great range of issues that we talked
about in the city government [group]. If there were more people like this, we
have more of this type of community, the politicians listened more often, this
would be a great city (Speaker 33).
The efficaciousness that the participants feel, as I have suggested already, is
linked to the desire to stay in Philadelphia rather than move to the suburbs. The desire to
stay in Philadelphia is not just a useful predictor of participation, as the regression
analysis showed; it is again a sentiment that is indicative of the civic identity and the
special type of efficaciousness that is part of that identity:
I see that people have come to a decision that it’s either fight or flight from the
City. And a lot of them take flight, and I thought before I have, you know, that
decision, I like the City and wanted to get more educated and more involved to
really stay here (Speaker 74).
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The citizens who participated in Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact have a very
clear sense of efficacy. First, they do not think, as the typical cynic might be described,
as if people have little power to make a difference. The participants know that
“something can be done.” Furthermore, they clearly believe that they specifically have
the power to affect positive change. Many of the participants believe, furthermore, that
the “decisions” made in the deliberations will have impact, will help change the status
quo. On the other hand, some participants understand deliberation to be a forum where
one finds specific efficacious actions that can then be taken outside of deliberation, as is
evidenced in the comment made by speaker 131. Overall, there is a clear sense of
efficacy within the comments of the participants. However, these comments do differ in
where that efficacy is located. For some, it is in the deliberations, for others,
deliberations provide actions that can be taken at a later time.
Perhaps the one area in which I believe role to be most evident in the transcripts is
the topic of accountability. Regardless of the topic at hand, a surprisingly large number
of conversations at some point lead to accountability or responsibility. There were
clearly four different targets of responsibility: other citizens, all citizens, specific public
officials, and all public officials / government in general. What seems interesting here is
that, again, regardless of the topic, participants seemed to hold the same view as to how
each of these entities should be accountable in general and to one another. “Other
citizens,” for example, seem to be an entity different from “the people,” such that “the
people” was used as the highest agency of accountability, that they, in a sense, have the
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final say. However, there is also a clear vein of dialogue in which “other citizens” lack
interest or involvement, in short, do not live up to what their role should be as watchdogs
or shareholders in democracy.
There are, then, a number of aspects of accountability that reveal the nature of the
civic identity. First, accountability to citizens is defined as a specific and concrete link
between government and citizens. At its most basic level, this link is expressed by
speaker 146 below. Yet immediately upon expressing this sentiment speaker 146 is
‘corrected’ by speaker 76. In this clarification is the heart of what the bulk of the
participants express, or base their own statements upon: the recognition that
accountability means streamlining or improving the method by which government
officials determine what the people think. Regardless, the supposition both statements
are predicated upon is that citizens are the final stop in the accountability chain, that a
well functioning democracy is predicated upon the existence and strength of this link.
Two ends to belief, yet both hold the same essential definition of how democracy
works: The politicians do what the citizens want them to do (Speaker 146). What
they think the citizens think they want them to do (Speaker 76).
There are, of course, two ways the link between citizens and government officials
can be improved: through a top-down and a bottom-up process. It can, in other words,
be initiated by government officials or by citizens themselves. Below are some examples
of the former:
And by having the superintendent report directly to the Mayor, that gives
someone that he is accountable to who is accountable to us if things are not going
the way we want them to go. So I think it gives us a more direct interaction
(Speaker 118).
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I think I'm concerned but there is still a level of overall disgust with how the
system communicates with me and how the system functions with an explanation
as to why this is the way it is (Speaker 188).
We have to start holding our officials, our government officials responsible. They
have to leam how to listen to what the public wants, not what they think we
should have because sometimes what they think that we should have is not good
for all of us (Speaker 151).
I think that if the new Mayor is going to be sincere about rebuilding the city, it has
to begin by making each level of each institution, each public official more and
more accountable to the people. It’s got to be community and public partnerships.
It’s got to be the role of the public sector in this. It relates to so many different
things. I think if we focus on building accountability, we’ll progress a lot
(Speaker 100).
In addition to the top down ways that government can improve accountability are
the bottom up processes. One process, as might be expected, is for citizens to simply
have more collective activities amongst themselves. It is, at least according to one of the
participants, in the interest of local government representatives to take heed of such
meetings.
If you are in a neighborhood and you get together with people that have an
interest in that neighborhood, you already have in place the mechanism to avail
yourself of government interest and dollars because you have a city council
representative in that neighborhood in which you have organized. It’s that city
councilperson’s interest to pay attention to you, especially as you grow and drag
other people into your group (Speaker 91).
Who truly represents the community? This is a national issue, having
representatives in your government who have absolutely nothing to do with what
the citizens want. You know, it kind of flows out. In terms of my own everyday
life, I have to be concerned about what’s going on with my block as a block
captain, and then be concerned about my neighborhood school. It builds out from
there. Politics is local (Speaker 192).
A second aspect of accountability moves beyond the link between government officials
and citizens and focuses more narrowly on citizens and how they might act in a
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normative communitarian environment. This aspect of accountability reveals a core
belief of the civic identity of what citizenship means and what it takes. The civic identity
is both civic-mindedness and civic duty:
First off, I would like to dispute the certain thing, I think, about citizenship that it
may just be a duty. It also should be a privilege because we’re bom into
citizenship (Speaker 14)
In the mind of the participants, citizens are responsible to care about two things:
others in their community and politics. Each is one face of the same communal coin.
Whereas the first three comments below reflect the responsibility to care for others and
the community one lives in, the latter three reflect the need to care for politics. Note that
with regard to politics, it is not just interest that counts: While speaker 8 reflects the
need for citizens to be politically interested, speaker 33 argues for the importance of
being knowledgeable politically while speaker 116 recognizes the difficulty, in fact, the
rarity of citizens in attaining such accountability. Even for those with a civic identity,
accountability is a tough job:
Since we are never going to have enough police to catch the people who are
doing, especially minor crimes, we as a community have to take responsibility for
noticing, reporting to the police, to the parents if you think they are accountable,
but if not, then to the police. You can’t ignore it and let the woman die on the
sidewalk as she did on the street of New York (Speaker 106).
[In discussing the former issue framing workshop, and the choice of “people first”
and what it meant] It wasn’t just a word, like citizenship. It was about caring
about your neighborhood. It was about knowing who your neighbors were.
Coming together in your fellowship. It’s not something artificial, it’s something
from your heart and soul that brings a community together (Speaker 192).
I feel that the neighborhood is only as good as the people that are there. If you
care about your neighborhood then you will care about your neighbors also.. .If
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you don’t care about your neighbor, how can you care about your neighborhood
(Speaker 196).
I think if people have more interest in government, they’ll spot corruption much
sooner, they’ll see inefficiencies sooner, and it will allow, you know, it will sort
of demand that things be run more efficiently (Speaker 8).
There’s too many citizens that go in and pull that level, that they’re Democratic
lever, every year, every election. They don’t know nothing about any of them
people (Speaker 33).
I have a question for everyone. How many people have actually attended a city
council meeting, a zoning commission meeting, a planning meeting? They meet
at night. I have never been to one. I have never watched one on TV. I find
myself motivated by my neighborhood, and other neighborhoods, but I have never
attended one. I’m sure I’m not alone in that. That’s part of the accountability. If
you are not taking part (Speaker 116).
It should be unsurprising, given the clear and strong perspective o f accountability,
that civic identifiers have a clear sense of the normative community. It is a community
where communication and relationships matter most, where the communal ideal is
achieved in everyday practice, and where government officials are not just accountable
but responsible to ordinary citizens:
If the model is to protect and serve, how come we do not get to have a
relationship with the people that are protecting and serving us? Because they
cannot feel good about trying to save my life, save my children’s life or help my
community if they’re not having any kind of relationship with them (Speaker
103).
I’m sorry. I just think the city employees are our employees. They work for us
(Speaker 33).
In addition, the ideal community is one in which the link between citizens and
government officials is direct and unambiguous. Just as civic identifiers are those who
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participated in the deliberative forums studied in this project, they search out and are
more likely to demand and take part in other public forums:
[About equal access] Our voice would be heard, our concerns would be heard.
One of the problems is the City Council could have meetings at night so people
that work during the say could attend (Speaker 33).
Indeed, some of the participants’ comments clearly reflected their recognition of
their own identities and how they are different from other citizens. As I and others have
argued, the civic identity motivates individuals to participate because participation is an
enactment of that identity. But another aspect, reflected in the exemplar below, is that
while civic identifiers are different in their drive toward community action, given their
belief in the power and equality of the people, this difference is seen as no difference in
terms of who should provide a public voice:
There are no standards for participation. You don’t get a greater voice just
because you come to twenty-five meetings. I shouldn’t have a greater voice
because I get in these meetings. I’m doing a service because I want to. I get
something out of it. I give something back and I think that’s the other thing
people feel, that they are getting something back. W e’re not all altruistic human
beings. We also want to feel a sense of accomplishment (Speaker 138).
Nevertheless, there is also a clear sense in the transcripts that the participants
acted as representatives of their communities and neighborhoods. Indeed, given the
amount of attention civic identifiers give to communal concerns it is perhaps natural that
such individuals would act as representatives at some level:
If they would not pay it’s because I know a lot of citizens that are in North
Philadelphia and a lot of them are hard working. So, I know if a good thing was
coming to North Philadelphia they would definitely want to pay the five percent if
it would help their section of the city (Speaker 14).
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In summation, the civic identity provides a very clear sense of accountability of
citizens, neighborhoods, and government officials of all levels. It is striking how
homogenous is the vision of accountability within the participants, a vision that includes
how neighborhoods should function, how elites and citizens should communicate, how
citizens and politicians should conduct themselves. The civic identity is reflected in the
comments made by the Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact participants on a number of
dimensions. First, the civic identity includes a sense of stewardship and a responsibility
to where one lives at every level. This is borne out not only in the regression analysis but
in the comments made by the participants as well. Second, the civic identity is defined
by a strong sense of accountability, which includes not only very specific opinions on
how government officials should conduct themselves and what government officials
should do to increase the link between citizens and themselves, but also includes a very
specific sense of how citizens should conduct themselves and what they can do to
increase the link of accountability between themselves and government officials. These
convictions are based upon a strong normative belief in democracy and its central tenet,
that citizens should rule. It is perhaps this sentiment that drives civic identifiers, that
defines who they are: A conviction that people do rule, and that the more local the issue,
the more control, and input, they should have.
Open Ended Survey Analysis: Uses for Deliberation
In addition to the regression analysis and the close textual analysis, I also
investigated the open ended questions in the various surveys conducted during the
project. Most of these were part of pencil and paper surveys conducted after each
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deliberative forum. Among the questions asked were what participants liked most and
least about the process and what they learned. In addition, participants were asked why
the deliberative process could lead to a greater understanding of the issues facing
Philadelphia.
Like the close textual analysis, the analysis of the open ended questions was
primarily an inductive one, although again with a number of areas to look for specifically,
based on prior literature and the two analyses reported above. Of particular interest were
not only stewardship comments, efficacious comments and the like, but also comments
concerning the giving and taking of opinions. These are of particular importance because
they reflect participants’ willingness to listen, to have the public good defined as part of
the deliberative process, in contrast to entering deliberations with concretized opinions
with the sole intent of giving such opinions and persuading others to adhere to such
opinions.
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Table 3c: Aggregation of Participant's Com m ents, January
C ateg o ry / P erc e n ta g e
H ear o th e r's o p in io n s
D ifferent

Liked

% of

L earned

% of

m o st

T otal

M ost

T otal

16

37%

2

2%

5

12%

1

D ifferent a n d learn in g how issu e s a ffec t

Process

% of

% of

T otal

All

23

29%

19%

1%

8

10%

7%

2

2%

11

14%

6%

4%

1

1%

3%

2

3%

1%

10

13%

5%

o th e rs d ifferen tly
Sam e

2

5%

4

G ot to e x p re s s ow n o p in io n s

1

2%

0

S h ap e ow n o p in io n s / h elp s

0

1

1%

m e th in k
G eneral in tera ctio n

4

9%

0

L earned a b o u t g en e ral

1

2%

38

43%

3

0

2%
4%

20%

5%

6%

topic(s)
L earned fa c t / su b to p ic

0

10

11%

0

Learn a b o u t g e n e ra l to p ic

0

9

10%

0

from o th e r's p o in t o f view
Efficacious im p act, g e n e ra l

3

7%

5

6%

4

1

2%

2

2%

0

efficacy
S tew ard sh ip
T otal n u m b e r o f c o m m e n ts

43

89

79

211

As is evident in table 3c, the vast majority of participants said that what they most
liked about the process and what they most learned from it was the opinions of others.
The results of the “liked most” question are typical of the others: 37% said because they
got the opportunity to hear others’ opinions, another 12% added to that “hearing opinions
different than their own,” and yet another 5% also most enjoyed hearing others’ opinions
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and realizing how issues affect other citizens differentially. This is in stark contrast to
the 2% of responses that said they simply liked getting the chance to express their own
opinions the most. In addition, a few comments (6% overall) expressed some sort of
agency or efficacy and one respondent expressed a stewardship function toward the city
or other citizens.
Summary
This chapter finds strong evidence for both the rational/instrumental framework
and the communal/conversational framework. Political participators are highly educated,
knowledgeable and interested in politics. But in addition, participators hold strong ties to
their communities and engage in politics to enact civic sensibilities. The textual analyses
conducted in this chapter reveals strong civic characteristics, including discussion of local
concerns, community narratives, and communal values. Rather than speaking from selfinterest, participators spoke for the communal interest in an efficacious and normative
frame. With regard to the question of who participates, this chapter has shown that
rational/instrumental variables are far from the only important variables to consider.
The results found in this chapter raise an interesting question with regard to
deliberation. Deliberative forums in this and other countries have been initiated through
a process of self-selection. Even in projects with strong incentives, like James Fishkin’s
National Issues Foundation forums (see Fishkin, 1996; Fishkin & Luskin, 1999),
individuals still are left to decide themselves whether to participate. The evidence in this
chapter shows, even with moderate incentives designed to lower the costs of deliberating
(parking, child care, etc.), that the decision to deliberate is one dependent upon the self-
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perceived gratifications that come from deliberation. The gratifications that come from
deliberation have been difficult to assess. But recently, given the move away from strict
rationalistic thinking about the costs and benefits of politics, scholars have begun to
recognize that the benefits of deliberation to the individual are largely in identitybuilding. Deliberation offers a number of gratifications, again, a) fulfilling a
responsibility of stewardship to the city and those in it, b) helping determine the
responsibilities of the polity, c) enjoyment in engaging with others politically, d)
believing that they can make a difference, e) hearing other opinions more so than having
their own heard, and f) taking part in the search for the public good. But the most
important thing to note here is that these are only gratifying actions for those whose
identity is constructed and reified through such actions. As with any identity-connected
activity, the activity is “fun” because it fulfills a part o f who that individual is: One
individual’s enjoyment is another’s tedium.17
17

Can deliberative forums ever be representative o f the general public? Likely, the latest round of NIF
forums were more representative than the current project because of the incentives given to the NIF
participants (free airfare, the chance to be on television, a generous stipend). Still, the NIF participants
were not wholly representative, and the NIF analyses did not test for the degree to which its participants
were more civic-minded than nonparticipants. Of course, there may be only a certain level o f
representativeness that organizers of deliberative forums wish to have in their events. Many Americans do
not even know the name o f the current Vice President o f the United States, and there is a fair argument that
such individuals should not be part of deliberation, despite the importance of representativeness and
equality. While the question is not o f particular concern for the current project, it should raise concern for
those projects who claim to be producing a representative informed opinion. What is clear is that such
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Participators very likely saw the potential of the deliberative events to satisfy
many of the gratifications they seek out in their development and enactment of a civic
identity. And if not, the Philadelphia Inquirer advertised the project as a chance to fulfill
such gratifications. The Inquirer specifically mentioned that the deliberative forums
would be a chance for citizens to “share their fears and dreams about their community
and to deliberate on the issues they deem vital to the future” (Satullo, 1998, p. A19). All
a citizen needed to participate, according to the Inquirer, was one’s own “values,” stories
about “what its like to live in the city,” and a “willingness to listen to others tell their
stories” (Satullo, 1998, p. A19). Indeed, throughout the process, the Inquirer seemed to
hone in on the degree to which the participants were civically minded. Harris Sokoloff,
the lead moderator of the project, noted that participants’ “sense of the power of citizen
activism was genuine and waiting to be utilized” (in Satullo, 1999, p. A43). Other

individuals (who don’t know the name o f the Vice President of the United States) would not likely join a
deliberative forum simply because they would not find it potentially gratifying.
W ith regard to normative claims o f deliberative democracy and the hopes o f Fishkin to have a
representative deliberative poll, the news is thus both good and bad. I believe there is good reason to
believe that the unrepresenativeness o f participants in the Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact project is
likely to exist in most deliberative forums. Simply stated, those who perceive deliberation to be most
gratifying will be the most likely to attend. On the other hand, individuals with a civic identity are least
likely to argue from self-interest and most likely to argue from the public good. W hat Fishkin might have
done with the number o f incentives his project provided was to move the mean of the self-interest communal interest spectrum more toward the self-interested, or at the very least more toward ordinary
citizens with ordinarily low levels o f political interest and information.
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moderators commented on the strong sense of attachment to the city, the “love felt
toward the local neighborhood” (Rota, cited in Satullo, 1999, p. A43). What did the
Inquirer say about the progress made on the particular issues discussed in the forums?
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the argument laid out in this chapter, the Inquirer found
that virtually every conversation “hinged on ideas about citizen involvement” and the
responsibilities of citizens to their city (Inquirer, 1999, p. E6).
It may be argued that the evidence provided in this chapter is suspect given that I
have made claims about the civic identity and the participants generally using comments
from individuals. However, the goal of this study is to make both individual and
aggregate claims. While I am interested in the individual character and abilities of
citizens, ultimately, what must be put forward in a project such as this, if even just to
respond and frame this project’s findings with prior normative and aggregate claims of
deliberation, is an aggregate claim about the character and utility of deliberation. As
such, this chapter has put forward an argument not only about the deliberative character
of individuals but also of deliberation itself.
The civic identity is a major motivator toward participating in a deliberative
forum. Although there is no ability in this project to compare participants to non
participants, a civic dimension of one’s personality also appears to contribute to what is
discussed in deliberation. However, the character of the dialogue of the participants
raises other questions as to the overall objectives and character of the dialogue of
deliberation. Do civic-minded citizens argue in a rational, Socratic manner, or is
deliberation marked by more reciprocal explorations of issues? Is deliberation talk about
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the costs and benefits of certain public policy actions, or is it instead talk about what it
means to be civic, what each actor (politicians, citizens, etc.) can do to help solve the
community’s problems? The following chapter will address these questions by
contrasting the argumentation model of deliberation with the civic model.
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C h a p te r 4: T h e D ialo gu e o f D eliberation
Knowing who actually shows up to deliberate, as the last chapter argued, is
informative and consequential for what is said. Beyond participation itself, however,
there are a multitude of other sources of information that shed light on what deliberation
“looks like,” that is, what is said, and how it is said. As I have mentioned, of all that has
been written of deliberation in the past decade (and before), the lion’s share has been
situated upon rational/instrumental normative theoretical principles. Additionally, I have
argued that this literature is incomplete in that while there is a preponderance of
normative theoretical works, actual research dedicated to testing the claims made in such
theories is lacking. This and later chapters aim to remedy these discrepancies, again by
testing the tenability of the rational/instrumental framework in contrast to the
communal/conversational framework of deliberation.
Perhaps the most important question undergirding this chapter is the following:
Why is it important to know what deliberation looks like? First, knowing the character of
actual deliberation provides useful, and to this point, essentially non-existent feedback to
the normative theories of deliberation mentioned above as well as both the traditional and
alternative expectation frameworks of deliberation being investigated in this dissertation.
Empirical investigations of deliberation can test for equality, accountability, rationality,
and other rational/instrumental normative principles currently entrenched in popular
deliberative theory. Second, gaining an understanding of the character of deliberation is
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interesting at “face value.” Description, however, is not only valuable for the sake of
description, but also paves the way for further questions and can serve as useful data to
inform those who organize and implement deliberative forums. If deliberation is meant
to discuss the pros and cons of public policy, for example, it is useful to know whether a
case of actual deliberation successfully met such a goal. Third, descriptive elements,
empirically measured, allow for investigation on the inclination of certain individuals to
make certain kinds of deliberative contributions, detailed in the next chapter. In the end,
we need to know what actual deliberation is like so that we can use such information in
the assessment of deliberation itself, to answer the question of whether deliberation
serves the functions for which it has been theoretically linked and whether other more
communal and conversational functions indeed exist and carry significant importance.
Chapter two reviewed a number of literatures pertinent to the question raised in
this chapter. Traditional normative theoretical works on deliberation have been premised
upon the Habermasian model of public speaking, guided by rationality, equality, and
openness. However, other literatures, specifically concerned with argumentation,
conversation, and reasoning suggest that deliberation may be less rational, reasoned, and
argumentative as theorists expect. Instead, deliberation, based on an alternative
framework, is more likely to be local, communal, and conversational, as opposed to being
reasoned discussion on public policy.
The present chapter will explore the validity of the traditional and alternative
frameworks of deliberation through an exploration of what is said and how it is said. In
the process the analysis will touch upon the three traditional principles of deliberation,
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namely, openness and engagement, equality, and reasoned argument, although, specific
interest will be focused on reasoned argument as the key contrasting feature of the two
expectation frameworks. These issues, frameworks and principles will be explored
though descriptive, quantitative and qualitative analyses of the text, using the text itself as
well as the coding scheme developed for this text detailed in chapter two.
A Descriptive Analysis of Deliberation
Before exploring in what ways the data inform the principles of deliberation, it is
useful to understand what the data look like and thus take a cross-sectional glance at
deliberation. Furthermore, it is important to first see if the data produced by the coding
scheme reflect the conceptual framework placed upon it. This is illustrated through a
confirmatory factor analysis presented in Appendix B. The results clearly confirm the
conceptual framework; similar types of statements load onto the same factor or highly
correlated factors. Given the valid connection between theory and the data, the next step
is to begin looking at the data interpret its dispersion. Table 4a below provides
frequencies of thought statement types.
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Table 4a: Frequencies o f Thought Statem ent Types
Type

N

P ercent

R eality C laim s (P resen t A rgum ent)

155

4 .7

P ro b lem D efinition (P resen t A rgum ent)

315

9.5

F u tu re Vision

92

2 .8

S o lu tio n (Action Linking P re se n t an d F uture)

437

13.2

Linked In fo rm atio n Claim s

906

2 7 .4

A g re e m e n ts

163

4 .9

D isa g re e m e n ts

105

3.2

Q ualifiers

160

4 .8

S e lf-c o n tin u a tio n s

112

3 .4

E lab o ratio n s

148

4.5

S eco n d a ry S ta te m e n ts to M oderator

65

2 .0

R elevancy S ta te m e n ts

97

2 .9

D eliberative M eta-T alk

52

1.6

In fo rm atio n al Q uery

74

2.2

S o lu tion Q uery

55

1.7

N /R s (Not R elevant)

225

6 .8

In te rru p te d

97

2.9

A rgum entative Elements

Primary Statements

Secondary Statements

Continuing Statements

Conversational Elements

T otal

3301

As expected, based on the findings in the conversational argument project,
primary argumentative statements comprise the majority of all thought statements. Just
under one third of all thought statements were one of the four main types of claims;
another third (roughly) were information linked to those claims. This leaves, of course,
just over a third of all thought statement types as secondary argumentative statements or
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conversational elements. Given Antaki’s (1985) finding that an elite population did not
use more than a few datum to support each claim, it is not surprising to find that the
participants made 999 claims and used 906 distinct information links for those claims. In
short, the ratio between claims and linked information (or in Toulminian terms, data) is
roughly one to one.
Of the three primary argumentative statements (leaving out reality claims for the
moment), it is clear that solutions are the most prevalent. Comparing these three types of
statements, 52 percent were solutions, 37 percent problem definitions, and only 11
percent were future visions. Why the disparity? First, there is no expectation, nor
reason, to expect that these three main elements should be equally dispersed.18 Indeed, it
makes sense that future visions would be the least frequent of the three, as in most cases,
the future is clearly implied in the definition of a problem or the proposal of a solution.
There is no need, for example, after one has claimed that “there are not enough police
walking beats on the street” that the future vision attached to such a claim is a day where
police are seen daily walking beats; it is implied in the prior problem definition.
Another interesting finding from table 4a above is the breakdown between
elaborations and self-continuations. In short, only about half of all individuals, when
prompted to elaborate, were able to provide any new information pertinent to their claim.
Given that the ratio between linked information and claims is 1:1, it is consistent to find

18 Gunderson (2000) does claim however, that the prescriptive (talk about where we should be in the future)
is the most important.
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that just under half the time individuals cannot provide more linked information when
prompted to do so.
Moving to secondary argumentative statements, the results show with the
conversational argument project, that the overall level of agreement and disagreement is
low, here accounting for thirteen percent of all thought statements. Perhaps it is
surprising to the reader not to find more of this in actual deliberation, where citizens are
encouraged to engage each other on issues of public policy. However, given the norms
and tendencies of conversation, that claims are usually taken at face value, and that
people try to be cooperative with one another, such numbers do not seem out of the
ordinary. In addition, given the low ratios between claims and linked information and
between self-continuations and elaborations, a reasonable explanation for the few number
of secondary statements— disagreements in particular—is that individuals do not possess
counter-arguments with which to engage others in relevant discourse. With the diversity
of topics discussed, and points within each topic, it may be that individuals simply did
not have many responses to the claims made by other participants.
Finally, the discourse exhibited a low number of conversational tangents (6.8%).
Conversational tangents occurred when participants left the political aspect of
deliberation and began conversing as they would in everyday life. They are moments
when deliberation, in the proper sense of the word, temporarily ceases. This relatively
low number shows that for the most part, citizens stayed on track, relevant to the task at
hand, deliberation.
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In addition to types of thought statements, the coding scheme looked at types of
utterances. A breakdown of these types is provided in table 4b:
Table 4b: Utterance Types
N

%

Initial

92

5.1

R e sp o n se to M o d erato r

398

22.3

R e sp o n se to A d jac en t P articipant

615

3 4 .4

R e sp o n se to O th e r P articip an t

571

3 1 .9

In te rru p te d

112

6.3

T otal

1788
Mean

M edian

Lines p e r U ttera n ce

3 .7 6

2 .0

T h o u g h t S ta te m e n ts p e r U tterance

1.83

1.0

The breakdown of utterance types shows, first, that engagement was widespread,
as just under 90 percent of all utterances were in response to some prior utterance or
statement by the moderator. Participants nearly evenly responded to either the
immediately prior utterance or an utterance that occurred before the prior utterance. Only
five percent of utterances started a completely new topic.
Utterances varied greatly in length, ranging from a single word to 27 lines of text.
Utterances averaged just under two thought statements each, although some utterances
contained up to 10 thought statements. In short, most utterances contained small amounts
of information; a plurality of utterances contained one primary argumentative statement
and one thought statement of linked information. Again, however, these are averages; the
range of utterance lengths shows that although many utterances were very short, they
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were balanced by a significant number of above average utterances that contained
multiple thought statements, most of them argumentative.
Given the high number of primary argumentative statements and linked
information, it is of interest to see the relative frequency to which information was linked
to specific types of claims. The same is true for secondary argumentative statements, as
provided in table 4c:
Table 4c: A rgum entative Connections
N

%

To Reality Claim

46

5.0

To Problem D efinition

439

48 .2

To F uture Vision

24

2.6

To Solution

402

44.1

T otal

911

Linked Inform ation Link

N

%

To Reality Claim

36

8.4

To Problem

64

14.8

T o F uture V ision

5

1.2

To Solution

23 4

54.4

To Linked Inform ation

3

.6

To O ption P rovided by C hoice Fram ew ork

87

20.2

Secondary Statem ent Linkages

T otal

430

The immediate trend noticeable in table 4c is the disparity in usage of information
links and secondary links. Of course, there is no theoretical reason to expect parity in the
dispersion of these variables. With regard to information linkages, almost half of these
statements were used to support (or refute, although uncommon in comparison to
support) the existence of a problem, and another 44 percent of the linkages went to
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supporting a solution. Delving deeper, the degree to which certain types of information
were used in comparison to certain types of primary argumentative statements was
investigated. As was expected, experiential information was used more frequently for
reality claims and solutions than for future visions and solutions. The reason for this is
simple enough: Experiential information claims are by definition narratives of
experiences that have occurred in the past or near present. As such, experiential
information is used with reference to past or present realities or problems, rather than in
support or refutation of a future vision or solution.
With regard to secondary statement linkages, the majority were used for solutions,
with another fifteen percent going to problems. In other words, most people agreed,
disagreed, or qualified the solutions proposed by others. In comparison, few of these
links were directed toward other primary argumentative elements. A reasonable
interpretation of this is that solutions are more varied than problems. That is, every
problem has a number of possible solutions, giving rise to the necessity of using
secondary statements to argue for or against various solutions. In the cases where
problems elicited secondary argumentative elements, experiential information was
prevalent. In other words, problems were tacitly accepted by the other participants unless
their experience told them otherwise.
The final two types of descriptive univariate frequencies are the type of focus of
primary statements and the type of information linkages. Table 4d provides the
dispersion of these two variables.
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Table 4d: Types o f Primary Statements and Inform ation Linkages
N

%

S p ecialized

88

8.3

E xperiential

24 8

2 3 .3

G en eralized

637

5 9 .9

G lobal

91

8 .6

Linked In form atio n/R eality Claim Types

T otal

1064
N

%

V ague A ction

159

15 .8

Value

29

2 .9

S tre e t / Individual

267

2 6 .6

M an a g em en t / S tructural

426

4 2 .4

Policy

124

12.3

Focus o f Problems, Visions, and Solutions

T otal

1005

Clearly, most linked information types were general, with eight percent being
coded as specialized and another eight percent as global. When experiential and
generalized types are combined (totaling 83 percent of linked information and reality
claims), it becomes clear that most people are argumentative generalists. And, in many
cases, it was evident in the text that the specialized knowledge used in information
linkages was generated from personal experience, usually professional, such as the
knowledge attained by working as a teacher, or in city government.
With regard to focus, a similar pattern emerged, with small tails (for policy and
vague levels of focus) and over 68 percent falling in either the street / individual level or
the management / structural level. However, here the tails are somewhat larger, with the
number of vague action primary statements outweighing the number o f policy level
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statements. These two variables suggest that individuals are argumentative generalists, as
neither produced a significantly large number of policy statements and the overall
majority of both focus types and information linkages were at average levels.
Further information can be garnered by investigating the relative focus of each
primary argumentative utterance, as shown in table 4d. What this table makes clear is
first, that argumentative statements of value are most likely used for solutions and future
visions. As should be expected, problems and solutions contain the highest percentage of
policy statements (although also the highest percentage of vague statements). A majority
of problems are at the managerial / structural level, while solutions show much more
parity with regard to level of focus. The implication of this is that problems that are
stated at the managerial level are provided solutions at the value level. This is the first
hint that what people talked about was accountability, as a significant amount of
deliberation was on how organizations (schools, government, etc.) need to operate based
on principled values rather than specific behavioral remedies.
The univariate analyses of the variables, then, provide a number of valuable
insights with regard to the principles of general argumentative ability, relevancy, and
engagement. However, more can be garnered from investigating the relation of thought
statement types to one another. One way to do this is to look at the correlations between
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these types, as w ell as to investigate their relation to the number o f thought statements in

each utterance,19 as shown in table 4e:
Table 4e: Correlations o f Statem ent Types
to Size o f Utterance
P earso n s R

# of Thought
S ta te m e n ts/U tte ra n c e

Linked Inform ation

.78

S o lutions

.56

P roblem s

.54

Relevancy S ta te m e n ts

.44

F u tu re Visions

.29

D isag reem en ts

.21

Q ualifiers

.18

A g re em en ts

.13

E laborations

- .0 9

S e lf-C o n tin u atio n s

- .0 8

In fo rm ational Q ueries

- .0 7

A number of aspects of argumentation are apparent from the table. First, longer
utterances are more argumentative, with the highest Pearsons correlations to number of
thought statements per utterance from linked information, solutions and problems. As
should be expected, utterances become longer when information is used to support or
refute a claim. In addition, relevancy statements are strongly correlated with length of
utterance. In other words, relevancy statements are usually in supplement to other
statements. Relevancy statements make an explicit link from what is about to be said to

19 O f course, such an analysis required the aggregation o f the thought statement level data to the utterance
level. Later chapters will further aggregate the data to the level of the speaker.
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what was already said by someone else. Utterances containing relevancy statements
therefore continue arguments already made on a particular topic by another speaker. And
because such utterances refine prior arguments, they require more verbiage and length.
In addition to primary argumentative elements, the secondary elements also show
significantly positive, although only moderate, relationships to the length of utterance.
Finally, the range of correlations to number of thought statements makes evident the
natural “decay” of deliberation: Initial utterances (and their relevantly-linked follow-ups)
are typically lengthy, and, provided that discussants remain on topic, the duration of
subsequent utterances diminishes as the conversation moves from primary arguments to
secondary utterances and elaborations. Further evidence for this is supplied in table 4f,
which shows the correlation between utterance type and length of utterance. In fact,
responses to adjacent utterances are on average the longest type of utterance, followed by
initial utterances. The correlation matrix provides evidence for two lengths of utterances:
short and long, on average, with initial utterances and responses to adjacent participants
exhibiting significant lengths and other utterances remaining quite short.
Table 4f: Correlation M atrix, Utterance Type to Length
U tteran ce T ypes

Thought

Lines

S ta te m e n ts
Initial
R esp o n se to M o d erato r
R esp o n se to A d jac en t P articip an t
R esp o n se to O th e r P articip an t
In terru p ted
All correlations significant at the p < .001 level

.21

.22

- .1 3

-.1 5

.3 4

.3 9

- .2 6

- .2 8

- .1 4

- .1 6
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While informative, the correlations between statement types and length of
utterance is only one type of empirical comparison. Additionally, I investigated the
relationship between statement types to each other (see table 4g). This table provides
information on which thought statements are most likely to be found with other thought
statements in the same utterance. As should be expected, linked information is highly
correlated with problems and solutions, and to a lesser degree, future visions, and
negatively associated to continuations and elaborations. While disagreements have a
moderately significant association to linked information (r = .12) and qualifiers (r = .09),
the correlation between agreements and linked information is not significant from zero.
In other words, of the three main secondary argumentative elements, disagreements most
require support. In contrast, agreements nearly always stood alone, without any
elaboration for why one participant agreed to another participant’s argument.
Table 4g: Correlations Between Statem ent Types
Linked

P roblem s

S olutions

.0 0

-.0 7 * *
.10**

Inform ation
Reality C laim s

.02

P roblem s

.37**

F uture V isions

.14**

.07**

S o lutions

.36**

.17**

D isag reem en ts

.12**

.03

.07**

A g re em en ts

.01

-.0 1

.01

C o n tin u a tio n s/E lab .

-.1 3 * *

-.0 8 * *

-.1 0 * *

** p < .01

While the above correlations and their interpretation do not always directly
inform the principles of deliberation, they are essential in providing an accurate and
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informative picture of what occurs in deliberation. Deliberation generally contains three
types of utterances. First, there is the argumentative utterance, which at best contains a
problem, solution, and linked information, if not also a future vision. Disagreements
might also contain linked information. Then there are secondary argumentative
statements, containing, and usually only containing an agreement or continuation of a
prior argumentative statement. Indeed, qualifiers, self-continuations, and elaborations are
negatively associated with primary argumentative elements. Reality claims usually stand
on their own and do not appear to be as ‘argumentative’ as other primary statements.
Finally, there are non-argumentative utterances, which are average in length (having no
significant correlation to the number of thought statements per utterance) and stand apart
from argumentative utterances (having no significant correlations to primary or
secondary utterances).
A final look at argumentation is provided by looking at correlations of significant
argumentative utterances to types of utterances. Significant argumentative utterances are
utterances which contain more than one thought statement where at least one of those
thought statements is a primary argumentative element (see table 4h below).
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Table 4h: Where Significant Argum ents Are Found
Partial C o rrelatio n s

Significant

(C ontrol V ariable: C o u n t o f U ttera n ces p e r Speaker)

A rg u m en tativ e
U tteran ces

Initial S ta te m e n ts (A genda S ettin g S ta tem en ts)

.57**

R esp o n ses to th e M oderator

- .0 6

R esp o n ses to A djacent b u t n o t Im m ediately Prior U tterances

.42**

R esp o n ses to Prior U tterance

-.6 6 * *

In terru p ted

-.8 8 * *

** p < .0 0 1 , N = 1 15

As is evident in the table, significant argumentative utterances are found in initial
statements as well as in responses to prior (but not immediately prior) utterances. The
reason for this is that responses to immediately prior utterances are typically simple
agreements, or respecifications of information. On the other hand, responses to adjacent
but not immediately prior utterances typically continue arguing about a topic already
discussed but on a different facet of that argument. For example, school vouchers might
have been talked about overall as a good policy to pursue. The immediate response may
be simple agreement. But later, someone else will raise her concern that school vouchers
give money to religiously affiliated schools and thus do not separate church and state.
Such an utterance will contain significant argumentative elements, and is not initial since
it is still on the topic of school vouchers.
A final look at the data in this descriptive analysis was done by mapping out the
discussion of topics through time to check the relative amount of discussion of each
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topic. These maps are provided in Appendix C. The pattern that emerges is that there is
no real pattern. Many topics are discussed at length while others are not even provided a
response after the initial utterance. At some points the participants stayed on topic for
some time; at other points topics were temporarily interrupted only to be continued the
very next utterance. Finally, some groups discussed a multitude of topics while others
stuck to relatively few. Overall, each group exhibited its own unique characteristics.
Qualitative Interpretation and Discussion
The above analyses provide a number of insights into the prevalence and
character of the principles of deliberation. As mentioned, the rational/instrumental
framework of deliberation is based on three principles. Equality will be a focus of the
next chapter. However, openness and engagement and rational argument will be
explored through qualitative analysis. The analysis reported below specifically finds
broad support for the existence of openness and engagement in deliberation but weak and
mixed support for reasoned argument.
Openness and Engagement
There is much evidence to suggest that the deliberations were characterized by
both openness and engagement. First, as was discussed in the prior chapter, a vast
majority of the comments found in the open-ended survey questions revolved around the
importance and frequency with which participants learned about the experiences of
others. A relatively unopen dialogue would not likely exhibit this kind of interest in what
others said but would rather be marked by the importance and frequency of being able to
provide others with one’s own opinions, not the other way around. Furthermore, in the
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first half of this chapter the vast majority of utterances were found to be responding to
what other participants said. Instances of initial utterances were quite low in comparison.
Second, utterances were evenly distributed between responses to the immediately prior
other and participants that spoke before the immediately prior utterance, suggesting an
even balance between direct and immediate interaction and interacting with prior
utterances. This type of distribution of utterance types suggests that Meyers et al. (1998)
were right in describing argumentative discourse as containing at any one moment
several possible topics and argumentative chains. With an average of fifteen members
per group, one participant has on average only a 1/14 (plus moderators) chance of
responding to the immediately prior other. It is encouraging, then, that nearly 35 percent
of all utterances managed to make a response to the immediately prior other (and another
22 percent to an immediately prior utterance by the moderator). Engagement was, in
other words, more often than not a strong characteristic of the deliberations. Much of the
engagement, as described earlier, centered on solutions: Since any one problem can
contain a multiplicity of solutions, solutions are most in need of engagement, and indeed,
most secondary argumentative statements responded to solutions made by other
participants.
In the text itself, many different statements exhibited a sense of openness and
engagement. At the end of the deliberations, if there was time, moderators asked what
the participants had learned. The number of positive examples raised by the participants
made it clear that, for the most part, individuals came into the deliberations with an open
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mind, paving the way for learning and opinion change. Some examples of participants’
responses:
Yes. I think it is about change. I did not know that charter schools were public
schools, so that was a change in my thinking (Speaker 133).
I think it was him over there, after I mentioned abandoned houses and you
mentioned rehabbing them ...I’m a recycler and I was amazed I hadn’t connected
that. So it’s good to think about different opinions that you didn’t think about
before and to get a different viewpoint on use. There are many answers (Speaker
140).
Additionally, participants made a fair number of relevancy statements and in most
cases made it clear who they were talking to:
And what Ray just talked about is very true. You know, children need—I’m a
single parent. I need day care. I work (Speaker 203).
On what did people engage? As we saw in the last chapter, in most cases,
engagement occurred as participants worked out who was accountable to whom, on the
responsibilities of various political actors. They collectively defined present political
realities and then specified how these realities differed from normative accountabilities
and responsibilities:
(On schools) It’s more than reading, writing and arithmetic. It’s socialization.
It’s learning to get along with people who are different from you. I know that
these are not classroom topics, but it’s a core part of the school (Speaker 43).
Indeed, the most pervasive feature of the text was the sense of communality
between the participants. The prior chapter, of course, provided evidence that those who
participated were, on average, communitarian-minded citizens who spoke from a position
of “community representative” on issues of accountability and responsibility. As such, it
is not surprising that aspects of the civic identity pervaded the nature of engagement. As
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the following segment details, communalism was even more pervasive in the character of
the arguments that took place all morning long in April.
Reasoned Argument and Use of Narrative
In short, what people discussed and argued and reasoned about was the
accountability and responsibility of government and its individual and group players. In
response to the question of what in summation was spoken about during the deliberations,
one participant, for example, said:
What I heard today, I think, is that we need leadership, collaboration, whether it’s
on the—presently existing schools or the charter schools—and a collaboration
across the board in society (Speaker 135).
The prevalence of accountability and responsibility as a subject for discussion is
of particular interest if dialogue is seen as a zero-sum game. The greater the amount of
communal discussions, according to this view, the less the discussions of public policy
are able to become prevalent. As the analyses in this chapter make clear, explicit
discussion of public policy was rare as measured in the focus variable. Instead,
participants used the deliberations to become more communal, to share communal stories
and (generally) to agree with one another on the normative communal norms of
accountability and responsibility. The discussion was about defining a reality through a
communal lens and offering communal solutions and sharing communal experiences. To
quote at length,
I think that’s a critical problem all over the city. It’s not the old days. And there
isn’t somebody at home all the time who can take care of all of these things and
go to these meetings. Everyone is working. If you’re not working, it’s because
they’re not interested in anything. And people will come out in force for a major
issue. In our neighborhood there’s a Burger King and a talk of a hotel on the
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edges of the neighborhood and people are opposed to that. So they’ll come out
for something like that. But it’s hard to get a whole group of people in a
neighborhood to work on the neighborhood itself, because their lives are so
complicated and involved as it is. I think one of the essential things that we have
to do is to form coalitions of neighborhoods. I know there is one started, because
my neighborhood association joined it, the Coalition of Neighborhood
Associations.. .(Speaker 26).
The communal values spread, however, far beyond discussions of a communal nature and
onto matters of public policy. The discussion was not, in other words, a zero-sum game
between public policy talk and communal talk. Instead, public policy was situated in a
communal frame. Public policy solutions were designed ultimately as ways to get more
accountability, responsibility, and connections between citizens:
Sure. The government could help. They could help by encouraging the big
business—when the big businesses come in and they offer incentives and
everything, it would be part of the package like, along with— you know, you
support our small businesses. Maybe we can, you know, have a list of some type
of charter or something listing small businessmen who are interested in opening
up and who have small franchises and different things like that (Speaker 89).
The values of communality not only pervaded the kinds of solutions put forward
by the discussants on a public policy level, but, of course, also typified the structural and
the individual level:
(On the privatizing of City Hall custodial staff) And I think its safe to say that a
cause of that—and this is not meaning to be disrespectful to anybody—but there
may have been an attitude previously at that staff, well, what do I care about it?
I’ll never lose my job. But now that it’s a private company that does it, you
know, they have to have results (Speaker 21).
Finally, it is interesting to note, in lieu of all the different discussions in the
normative literature about consensus, that communality is a major player in what is
collectively consented to and why. Certainly, when it came to public policy issues, there
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was dissensus, for example, on school vouchers and charter schools. Indeed, for many
public policy issues it seemed as if the discussions could not become informed enough
for consensus or dissensus to even be possible. However, there was broad agreement on
many different communal arguments. The attainment of any consensus is surprising
given that groups averaged fifteen members each, a relatively difficult number from
which to get unanimity. At the end of many of the discussions, moderators were
instructed to ask the participants where consensus and dissensus occurred. A typical
response is provided below:
I think we thought that there were major changes that needed to be made. I think
that we thought we don’t want to scrap the system. And that we want more
accountability, a tighter sense of mission, and more involvement in the
community (Speaker 132).
In fact, when asked by a moderator, “what do we feel we have in common as a group for
policy?” the immediate responses were “more efficient government” (Speaker 32),
“responsibility in our appointed officials” (Speaker 33) and “community involvement”
(Speaker 7).
We need to remember that those who participated, as corroborated by other
scholars (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady, 1995), were very high in knowledge as
compared to a representative sample of Americans. As such, there was a high degree of
expertise in politics in general, but specifically with regard to being a civic citizen. The
participants frequently exposed their communal nature. Seventeen participants
mentioned their role as a member of a civic association or their status as a block captain.
Thus, the deliberations could certainly be characterized as a combination of technical and
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public spheres, but only if the technical sphere being used was that of the expertise
gained from the years of being a communal activist or as someone who worked in the
public domain (teachers, city employees, etc.). The manager of a charter school, in the
example below, adds his/her experience to the conversation.
I mean, charter schools are out there. What I’m surprised about it, at our
particular school, we have about seven hundred thousand dollars that we have
at—we’re a hundred and twenty five thousand dollars short on our operating fund.
And it’s like pulling teeth to get some support. I just wrote 80 letters to corporate
people over the weekend to try and get some more money in. I mean it—I think
that somebody mentioned corporate before. If corporations are going to get
involved, let them get involved in the financial level. There really will make a
difference in a school like a charter school that already has ownership from the
people who are promoting and putting it together (Speaker 77).
This example importantly illustrates the way in which public policy is discussed.
Rather than discussing charter schools as a national, political issue, the issue is brought
down to the street level, as experiences and local information is shared by similarly
concerned individuals. Thus, while some public policy was discussed and argumentation
appears by the coding frequencies to be rather widespread, both argumentation and the
subject of that argumentation were irrevocably colored by the communal identity, its
values and concerns. This can be seen, depending upon one’s point of view, as a
negative characteristic, for taking away a degree of real public policy discussion, or it can
be seen as a positive characteristic, in the sense that public policy discussions were not
replaced but rather transformed by the communal or civic identity. This question will be
returned to shortly, as it will be further informed by a discussion on the nature of opinion
formation in deliberation and the subsequent character and quality o f the argument
contained therein.
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Opinion formation is predicated on openness. Without openness, neither opinion
change nor opinion formulation occur. Again, this project will not explore opinion
change in any empirical fashion. However, much can be said about opinion formation by
looking directly at the text itself.
There were numerous instances in the text where participants seemed to be
forming an opinion as they were uttering it, a key feature of deliberation (Barber, 1994)
and something expected by conversation theory (Lasch, 1995). Note the high number of
qualifications and clear sense of “thinking out loud” present in the following exemplar:
I think what you are talking about is services. There are certain services that
government should not be deciding. Maybe the tax issue is an offshoot of this
issue, but that’s not what this is about. This is about should Philadelphia, for
instance, be responsible for delivering a gas—I don’t mean gasoline—but, I mean,
because as a perfect example and probably something we might be able to focus
on is PGW. For instance, should they exist as a private or a pubic entity. There
are arguments on both sides. I, for instance, wish they would just sell it to PECO
or someone perhaps who would actually run it more effectively. On the other
hand, PGW does have a heart that perhaps a private enterprise does not have. I’m
talking about providing heat to those who can’t afford it. I know they do that on a
regular basis. I’m sure PECO would handle that situation for people who can’t
afford it. I don’t know (Speaker 31).
There were a number of cases, in fact, where the deliberations provided political
alternatives but the participants were not sure which they preferred. The following
exemplar is an excellent and quite sophisticated example of one participant weighing the
alternatives, attempting to formulate preferred positions on a number of topics:
She raises management issues. One, should the police be transferred—rotated
fairly frequently to different neighborhoods or should they stay in the
neighborhood where they can get to know the people, the people can get to know
them and a real cooperative feeling can be fostered? Two, should they be as much
as possible taken out of patrol cars? She was talking about bike police actually
having face-to face interface with people in the neighborhood. That is pretty hard
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to occur if they’re in a patrol care. Of course, in a patrol care they can cover more
ground. Three, what about recruitment? Right now, if you go to work for the City
of Philadelphia in a civil service position, generally if you’re not a resident, you
can do that, you have six months to move in. A person who wants to be on the
police force has to have already lived in the city for a year before they can enter
the police academy. That seems to be an—in terms of hiring and recruiting an
unlevel playing field. Certainly if a police officer lives—a want-to-be officer
lives out of the city, he or she should have to move into the city within six months
of taking the jo b ... (Speaker 50).
As should be evident from the above exemplars, opinion formation was prevalent
in the deliberations, further underscoring the satisfaction of the principle of openness and
engagement, as well as framing a discussion on the nature of deliberative argumentation,
its sources, its nature and its quality. Clearly, with a large degree of opinion formation
occurring, one might think that the overall quality of argument is low, following the
convention that preformed opinions lead to tighter and more informed arguments.
However, as the last exemplar above illustrates, even those without an opinion can
exhibit a high degree of argumentative sophistication. Of course, the degree to which
citizens can argue is dependent upon the information held by the participants. This
naturally leads to the question of what kinds of evidence were prevalent in the
argumentation exhibited in the deliberation.
Citizens revealed that they used a wide variety of sources from which to base their
arguments. These include the media, personal experience, 3rd person experience,
professional experience, and the values that guide communality. Clearly, given that these
were the most prevalent sources of argumentative information, storytelling was a
prevalent form of discourse.
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In many cases citizens mentioned stories that they remembered hearing about in
the news media and subsequently used this information in their discussions and
arguments. To underscore just how communal and politically interested these citizens
were, on two occasions participants mentioned stories written by Inquirer writers who
were at the time actually in the room!20 Evidence one participant’s utterance:
Yeah, Yeah. SCT Technologies, I think, was one of the companies specifically
mentioned. They took advantage of all the grants and whatever, and started up in
one of the science centers. But then they, as soon as they got up on their own,
they moved out to, I think, Malvern, I’m not sure offhand. And now they’ve got
like 2,000 employees. It’s good to have that partnership. But it looks like there’s
a lack of a follow-up with it. You know, how to keep them here, how to
encourage them to stay and grow (Speaker 21).
Another common source of information came from the experiences of the
participants in their jobs, and many of them were in the political domain. This
experience, again, brings discussion of public policy down to the level of the individual.
Instead of high-browed argument on public policy, public policy was transformed to the
level of individuals situated in their communities, with the community’s needs in mind:
I worked for 30 years for the city. I retired two years ago. I remember the city
almost went bankrupt, almost didn’t make payroll a couple of times in my career
at the end of the Wilson Goode administration. When the Rendell administration
came in, one of the priorities they had was to re-configure the way management
could manage the business of city government... (Speaker 129).

20 The Inquirer provided a “topical expert” from its staff to sit in on each deliberation. They were
instructed not to speak of their own volition, but rather to be there to provide information if prompted by
one o f the participants.
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In many cases, the participants “shot from the hip,” using their understanding of
the situation to think on their feet and make important connections with but the most
general of information:
I think that parts of this particular point of view are necessary but not sufficient. I
think that reading, writing, and arithmetic are the result we want, but I’m not sure
it’s how we get there. I think that we have to be real and know that it is not a few
years ago, in fact, families are different right now. So this is a very large part of
where I think we would want to go, but I think that even if you look at the best
schools, the schools we would choose for our kids to go to school, they are, in
fact, community and other things go on there other than the product of reading,
writing, and arithmetic (Speaker 199).
By far one of the most prevalent sources of information was personal experience.
Again, rather than discuss the relative benefits and drawbacks of a particular issue of
public policy, for example, the wage tax, insurance rates, and other discrepancies
between the city of Philadelphia and its suburbs, citizens discussed these topics through
their own personal experiences, raising relevant points and important aspects of such
issues:
I am in the process of opening my own business. It’s a used book store. I have
looked at places right down the street from me a little strip mall in Northeast
Philly towards Juniata. I ended up getting—saving money by going to
Jenkintown. And just one cost alone, the cost that you pay the real estate people
for the insurance that just covers your building was $500 more per month to be in
Philly than it is out in Jenkintown. So that’s a cost—as a small business owner,
that’s where you need to address— you know, you can help if you are in a
partnership. It’s little costs (Speaker 127).
As with other aspects of deliberation, storytelling was marked with a definite
dimension of communalism. The participants shared stories of their own communities,
spreading information and experiences from one community to another. Again,
communalism affected not only what was said but guided what was deemed good and
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bad policy. Experiences that occurred in one neighborhood were often used not only
argumentatively but as moments where one participant could spread communally
important information at a personal level to other participants:
Like what you are speaking on, I’m from Southwest Philly. I started an action to
get drug dealers off my block, a drug house. And it took a long time. And I was
surprised, you know, that it took less time than it did, but it only took six months.
And I talked to police and everything. The number one thing was to get a petition
from everybody on the block to sign (Speaker 10).
In sum, the claims made by the participants, including problems, solutions, and
future visions, were supported by a high number of experiential statements. Their
statements, like the claims themselves, were in many if not most cases generated within a
communal framework, leading to specific types of claims and evidence for those claims.
What does this mean for deliberation? Is deliberation marked by well-reasoned
arguments with informed and knowledgeable evidence? Or is deliberation marked by
poor reasoning, nonspecific claims, and less than completely coherent arguments and
statements? The text provides evidence, in fact, that both descriptions were at different
times well represented in the text. For example, there were a few cases where individuals
argued for certain solutions without any knowledge that such solutions had long been
tried or were already in place. In one case a speaker (16) emphatically argued for the
creation of a kind of business bureau to help people learn how to start a business and find
business-related incentives. The next speaker followed up this solution claim with
detailed information of two types of city government business bureaus that were
specifically created to address the concerns of Speaker 16. Other cases were encouraging
where participants “fixed” the utterances of misinformation by other speakers. But again,
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there were only a handful of such instances. Many more kernels of information may have
gotten by without challenge.
At other points there was evidence that participants could not even offer solutions
beyond the notion that communal values should guide such solutions. After a moderator
prompted one participant for a solution, the participant was only able to say
It’s very hard. And somehow our new Mayor needs to create a bond so that we
have a louder voice and get more respect. And I’m not familiar with exactly
where the conflict, personal or otherwise, exists, but there definitely is, and it’s
detrimental. I don’t know if that answers the question (Speaker 58).
Such statements were not uncommon. In many cases, participants were simply not even
able to be coherent. There were many cases where—in response to the moderator’s
prompt for more information— a speaker was clearly not able to provide any more
relevant information. For instance, a participant who argued for reducing government
expenditures was asked by the moderator for an example, but openly admitted he or she
was not able to provide one (Speaker 149). And in quite a few cases, it was barely
possible to even understand what participants were saying (let alone code the text):
One of the things—I like to look at things in a broader post-obstacle perspective.
And I know all though this county, things are set up in a win-win situation. And I
think the world is getting too small and this is like Star Trek and there’s a life
support system, and we don’t have anywhere else to go. And we need to begin to
work—we talk about global economy and things of that nature. W e need to set up
a win-win as opposed to a win-lose. The whole culture is going to win if we take
our children and all of our citizens and look at each and every one of them as a
resource...And if we don’t take that approach, those who are taking it will surpass
us and we will go the way England who used to rule the world. And now they’re
what a second, third-class country (Speaker 4).
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Rather than making sophisticated claims, there were of course a number of
instances where the arguments used purely global language, turning complex political
realities into more or less black and white situations:
The police academy today is a joke. A forest. They are throwing cops out on the
street who think they’re in the Wild W est.. .if a person coughs, they are reaching
for a gun (Speaker 49).
Like scholars of reasoning have found in the past, individuals often do not explore
issues thoroughly and in many cases argue even more strongly in the face o f clearly
contradictory information. At one point, an Inquirer representative cited a statistic that
80 to 90 percent of people in America’s prisons are illiterate. Three utterances later a
participant made the claim without even refuting what the Inquirer representative had
said—from his experience of “talking to people in prison and stu ff’—that “half of them
went to college, have all kinds of degrees and everything.” (Speaker 144). Even when
individuals did discuss public policy, often the statements revealed that the participant
held very little (or was unable to access much) information on the topic:
I think charter schools are a waste of time also because it’s taking up space and
we already got too many private schools and public schools out in the city and the
suburbs. And I think it’s a waste of time because it depends on the students, the
parents, the way they raise their child from day one as they grow up. So I think
charter schools is a waste of time because you can get the same education in a
public school as well as a charter school, and a charter school is—I ain’t going to
say it’s useless, but you can—I think you can get the same education in a public
school and in a charter school (Speaker 18).
In sum, there is evidence that individuals were not particularly capable of
discussing public policy, or capable of having at times any kind of political discussion
that could be described as informed or well-reasoned. Yet the news is not all bad. First,
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there were many examples of quite sophisticated argument, to be reviewed shortly.
Second, poorly informed individuals and individuals with less than satisfactory
argumentative skills still provided a number of important conversational contributions.
One particular participant, an individual below average in education and political
knowledge, spoke only three times in April. This participant was involved in a
discussion on neighborhoods. Interestingly, all of the groups that discussed
neighborhoods at one point focused in on the matter of race relations and how it affected
the quality of the neighborhoods. But in this particular group, there was only one reason
why race relations was ever discussed: All three of this particular participant’s utterances
were designed to move the agenda away from the subject at hand and toward race
relations and how that was related to neighborhoods. On the last try, she succeeded, and
the group continued after her last utterance to deliberate on the subject for some time. In
another example, a participant low in sophistication measures was able to find common
ground between the positions of two others participants and was able to not only calm the
discussion (the only instance where the discussions got tense) but also got the participants
to see the commonalities between their positions (Speaker 144). Thus, even if they are
not fully capable to argue deliberatively, such participants may still make important
contributions to deliberation.
Furthermore, it would be inaccurate to describe the discourse as wholly
uninformed and poorly argued. Far from it. On the whole, participants were far more
knowledgeable about politics than the average Philadelphian. Such participants used the
deliberations to inform others:
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If we can discuss police collective bargaining, we all know how it works, the
police and the fire and governed by state Act 111 which prevents them from going
on strike, which says that if collective bargaining fails, which it always does, each
side appoint an arbitrator and then the two arbitrators appoint a neutral arbitrator,
and often, the neutral arbitrator generally writes the entire contract (Speaker 50).
Even when individuals did not have prior knowledge on a topic, they often
exhibited the ability to quickly make connections and implications of political actions. In
thinking about charter schools, one participant reasoned that such schools
Take the students out of the [public] school whose parents are most involved and
most likely to be involved in education and it leaves those in public schools then,
those students whose parents are least involved. It seems to me that we need to
rework the system to involve the parent more, and then those parents are not
going to get involved, their children have to be well-educated anyway, even if
they’re not involved (Speaker 47).
In addition, many of the statements made by the participants made it clear that they held
nuanced views of the world and understood the situatedness of their political decisions:
I think that just underscores—the last few comments just underscores there are no
simple solutions to any of these problems. In this case, the political appointment
that has political connections is more capable to do the job than a person from the
outside. But in the Police Commissioner’s case, obviously they needed some new
blood that didn’t have connections. So, I think it’s difficult to say what should we
change other than being conscientious to make the choice which I really think
Rendell has made (Speaker 42).
And again, the expertise of the communalist was apparent in much of the discussions. As
the participants shared stories they passed on important information about the enactment
of communalism:
Especially about zoning, we do it a little different in our part of the city. In Mt.
Airy and Chestnut Hill we have volunteer groups that meet through the
community associations that meet on the zoning issues, will actually go
downtown to the Zoning Board to represent the community (Speaker 158).
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Contrary to what some scholars have argued, the ability of individuals to effectively
argue and reason seemed to be widely varied in the discussions. The deliberative
capabilities with regard to argumentation and reasoning of the participants was a mix of
highly capable and barely capable individuals. This finding supports the analysis
provided earlier in the chapter. The deliberations exhibited a low ratio of claims to linked
information. There was also a low ratio of self-continuations to elaborations as well as a
low overall number of secondary argumentative statements, especially disagreements.
For the most part, individuals were evidentiary generalists, with over 84 percent of
information linkages general or experiential and 16 percent global or specialized.
Finally, only twelve percent of primary argumentative elements were at the policy level;
68 percent were at the street or structural level. There were, in short, more primary
argumentative elements at a complete nonspecific or vague level as compared to the
policy level.
Discussion
This chapter has detailed the centrality of three main principles of deliberation,
openness and engagement, equality, and reasoned argument. Without satisfying these
principles, we cannot say that deliberation has achieved the goals for which it was
designed by deliberative theorists. Literature on argumentation, conversation, and
reasoning, as reviewed in chapter two, simultaneously bolstered the possibility of finding
engagement and openness in actual deliberation while calling into question the ability of
citizens to provide sophisticated argument and reasoning on matters of public policy.
Even if citizens can argue effectively, some scholars argue that they lack the necessary
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specialized knowledge on politics to actually do so (Lippmann, 1922). The argument of
the prior chapter furthermore suggested that the problem is specifically concerned with
the proclivity of citizens to argue on public policy versus discussion on the communal
side of what is political. Such discussion instead focuses on talk of values, most
importantly, accountability and responsibility.
Chapter two reported the use of germane literatures on deliberation and its
associated dialogic activities to design and implement a major coding instrument on
actual deliberative texts. The evidence from this coding analysis, as well as data from the
close textual analysis, lend support for the existence of widespread engagement and
openness in deliberation, as reviewed earlier. Additionally, the coding analysis and close
textual analysis found widespread influence of the civic identity, centering again on
discussion of accountability and responsibility, with little direct talk on a policy level of
sophistication. As for the reasoned argument principle, exemplars of both a high and low
order of sophistication were found. In general, the data pointed to an average and
unremarkable level of argumentation overall within the text and in the individual
capabilities to argue at high levels of sophistication. Indeed, only 31 percent of all
utterances included a primary argumentative statement, and only 13 percent had both a
primary argumentative statement with linked information. Only 13 percent of all
utterances, in other words, included a claim with data to support that claim. In many
cases, individuals were not able to provide more than one coherent utterance on any
given issue. Over half the time, individuals could offer no additional relevant
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information when prompted to do so. Other facts pertaining to the overall average
argumentative abilities of citizens have been documented throughout the chapter.
It is still difficult to claim from the analyses thus far that deliberation does not
satisfy the reasoned argument principle central to the rational/instrumental framework of
deliberation. In many cases participants exhibited highly sophisticated argumentation
coupled with a surprising body of political knowledge. And while at the individual level
deliberation might not always satisfy the reasoned argument principle, this is not to say
that overall deliberation as an aggregate phenomenon did not display a remarkable level
of reasonableness, rationality, and group argumentation.
Certainly, the citizens did not explore every issue thoroughly. Nor did the
citizens allow every instance of poor reasoning and invalid argumentation to go
unchallenged. In most cases, though, deliberation was a team effort. When someone
offered misinformation as fact, or poor reasoning as valid inference, someone else in the
group usually caught it. From this perspective, it is neither good nor bad if someone
offers misinformation or poor reasoning. However, it is bad if it is not caught. Politics is
no different than other trades in that many mistakes will be corrected performatively.
Someone acts out (or in deliberation, speaks out) improperly, giving rise to the
opportunity to fix such missteps.
Indeed, perhaps the most important role served by deliberation was that it
provided a forum where banal popular political myths could be qualified or even
dispelled entirely. In one example, a participant dispels the notion that it is impossible
for a teacher to get fired because of the unions:
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I was a teacher in Philadelphia. I was in the classroom for 24 years.. .It is not true
that a teacher who is not performing cannot be fired. I want to assure you.. .1
know what I am talking about. Teachers in Philadelphia, if you are
unsatisfactory, the first thing that has to happen is that the principal has to come in
and observe you and write you up. And I say this: That is the first step. If the
principle does not observe you, you will never get written up and you will never
get thrown out. But the principal must observe you. He or she must observe you
twice and you have a hearing. If it happened twice, sir, you are out (Speaker
127).
Where did the original argument that it is impossible for a teacher to get fired
come from? There is no way to tell, other than to limit the culprit to the only two
possible suspects: another interlocutor in a past discussion, or the mass media.
Regardless, when a generally popular argument is put forward in deliberation, it always
runs the risk that someone might have the capability to dispel such an argument with
reason or experience. The likelihood that someone else might be able to refute or qualify
a generally popular argument is increased when the number of participants is high, as was
the case in the groups of the Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact (too many
participants of course, makes conversation unwieldy and dilutes the contributions made
by each speaker). Second, individuals who have spent their careers in the public domain,
or whose communitarian personality has afforded them a wealth of public experiences,
will have had more “political experiences” with which to gather data to refute or qualify
such arguments.
I found a prevalent use of experiential information in the deliberations of this
project. One possible fear that was raised is that there was not enough specialized and
otherwise sophisticated discourse in the deliberations, which were instead marked by the
simple telling of stories. Is it bad to have so much of the discourse be experiential?
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Indeed, using experiential information may be more persuasive than using specialized
information in deliberation. How can you refute the teacher quoted above? Do you not
believe she knows what she is talking about? The fear with story based information is
that it does not provide “base-rate” (Gibson & Zillman, 1994) information. The stories,
in short, may not be representative of the population under consideration. But as the case
above exemplifies, many of the stories are clearly grounded in political realities, and are
designed to exemplify not an outlier of reality but the “everyday” of reality. Finally,
using experiential information rather than base rate information is more personable
(Baesler, 1997), creating a better chance for the development of community, an important
character posited by deliberative theorists (Barber, 1994). And, it is likely to also lead to
greater recall and recognition in future political conversation (Price and Czilli, 1996).
What of the prevalence of communal values as the primary foci of the
conversations? Yes, citizens could have spent their time arguing the intricacies of public
policy instead (if they are truly capable of doing so). But in not arguing sophisticated
public policy, citizens did what they could: They brought public policy down to their
level. The message of every single deliberation was in fact “OK, now were are going to
talk about this matter of public policy from square one, asking first, what are the values
upon which such policies should be guided?” Indeed, some argue this is exactly what
citizens should be doing in deliberation. As stated by one scholar:
The American people aren’t ignorant. That aren’t non-participatory. They
already play, for all the imperfections of the process, the role American
democratic understanding has long posited...W e don’t want the general populace
to be like elites. We want it to stand back from the hubbub of politics-as-game
and assert broad, guiding values (Ladd, 1996, p. 43).
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The civic identity, then, plays a central role in the deliberations that took place in
Philadelphia in 1999, for it was the values they brought to the table, that, in essence, set
the table, framed matters of public policy at the level of citizens rather than the level of
policy analysts. Surely, the citizens made some mistakes in doing so, and in all
likelihood traveled over ground already explored in detail by policy analysts. But even if
that is all they did (which is certainly not the case), the fact that it was individuals acting
as ordinary citizens who traveled such ground, and made impressive headway at that, is
important nevertheless, for it satisfies the central tenant of democratic associational
autonomy (Dahl, 1998).
The evidence supplied in this chapter as well as the prior chapter make clear that
the communal/conversational framework of deliberation is not a replacement for the
rational/instrumental framework. Instead, both can be seen as working in conjunction
with one another. In chapter three, while there was some empirical evidence for the
importance of the communal/conversational framework and strong qualitative evidence
for the model, political sophistication variables were quite strong predictors of
participation. Thus, the two models worked conjunctively to influence who participated.
In the present chapter, evidence for the communal/conversational framework was
widespread, as the characterization of how people talked found widespread use of
narration, personal experience, communal experience, and the use of communal values.
While there was substantive evidence for the rational/instrumental principle of openness
and engagement, there was mixed support for rational and reasoned argument. This
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chapter found that reasoned argument did occur in some utterances and not in others.
Most importantly, the principle of reasoned argument worked through communal talk;
instead of a zero-sum game between communal and rational talk, rational talk was found
to be produced through or during communal talk. Thus the rational/instrumental
framework was found to actually depend upon the enactment of the civic identity in what
people said and how they said it.
The present chapter explored deliberation at the level of the utterance and thought
statement. As mentioned, this allowed for the exploration of a number of different
principles using various methodologies and operationalizations. This chapter, however,
did not look at deliberation at an individual level, formally defined. As I have mentioned
earlier, investigating deliberation at the individual level is not only something that has yet
to be done in research but holds the possibility of exploring the two expectation
frameworks of deliberation and their principles at the individual level, especially the
principles of equality and reasoned argument. Not knowing what each individual
contributes to deliberation is akin to being a car mechanic without understanding the
roles played by an engine’s separate components. A nuanced understanding of
deliberation as an aggregate phenomenon is dependent upon an understanding of
individual deliberative propensities, the topic discussed in the following chapter.
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C h a p te r 5: D eliberative D ialogic C o n trib u tio n s
The question explored in each chapter necessarily leads to the next: Knowing
who participates begs the question of whether that has any impact on what they say and
how they say it. And knowing something of the aggregate character of deliberation leads
to questions about who exhibits what dialogic characteristics, the question raised in this
chapter. This question, especially, who says what, provides data on two principles of the
rational/instrumental framework of deliberation, equality and reasoned argument. But
more importantly, an investigation of who says what offers a substantive comparison of
the rational/instrumental framework, which stipulates the importance of political
sophistication, and the communal/conversational framework, which underscores the
importance of conversational abilities.
The empirical goals of this chapter require an individual level analysis and require
two sources of data: data from a survey of the participants, and data from what the
participants said. Indeed, this project can boast being the first of its kind to combine both
data sources for an individual-level analysis of deliberation.
Of course, the place to start such an investigation is with prior research, where
available. This project has already tapped into a wide range of research, including
participation studies, research on the communalist, the theory of deliberative democracy,
and the nature of deliberation, argumentation, conversation, and reasoning. This chapter
does not provide much more than what has already been provided. What will be
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discussed are the few studies that look at the covariation between individual level
attributes and types of dialogue relevant to deliberation (argument, conversation, etc.).
Again, to date, there are no studies that have specifically looked at the covariation
between individual level attributes and deliberation as a unique type of dialogue.
How does one measure who says what in deliberation? Like many empirical
questions, this one has two primary dimensions: quantity and quality. Quantity can
further be broken down into depth and breath. Together, then, the question of who says
what can be investigated across three overall dimensions. Thus this chapter will
investigate three different classes of dependent variables. Depth (quantity) is
operationalized through various counts of the amount of speaking provided by each
individual, including the number of lines of text, thought statements, and utterances.
Breadth (quantity) is measured as the range of topics upon which each individual speaks.
And finally, quality is empirically measured as the number of primary argumentative
statements, or in some analyses, the ratio of argumentative statements to nonargumentative statements.
Literature Review
Like the previous two chapters the present chapter will not provide a detailed
literature review of the theory undergirding the overall rationale for the chapter or the two
frameworks contrasted in this chapter, as chapter two already provided such information.
That chapter underscored most theorists’ expectation that individual levels of political
sophistication will be most predictive of how much each individual speaks out in
deliberation as well as the degree to which their talk is considered sophisticated. In
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contrast, my alternative model argues this: It is not political sophistication, but political
conversation, that leads to deliberative talk and, furthermore, sophisticated deliberative
talk. In addition to these variables are of course a host of other variables that may show
significant relationships to how much one speaks, on how many topics, and with how
many argumentative elements. Below is a brief review of the variables that prior
analyses have shown to be potentially important to the present analyses.
A number of studies provide at least indirect evidence of systematic variance on
an individual’s disposition to speak out in deliberation. Lasorsa (1991) found political
outspokenness (at least, as tapped by survey self-reports) to be a function of education,
age, opinion climate and certitude, efficacy, and interest. Like much of the research on
the willingness to speak, Lasorsa’s research was predicated on the spiral of silence
theory. Noelle-Neumann’s (1993) spiral of silence theory has certainly paved the way for
a wealth of studies on the predilection to speak in different opinion climates and overall
levels of political outspokenness. This research generally finds systematic variance in the
willingness or predilection to speak with variables such as the perceived opinion climate
and the speaker’s own majority or minority position on a topic. In addition, however, are
relationships with political interest, education and knowledge. Again, these studies are
removed from actual political deliberation, leaving open the question whether such
variables would predict the willingness to speak in this more formal setting. For one,
these studies differ from the one I propose here in that they are either survey-based or
study experimentally-based texts of small group communication or hypothetical
communication environments. Second, the question typically asked in these surveys is
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how likely the respondent would actually be to speak on political issues to a stranger, not
whether, given the opportunity, he/she would speak in an organized political deliberation.
Still, however, I believe these studies provide a strong rationale for testing whether
similar relationships exist in political deliberation.
The spiral o f silence theory states that individuals will suppress their opinions if
they perceive themselves to be unsupported by others (Noelle-Neuman, 1993). It is a
theory that depends on the assumption that individuals use the mass media in their search
for support and that the mass media tend to speak monopolistically, as if with one voice
(Katz, 1981). With regard to deliberation, individuals may enter discussions with pre
formed perceptions from the media about whether those with whom they interact will
support their opinions. Additionally, individuals may use deliberation as an opportunity
to try out their opinions in public in order to gamer the support of other citizens. With
regard to perceived opinion climates, Noelle-Neuman found that both gender (e.g.,
males) and education predicted the willingness to speak. Salmon and Neuwirth (1990)
have also investigated the factors underlying the willingness to speak. Using structural
equation modeling, the authors found a number of indirect effects on the willingness to
speak on political issues. Only two variables exhibited significant positive direct effects,
specifically, political knowledge and issue involvement. In addition, education was an
indirect predictor of the willingness to speak. Other studies also suggest that education
and political knowledge are significant predictors of political conversation. Scheufele
(1999) again defined two types of political talk, the more formal of which was
significantly predicted by political knowledge. The more informal type of political
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discussion, opinion expression, was related to age, education, and opinion climate.
Presumably, political knowledge prepares an individual to speak on politics, providing
ammunition with which to build arguments and defend positions. Since information
generated in political discussion is determined by an individual’s level of “opinion
preparedness” as partially created by high levels of political knowledge (Gerard & Orive,
1987), political knowledge should again be a significant predictor of the proclivity to
speak in political deliberation.
Gender has also been found to be a significant predictor of some types of
conversation. There is a wide range of evidence that men dominate discussion by
significant amounts, primarily, though, injury deliberations (Hans & Vidmaar, 1986;
Marsden, 1987; Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983). Most multivariate analyses of
political conversation based on survey data, however, find few significant differences in
gender. This discrepancy between the analyses of jury deliberations and political
conversation research only underscores the importance of investigating gender
differences in political deliberations.
The potential of gender differences in deliberation is of paramount concern with
regard to the equality principle. Of course, equality many also be threatened by
inequalities in race and, since deliberation is essentially a political discussion, political
minorities. For this reason studies on the spiral of silence were reviewed above. These
studies underscore the possibility that such inequalities may occur across a wide range of
political discussion. As advertised, this chapter will focus closely on these concerns and
test equality as a central and essential principle of deliberation.
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In addition to equality, this chapter will again look at reasoned argument as a
central litmus test of the two frameworks of deliberation discussed throughout this
dissertation. The literature review of chapter two made it clear that the
rational/instrumental framework’s expectations are that sophisticated individuals will be
most capable of speaking up in deliberation, and doing so in a sophisticated, or more
rational, reasoned, and argumentative manner because of their high levels of political
interest and attentiveness and thus high levels of knowledge (Judd & Krosnick, 1989;
Wegman, 1994), non-neutral opinions (Krosnick & Telhami, 1995), greater store of
knowledge with which to make sophisticated claims (Galotti, 1998; Perkins, Allen, &
Hafner, 1983), more concretized opinions (Tesser, 1978), and prior experience in
collective decision making and public speaking (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, & Nie, 1993).
Politically sophisticated individuals, as measured by education, interest, and political
knowledge, exhibit a greater level of cognitive complexity, leading to greater detail and
breadth of appeal justification in persuasive discourse (O’Keefe & Delia, 1979) and are
most accustomed to high levels of complex information exposure (Emler & Frazer,
1999).
Again, however, I must point out that none of the studies mentioned thus far
explored these issues in the context of political deliberation. And, there are a handful of
studies reporting conflictual findings (e.g., Ceci & Liker, 1986; Perkins, 1985; Wager and
Sternberg, 1986). In contrast, the communal/conversational framework I have argued for
throughout the dissertation claims that political sophistication will be subsumed under the
importance o f prior political conversation. Indeed, a wide range of literature suggests

192

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that the only way to gain sophisticated opinions and comfort in talking politics is, in fact,
to talk politics. Frequency of discussion brings about more critical thinking (Paul, 1992),
more structured opinions (Lasch, 1995), associational intelligence (Dewey, 1954), more
sophisticated utterances (Scott & Lyman, 1968), and political comprehension (Robinson
& Levy, 1986). Political conversation, in short, organizes attitudes (Lalljee & Evans,
1998; Emler, 1990).
This chapter, then, will explore the validity of these two expectation frameworks
primarily by looking at the relative weight of political conversation to political
sophistication in the production of political talk, political topics, and the degree to which
citizens offer sophisticated political talk. In addition, the principle of equality will be
explored as a central normative principle of deliberation. Coming to a greater
understanding of these two facets of deliberation is vital in making an overall assessment
of the character of deliberation as well as its utility and the validity of each framework of
deliberation.
The Data
This analysis combines the coding instrument data with data from the baseline
survey of deliberative participants and residents of Philadelphia. Given the theoretical
review above, a number of variables from the survey are important either as control
variables or variables of theoretical interest. Survey variables will serve as independent
variables, as they are causally prior to the dependent variables of interest, namely, the
amount of speaking, the number of topics discussed by each speaker, and the level of
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argumentation by each speaker. Additional coding variables will be used as controls
where applicable.
Although there are two main areas of interest, equality and argument, there are, as
mentioned, three main dependent variables of interest. Of course, the amount of speaking
is designed to primarily test the equality principle. It does, however, also provide a test
of the determinants of deliberation, be they political sophistication or conversation. The
number of topics also tests these two principles, and although perhaps more obliquely,
this variable still has great importance. Would the equality principle be upheld if the
number of issues members of each group were capable of raising unequal? Additionally,
there is more reason, perhaps here than with the other two dependent variables to find
covariation with both sophistication and conversation, as both are logically required to
speak on a number of topics. Finally, the number of topics offered by each individual
(controlled, of course, for overall amounts of speaking) is a direct test of whether certain
types of individuals (that is, more sophisticated) are more capable and indeed more
argumentative in deliberation. The final dependent variables of interest is a count (and
ratio) of argumentative elements provided by each individual, to be used as the most
important comparison between sophistication and conversation.
Since many of the survey variables used in these analyses were discussed in
earlier chapters, they will not be reviewed here. Below are explanations of the coding
variables used in this analysis, not yet described in previous chapters.
Lines o f text: Measured by the quarter line, this measures the amount of speaking
by each speaker and was used instead of words per speaker, first, for ease of
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measurement by the coding team, and second, because number of words can be slightly
misleading depending on the length of spoken words by each speaker. Mean = 44.8,
Range = 0 - 132.25.
Number o f Utterances: A count of the number of utterances by each speaker.
Mean = 19, Range = 0 - 7 1 .
Number o f Thought Statements per Speaker. A count of the number of thought
statements made by each speaker. Mean = 10, Range = 0 - 5 3 .
Number o f Topics: A count of the number of topics discussed by each speaker.
Mean = 4.6, Range = 0 - 1 6 .
Number o f Significant Argumentative Contributions: Measures the number of
utterances that contained at least two thought statements where at least one was a primary
argumentative element. Mean = 5.3, Range = 0 - 1 7 .
Index o f the Number o f Argumentative Elements Minus the Number o f
Conversational Elements: This measures the number of argumentative elements minus
the number of conversational elements provided by each speaker. Mean = 8.5, Range = 3-37.
Number o f Discussants in Group: A measure of the number of discussants in
each individual’s group. Used as a control variable for correlational analyses. Mean =
15, Range = 9 - 2 1 .
The analyses used three methodologies: correlational analysis, regression
analysis, and structural equation modeling. The first of these is designed to the reveal the
bivariate associations between the dependent and independent variables of interest. Of
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course, there are a number of moderate to strong associations between a wide range of
independent variables, as is the case in most political analyses. In many analyses,
bivariate associations can be misleading or theoretically insignificant compared to
multivariate relationships. Here, however, bivariate associations are important because
many of the associations posited in the literature are important regardless of their
correlation with other variables. For example, theorists have argued for the possibility of
differences in deliberative equality on variables like gender and race (e.g., the equality
principle), regardless of associations these two variables have with political knowledge
and interest. Any inequalities that exist, with or without controls, are important to report.
The regression analyses, then, show what occurs when these controls are introduced, and
in this sense, show which variables are the primary motivators and predictors of
speaking, arguing, and discussing a number of topics. Finally, structural equation
modeling is employed to construct a model of the predilection and ability to deliberate.
The structural equation model has many advantages over regression. In addition to
including measurement error and the possibility of measuring correlated error terms, the
model includes all the dependent variables of interest and shows many different direct
and indirect paths from endogenous to exogenous variables.
Importantly, the data used in these analyses have multiple levels that have to be
accounted for to properly measure the relationship between the variables of interest.
Although the analysis is an individual level analysis, the participants in the deliberation
were situated in twelve groups. As we saw in the topical maps discussed in the previous
chapter, each group developed and exhibited it own unique characteristics. Moderators
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also exhibited different styles: Some allowed discussion to range freely while others
were more involved in the discourse. The coding of topics, to cite another example,
varied by subject (subject denoting the five subjects discussed; education, jobs,
government, crime, and neighborhoods). Some subjects, as is apparent in Appendix C,
were coded for more topics than others. Twelve (actually, eleven since one group was not
transcribed by court reporters) is too small an N to test for significant trends at the group
level. Thus the macro level of the data, that of the group, need not be measured in any
significant way. However, it must be controlled statistically. O f the different types of
multilevel analyses available, the use of regression analysis with dummy variables for k-1
groups is the most effective at controlling for macro-level effects while leaving micro
level effects untouched (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998). As such, the correlational analyses
reported here are not Pearsons R. Rather, partial correlations are reported, with k-1
dummies included, as well as additional controls where applicable. However, The use of
dummy variables would create a quite burdensome structural equation model. Instead,
each variable in the structural equation model is transformed from the variables used in
the correlation and regression analyses in that, for each individual, the group (macro
level) mean for that variable was subtracted.
As reviewed earlier, the amount of speaking variables test both equality in
discourse and test for political sophistication and conversation as motivators of speaking
in a deliberative forum. Of course, violations of the equality principle would be the result
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o f significant associations between amount o f speaking and individual level

demographics, most importantly gender and race.

71

In addition to these variables (and conversation and the sophistication variables of
education, knowledge, and interest), the analyses reported here also tested for
associations between the dependent variables and employment, age, income, efficacy,
and neighborhood participation. Employment was included because it was suspected that
this variable might have a significant association to speaking based on a review of the
careers mentioned in the text. Unfortunately, the survey itself did not ask participants to
specify their careers. However, 38 participants did mention their employment in the
deliberations. Not surprisingly, the education groups included quite a few teachers, as
r

well as administrative staff and charter school managers. Neighborhood groups included
a few neighborhood planners; and city government groups included a number of city
employees. Of course, an employment variable could not be constructed from the coding
data since such data was only recorded for those who mentioned their careers in the text.
As such, the data were incomplete. As an alternative, the survey-based employment
status variable was included in the analysis, hoping that if enough of the careers were
related to the topics being discussed in the deliberation, such an association might show
up in the correlation and regression analyses.

21 Although not reported here, “political” minorities were also used in testing for the equality principle.
Since there were very few conservatives and / or republicans in the deliberation, these two groups were
considered political minorities. No significant differences were found on any o f the dependent variables of
interest.
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Efficacy was included in the analyses for its potential theoretical association to
the dependent variables of interest. That is, individuals who hold a positive view of their
ability to affect change in government, and who believe that public officials care about
them and what they have to say, will use their beliefs as motivation to actually have
something to say when given the chance. Finally, age and income were included based
on the wide range of literature finding associations to general measures of participation
reviewed in chapters two and three, as well as for general control variables.
Throughout the analyses, neighborhood participation was included in the
correlation matrices as a potential surrogate to political conversation. Although being a
frequent neighborhood participant does not necessarily mean that a person will discuss
politics with others, it does mean that such an individual is more frequently exposed to
other individuals in his or her neighborhood, raising the possibility that that individual
would be exposed to political talk or at the very least local talk about the neighborhood,
which may include political content.
Results
The results, then, are reported in the order of the three dependent variables
described above. Each sub-analysis reports correlations and then regression analyses.
Finally, the structural equation model is introduced and reported. Discussion of the
findings will be provided in the next section.
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Table 5a: Correlation M atrix, A m ount o f Speaking in Deliberation
Partial C o rre la tio n s (A dditional C ontrol:

Lines o f T ex t

N u m b e r o f D isc u ss a n ts in S p e a k e r’s
C roup)

N u m b er of

N u m b er of

U tteran ces

Thought
S ta te m e n ts

Male

.13

.1 6

.18*

Black

- .0 4

- .0 6

- .0 9

Age

- . 22 *

- .0 7

-.1 8 *

Incom e

.13

. 21 *

.1 7

Education

-.01

.0 4

.02

Em ployed

.24*

.19*

.24*

Political C o n v ersatio n

.42***

.25**

.35***

Political Efficacy

.19*

.19*

. 20 *

Political K now ledge

.14

.1 4

.1 7

Political In te re st
.09
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, N@ 110

.01

.0 9

(Note: Lines and Utterances R = .73**, Lines and T. Statements R = .90**, Utterances and T. Statements R = .93*)

Table 5a provides the partial correlations between the three speaking variables
and the independent variables. While males have a slightly higher tendency to speak
more than females, the correlation is only significant with the number of thought
statements. There is no association between the amount of speaking in deliberation and
race. Age has a moderate negative association to amount of speaking, and efficacy
exhibits a moderate positive relationship.
On the debate between conversation and knowledge, the results show a stark and
substantively significant contrast. By far, political conversation in everyday life, with
friends, family and others, is a most powerful and substantively significant predictor of
speaking in deliberation. In contrast, education, knowledge, and interest show no
significant relationships to any of the three independent variables. As mentioned, a
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number of these variables have moderate to strong associations with one another, giving
rise to the importance of controlling between the independent variables in the model.
This is done with regression analyses, shown below in table 5b.
Table 5b: Regression Analysis, Am ount of Speaking In Deliberation
Lines

U tterances

Thought
S ta te m e n ts

B

SE

B

SE

B

SE

.7

3.4

.3

1.1

.7

1.7

G en d er (1 = m ale)

8.1

2 .7

1.9

4.9

2.9

Race (1 = black)

-.5

6.0
6.8

2.1

-1 .5

3.3

Education

-.2

2.7

-.1
.1

.9

-.2

1.3

Em ployed

10.4

6.3

2.0

5.4

3.1

Political K now ledge

- 2.6

28 .8

9.0

.3

14.1

Political Efficacy

3.6

3.4

2.8
.0
1.8

1.1

2.3

1.7

Political In terest

- 6.1
10 . 2 ***

9.2

- 3 .7

2.9

-3 .5

4.5

2.7

1. 8 *

.8

4.1**

1.3

Intercept

-1 5 .9

75 .6

- 3 .2

23.7

- 1 5 .0

3 7 .0

N

110
2 .0 ***

3.3***

110
2 7***

R2

.30

.41

.36

R2 fo r Political C o n v ersatio n

.11

.03

.07

N um ber o f C roup D iscu ssan ts

Political C onversation

F

110

p < .05, ** p < .01. *** p < .001

When simultaneously controlling for the independent variables, the moderate
effects for male, efficacy, age and employment disappear. However, conversation
remains a substantively significant predictor. The overall model fit statistics are highly
significant, and the models account for a fairly high percentage of the variance in the
dependent variables. Conversation alone accounts for anywhere from three to eleven
percent of this variance.
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A different test for equality delves a little deeper beyond overall amounts of
speaking to specific types of speaking. The other two main tests, as mentioned, will be
the number of topics discussed by each speaker and the number of argumentative
statements made by each speaker. Before reporting those analyses, however, it is useful
to take a look at the tendency to make specific types of deliberative contributions. This
to ensure that the non-findings with regard to equality and political sophistication in the
above analyses on amount of speaking remain at more specific levels of talk.
Table 5c: Specific Deliberative Contributions
Partial C o rre la tio n s (C ontrol

Problem

V ariable: C o u n t o f T h o u g h t

F uture

Solution

Vision

S ta te m e n ts p e r S p e a k er)

Info.

Self-

Elabor

Q uery

C ont.

a tio n

G ender

.0 9

.03

.0 7

-.1 3

- .0 7

.0 9

Race

- .1 4

.05

-.1 5

.15

- .0 7

-.01

- .0 6

-.28**

- .0 4

Education

-.1 0

-.1 0
-.1 0

Em ployed

.19*

.24*

.08

.10

-1 4

- .0 6

Political C o n v ersatio n

.24*

.08

.12

-.1 9 *

-.0 3

- .0 8

Political In te re st

.28**

.0 7

-.02

- . 21 *

-.1 9 *

Political K now ledge
* p > .05, ** p > .01

.12

- .0 6

- .0 7

.03

-.1 4

-.1 0
-.01

Although no clear trends emerge, a number of specific findings are of interest.
First, the table confirms the equality of discourse with regard to gender and race. Thus
far, it appears that the deliberations were relatively equal with regard to the different
groups tested in the analyses. Second, there is an interesting finding with regard to
education in that is has a strong negative association with the tendency to make self
continuations, but no association to making elaborations. A similar result is apparent
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with political interest. This is as might be expected: Self-continuations are moments
when individuals are prompted to elaborate but are unable to provide any new
information (they instead almost always restate what they already said). Thus, these
significant correlations indicate that individuals who are unable to elaborate are also
those low in at least two of the political sophistication variables, education and interest.
Similar analyses were conducted with specific information types and primary statement
types, with no consistent significant findings. Interestingly, though, political knowledge
had a substantively significant and negative association to the use of experiential
knowledge claims, suggesting that storytelling may be used in many cases in place of
actual knowledge of politics.
The second model fitted in this chapter is similar to the first but is concerned with
the number of topics discussed by each individual rather than the overall amount of
speaking. The number of topics discussed still gives some insight, though perhaps more
indirectly, toward the principle of equality, for just as we would hope that various groups
would make rather equal contributions to the overall amount of speaking in deliberation,
so too would we hope that different groups provide equitable contributions to the type
and number of topics discussed. And of course, number of topics is a more direct
measure of deliberative ability, for people who are able to contribute to deliberation no
matter the topic being discussed subsequently provide greater and more significant
contributions to the overall discussion.
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Table 5d: Correlation M atrix, N um ber of Topics
Partial C o rre la tio n s (C ontrol
V ariable: N u m b e r o f D isc u ss a n ts in
S p e a k e r’s G roup)

N u m b er o f T opics

N um ber o f T opics

D iscu ssed by

D iscu ssed by S p eak er

S p eak e r

n u m b e r o f u tte r a n c e s as

(w /

a d d itio n a l c o n tro l)

Male

.15

-.01

Black

-.0 5

.05

E m ployed

.13

-.1 3

N e ig h b o rh o o d P articipation

. 22 *

.24**

Political C o n v ersatio n

.36***

.13

Political K now ledge

. 21 *

. 20 *

Political In te re st
* p = .05, ** p < .01

. 21 *

.26**

Like the analysis on the amount of speaking, there does not appear to be
significant inequalities between groups with regard to the number of topics discussed by
individuals in such groups. As the table shows, political conversation at first appears to
be a most substantively significant predictor of the number of topics discussed.
However, when the overall number of thought statements is added as an additional
control, political conversation falls just below the level of two-tailed significance. In
contrast, both political knowledge and political interest remain significantly positive
predictors of the number of topics (education, not shown in the table), was not
significantly correlated to number of topics discussed. As shown in table 5d above,
neighborhood participation also has a significant association to number of topics
discussed, especially when overall amounts of speaking are being controlled.
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Table 5e: Regression Analysis, Num ber o f Topics

N u m b er o f T o p ics D iscu ssed by S p eak e r
B
SE
B
SE
N u m b er o f G roup D iscu ssan ts

.07

.32

N u m b er o f U tterances

.0 4

.1 6

.25***

.02

G e n d er (1 = m ale)

.85

.56

.13

.2 8

Race (1 = black)

.07

.63

.1 7

.31

E ducation

-.02

.26

- .0 6

.13

E m ployed

.42

.59

- .1 6

.2 9

N eig h b o rh o o d P articipation

.26

.20

. 20 *

.10

1.05

2.81

1.98

1.38

Political In terest

.43

.86

1. 01 *

.42

Political Efficacy

.17

.31

-.2 3

.16

Political C onversation

.67**

.25

.26*

.13

In te rc e p t

-4 .9 0

7.10

- 4 .9 7

3 .4 8

Political K now ledge

N

110

110

F

3.6***

27***

.64

.8 7

R2
p < .05, ** p < .01. *** p < .001

In the multivariate analysis, the results largely replicate those found in the
bivariate analysis. When the amount of speaking is used as a control, neighborhood
participation, political interest, and political conversation all exhibit significant and
positive relationships to the number of topics discussed. The model is not only a
significant fit of the data but explains most of the variance in the dependent variable.
The final dependent variable of interest is the degree to which individuals provide
arguments in deliberation. Given that the range and level of argumentation is average
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within and between individuals, the next question to explore is the degree to which
individuals are able to provide political arguments at all.

Table 5f: Correlation M atrix, Argum entativeness
Partial C o rre la tio n s (C ontrol V ariable: C o u n t o f U ttera n ce s p e r
Speaker)

N u m b er o f S ignificant
A rg u m en tativ e U tterances

Male

.11

Black

-.1 3

Political C onversation

.18*

Political K now ledge

-.0 3

Political In te re st
* p = .025

.0 9

Similar to results found for overall amount of speaking and number of topics
discussed by speaker, gender and race are not significant predictors of the number of
argumentative statements made by each speaker. Again, political conversation, even
when controlling for the overall amount of speaking, displays a significant and positive
association to the frequency with which individuals make significant argumentative
contributions.
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Table 5g: Regression Analysis, Argum entativeness
N u m b er of S ignificant

S ignificant S ta te m e n t

A rg u m e n ta tiv e U tteran ces

Index

B

SE

.11
34 ***

.25

.53

.67

.02

.36***

.06

.58

.43

.4 8

1.16

Race (1 = black)

-.7 4

.49

- .7 5

1.30

E ducation

-.01
-.02

.20

- .2 7

.54

.46

1.14

1.22

-2 .0 3

2.05

5 .87

Political In te re s t

.41

.48

-2 .4 2
5 44 ***

Political Efficacy

-.22

.24

-.8 6

.66

Political C o n v ersa tio n

.37*

.18

1.03*

.53

.95

5.17

- 2 3 .3 6

14.81

N u m b er o f G ro u p D isc u ssa n ts
N u m b er o f U ttera n ces
G e n d e r (1 = m ale)

E m ployed
Political K now ledge

In tercep t

B

N

110

110

F

1 7***

4.1***

.78

.4 9

R2
R2 fo r In te re st
p < .05, ** p < .01. *** p < .001

SE

1.79

.05

In the regression analysis, two different dependent variables were explored, the
first, the same count of significant argumentative utterances used in the correlation
analysis, the second, a measure of the number of significant argumentative statements
minus the number of conversational elements (queries, elaborations, and tangents). In
both cases, political conversation is again a significant and positive predictor. Although
education, knowledge, and interest did not show any significant association to the number
of primary argumentative statements made by each speaker, interest was substantively
significant to the measure of significant to non-significant statements. Both models
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significantly fit the covariance matrices of the data, and similar to the other models, both
explain at least half of the variance of the dependent variable.
As was shown in the chapter on participation, those who participated were not
representative of the overall population. Variables upon which differences occurred are
now going to look very different in the present analyses. Luckily, most of these variables
only show a higher mean; their dispersions are not abnormally skewed or kurtotic.
Political knowledge and interest, however, do show somewhat nonnormal levels of both
skewness and kurtosis (see Appendix F for histograms of these variables). In addition,
the independent variables also showed nonnormal indicators at levels that might lead to
concern that the assumptions of regression analysis might be violated. However, it is the
dispersion of the independent variables on the dependent variables, not the variables
themselves, that need to remain normal to satisfy the assumptions of regression.
Appendix F reports tests for the regression assumptions for each model. Despite some
nonnormality in the independent and dependent variables, the analyses strongly satisfy
the regression assumptions of normality, linearity, and equality of variance.
A Model of Deliberative Dialogue
Based on both theory and the results reported above in the correlational and
regression analyses, I now present a final model of deliberative dialogue. Included in the
model are the three main deliberative outcomes researched in the prior section, that is,
amount of speaking, number of topics discussed, and number of arguments (here,
measured as the ratio of significant argumentative contributions to non-argumentative
contributions). Also included are two of the “sophistication” variables, political interest
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and political knowledge, and of course, political conversation, which, as we have seen,
plays a vital and central role in the predilection to deliberate at all on a wide range of
topics and in an argumentative fashion. Other variables are not included in the model, for
they do not have any direct effect on the three primary exogenous variables of the
analysis, and their inclusion does not change any of the coefficients among the six
variables mentioned above. Thus, they only serve to complicate the presentation of this
model. Of course, I did run a model that included these variables, which performed
largely as expected, namely that there are significant associations between gender and
political knowledge, education and knowledge and interest, and race and interest.
The model was constructed as follows: As mentioned and shown in prior
analyses, the “central” (both graphically in the model and conceptually) variable
concerning deliberative dialogue is prior political conversation. Not only does it have a
direct effect on the amount of speaking, argumentativeness, and number of topics, but
also indirect effects to argumentativeness and number of topics through amount of
speaking. This makes sense, for, as we have seen, the amount of speaking is logically
and empirically the most powerful predictor of both the number of topics and level of
argumentation. Given the strong association of interest to the ratio of significant
argumentative contributions to non-arguments, there is a direct association between these
two variables, as is also the case between political knowledge and number of topics.
Amount of speaking in the model is an additive variable of the standardized measures of
lines, number of thought statements, and utterances. Reliability of these three estimates
was high (alpha = .84). Finally, there are indirect effects of both knowledge and interest
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to the three main exogenous variables through political conversation. This model, then,
effectively controls the three “prior” (the two endogenous variables, interest and
knowledge, plus conversation) variables through these indirect effects, plus an
association between the error terms for political interest and knowledge. The model is
represented in the figure 5a below, with variances, covariances and coefficients from
fitting the model to the data.

A Model of D eliberative D ialogue
Z5 0, .13

political

arguments

interest

0, .82
amount of
speaking

cn /

/

i

political
conversation

\2 .0 7

political
knowledge

z4

0, .01

.01

/

o

b

.19

1.86

number
of topics

0, 1.40 z 2

F igure 5a: A M odel o f D eliberative D ialogue
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Table 5h: Model Fit
C h i-S q u a re

2.7 4 4

D eg rees o f F reedom

5

RFI

.97

IFI
RMSEA

1.0
.00

V ariables

C oefficients

S.E.

K now ledge

C o n v ersa tio n

1.9*

.95

In te re st -> C o n v ersatio n

1.1**

.3 0

C o n v ersa tio n

.27**

.0 8

C o n v ersa tio n -> A rg u m e n ta tiv e n e ss

.44*

.22

C o n v ersa tio n

.16*

.0 8

1.9

Am t. O f S p eaking
# o f T o p ics

In te re s t -> A rg u m e n ta tiv e n e ss

3.3**

1.1
1.1

A m t. Of S p eak in g ->

4.8***

.3 7

A m t. Of S p eak in g -> # o f T opics

2 | ***

.11

R -s q u a re d , C o n v ersatio n
R -s q u a re d , A m o u n t o f S p eak in g

.12
.10

R- s q u a re d , N u m b er o f T o p ics

.75

R -s q u a re d , A rg u m e n ta tiv e n e ss
p < .05, ** p < .01. *** p < .001

.63

K now ledge

# o f T o p ics

A rg u m e n ta tiv e n e ss

The structural equation model of deliberative dialogue presented here fits the data
exceptionally well, with many of the fit measures not significantly different than their
respective optimal measures (e.g., RMSEA = .00, IFI = 1.0). Every individual
coefficient, not including the path from knowledge to number of topics, is at least
marginally significant. Given the paths from amount of speaking to both number of
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topics and argumentativeness, it is not surprising to see high r-squares for these two
variables.
Discussion and Conclusion
Despite the large number of analyses reported in this chapter, the results are
consistent for both the equality and reasoned argument principle of deliberation. First,
with regard to equality, there is no evidence here to support that deliberation is unequal
across gender and race. This is true not only for overall amounts of speaking, but also the
kinds of dialogic contributions made, the degree to which individuals argue, and the
number of topics discussed. Although not represented in the tables provided here, similar
insignificant findings were found for both political conservatives and republicans, both in
short supply (with regard to attendance) and thus “political minorities” in the group
deliberations.
Important to note, nevertheless, is that the signs of the bivariate coefficients of
gender and race are in a direction of inequality, with slightly more whites than blacks and
slightly more men than women talking, making arguments, and talking on a number of
topics. With a larger N these trends would no doubt be significant at the bivariate level.
However, they would not be substantive. Additionally, such bivariate associations would
in all likelihood dissipate in multivariate analyses since they weakened from the bivariate
to multivariate analyses reported here. The reason seems clear enough: differences in
interest and knowledge across gender and race seem to account for most of the difference
with regard to deliberative equality. Overall, then, the news here is good: I find no
statistical evidence of inequality in the amount of speaking, the number of arguments
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made, or the number of topics discussed. Charges that deliberation will lead to inequality
(Sanders, 1997; Young, 1996) appear unwarranted.
With regard to the debate over sophistication versus conversation, the results are
clear and consistent: Political conversation begets political deliberation. While this may
seem commonsensical, it is not necessarily the case. People who are comfortable
conversing with family and friends may not have necessarily been comfortable talking to
strangers. Second, deliberation is a more formal and (supposedly) argumentative form of
political dialogue than is political conversation. If the differences are anywhere near the
differences found by McLeod et al. (1999) between opinion expression and political talk,
the relationship between political conversation and deliberation are by no means
automatic. Political conversation, especially when asked after being recruited for a
project in which the respondent agreed to discuss politics, may be in some way invalid,
for example, due to social desirability. If this was the case we might also see a weak if
not altogether insignificant relationship between political conversation and deliberation.
Finally, while political conversation is a self reported survey variable subject to social
desirability and telescoping, the variables based on the coding instrument are actual
measures of real discourse.
The relationships between various deliberative measures and political
conversation are strong and consistent. There is strong evidence in these findings that the
political conversation argument (remember Lasch’s quote earlier in the chapter) is bome
out: The formation of opinion occurs with the attempted utterance of such opinions. As
such, the level and frequency of prior political utterances leads to greater and more
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significant future utterances, or at least, given the opportunity to do so, prior political
utterances equip one to make more substantive future political utterances, as individuals
with high levels of prior political conversation (it is inferred) have more crystallized
opinions ready and waiting to be vocalized.
As for the political sophistication argument, the evidence produced here is weak if
not in opposition to the position that politically sophisticated individuals are best
equipped to deliberate. Indeed, between education, interest, and knowledge, in six total
regression analyses (thus 18 possible tests for significance), only two were substantively
significant. There is little evidence here that political sophistication produces or predicts
deliberative ability.
Of course, there are two ways in which these findings must be qualified. First,
prior chapters have shown that deliberation is not a wholly argumentative endeavor, but
rather tends toward discussion of accountability, responsibility, and community. While
these topics may involve quite a bit of argumentation, they do not require much
specialized knowledge, certainly to the degree required for topics more oriented toward
public policy. If we were to force the participants to talk public policy, what would have
happened? Would we have seen differences with regard to political sophistication? Or
would it have been flat out impossible for the participants to talk public policy? Of
course we cannot know the answer. Nevertheless, the participants did spend an entire
day talking politics, with moderators trained to keep people on a predetermined agenda of
talk that entailed the discussion of a number of political actions, each of which had
serious public policy implications. Even if individuals did not talk at the level of elites,
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surely some trends would still have been hinted at in the data. As it happened, no trends
were apparent with regard to political sophistication and deliberation. Indeed, many of
the insignificant coefficients between knowledge and the dependent variables were
negatively signed.
Second, the data at hand might not have been capable of showing the findings I
was looking for. This argument, however, does not stand up to facts: While it is true that
there was a significant number of missing cases and an N that may seem small to some
survey analysts, the overall N was indeed nowhere near so small as to preclude an
acceptable amount of statistical power, as is evidenced by the particularly strong findings
with regard to deliberation and political conversation. Certainly, better data, with less
noise due to higher reliability scores, more coded data, and more cases would have
certainly increased the statistical power of the analysis. However, for what gain? Such
changes would not likely drastically alter the coefficients found in the analyses above,
which, if significant, were moderate at best, and in many cases (e.g., knowledge) not even
in the predicted direction.
The analyses presented in this chapter gives credence to three major findings.
First, that deliberation exhibits equality, second, that prior political conversation best
equips one to discuss politics, in depth, breadth, and quality. Finally, political
sophistication as measured by education, political interest and knowledge, does not afford
those with high levels of these qualities an advantage in deliberation. Indeed, political
conversation serves as the portal through which political sophistication variables must
travel in order to have any effect, as is evident in the model of deliberative dialogue. And
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as we will see in the next chapter, its effect does not stop there, as conversation is not
only predictive of what people do in deliberation but of what they get out of it as well.
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C h a p te r 6: D elib eratio n a n d th e Diffusion o f O p in io n
F o rm a tio n
Deliberation is a specialized form of political communication. As such it should
not be altogether surprising that conversation predicts not only whether an individual is
willing to participate in deliberation, but, and more substantively, how much they will say
and argue for in deliberation. The differences between conversation and deliberation,
however, are important to point out. First, deliberation is pre-planned. It is an event to
which each individual asked to participate chose whether or not to do so. Chapter one
defined the differences that arise in the self-selected process of joining deliberation. And
while deliberation was significantly related to and predicted by an individual’s prior
levels of political conversation, the relationship was weak. Indeed, if the model of
deliberative participation in chapter one is compared to models of political conversation
reported elsewhere (Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 2000; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999;
Waldman, 2000), a number of differences become apparent. In chapter three I argued
specifically that while engagement in political conversation is a widespread (but lowlevel) activity, deliberative participation is most likely to occur in communalists and civic
identifiers.
A second difference between conversation and deliberation is that deliberation is
a conversation with greater than two participants. While Gunderson (2000) argues that
the ideal number of deliberative participants is two, I have suggested otherwise (Dutwin,
in press), specifically that deliberation is a most effective mode o f political conversation
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because one is exposed to so many different perspectives and wide ranging information.
In practical terms, though, Gunderson and all other deliberative theorists agree that
deliberation is a group event. Political conversation, like deliberation, is almost never
directly measured empirically. This is due, though, to the difficulty in direct observation,
as compared to deliberation, where such measurement has simply rarely been undertaken.
In surveys, political conversation is measured as a frequency, with questions such as
“how many days in the week did you talk politics with friends and family?” Deliberation
is not something that occurs with frequency, and thus is not measured in such terms but
rather in dichotomous terms. While there is no empirical evidence that political
conversation most often occurs in dyads, the most likely reality is that such conversations
average just about two participants. Deliberation is a group process containing as many
as 21 participants in the present project.
Theoretically, deliberation and conversation show a number of additional
differences, as described throughout the dissertation. Deliberation is a more formalized
method of political talk, and has been theorized to contain reasoned arguments on public
policy and, as I have shown in earlier chapters, communal concerns and values.
Of course, despite the differences between political conversation and deliberation,
these two measures are closely related. Given the existence of inter-relativity, the
obvious interesting question is how. As mentioned, prior frequency of political
conversation is weakly but significantly related to participation in deliberation, and
strongly and consistently associated with the frequency to speak out in deliberation as
well the likelihood to argue and speak on a wide range of topics.
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However, perhaps the one potential association between deliberation and political
conversation most important to democracy is the effect political deliberation may have on
future political conversations. The specific goal of this chapter is to explicate the
theoretical importance of this relationship as well as to test this previously unexplored
effect.
The rational/instrumental framework of deliberation is rational in that it argues for
the importance of political sophistication as a predictor of quality discourse and more
importantly argues that deliberative discourse will be characterized by rational, reasoned
discussion on public policy. The model is instrumental in that deliberation is designed to
be an instrument by which citizens gain knowledge and informed opinions. Deliberation
is also an instrument of policymakers, a way for policymakers to get a representative
informed public opinion on public policy issues. This instrumental side of the framework
is of paramount importance to this chapter.
The communal/conversational framework contrasts this perspective by
underscoring the importance not of knowledge leading to informed opinions but of
conversation leading to the very formation of opinion. Instead of serving as an
instrument of representative public policy, thereby rendering deliberation as important
not just for those who participate but for the polity at large, the communal/conversational
framework of deliberation argues that deliberation will foster greater levels of
conversation, leading to a diffusion effect of political conversation to those who did not
participate. The goal of this chapter is to estimate this potential effect.
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The Effects of the Rational/Instrument and Communal/Conversational Frameworks
It is important to recall that chapter one detailed a wide variety of concerns with
the empirical findings of the rational/instrumental framework on methodological grounds.
The criticisms significantly call into question the degree to which deliberation changes
opinions in the long term and in any way increases the positive efficaciousness of the
participants. As I argued in chapter one, these extensive criticisms underscore that the
rational/instrumental framework still has significant work to do to validate its claims.
Despite these criticisms, the complimentary finding by Labrie (2000) with the
present data gives some indication at least that the knowledge effect of deliberation is
genuine. While the knowledge effect can and has been tested with the present data, these
data do not afford an opportunity to test opinion change, having only asked “issue
importance” questions rather than opinion or issue positions outright. As for the
importance measures queried in the projects, no significant changes have been found to
date by this author and a number of other graduate students working with the same data.
Given Fishkin’s weak but significant findings in efficacy change, at least in the
short term, efficacy change as a function of deliberation was checked with the present
data. Given that Fishkin’s moderate effect sizes disappeared long term, effects were not
particularly expected, and in conjunction with that expectation, none were found, using
various scalings of the efficacy questions used in the present study’s surveys (see
Appendix A) as well as individual items.
With regard to knowledge, the present project also tested for specific types of
knowledge changes. Labrie’s thesis was on whether deliberation produced a “gap” in
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knowledge (Tichenor, Donohue, & Olien, 1970) such that those who participated scored
much higher than those who did not. The effect was significant and highly substantive.
However, the literature on knowledge gaps also suggests a different kind of model.
Formerly defined, the knowledge gap is a gap between high and low status individuals.
The division here is defined with five elements. First, high status individuals have more
advanced communication skills. Also, these individuals have larger networks of social
contacts and are more selective in exposure to and retention of information. Higher
status individuals are more oriented toward mass communication (and importantly, this
relationship is reciprocal). Finally, and most importantly, higher status individuals,
specifically those most attuned to public affairs and those most knowledgeable of public
affairs, have larger amounts of stored information, enabling these individuals to better
incorporate new information (Price and Czilli, 1996; Price and Zaller, 1995).
Thus, those with higher levels of knowledge should learn at a higher rate than
those with lower stores of knowledge. This gives rise to a regression model predicting
knowledge measured after a deliberative event, with an interaction between prior political
knowledge and deliberation to test for whether knowledge did give rise to gaps within
those who participated. The data, however, did not exhibit any such effect: The effect of
knowledge and the effect of deliberation on gains in political knowledge were strong but
separate.
As mentioned, the communal/conversational framework of deliberation posits that
conversation is a substantive and important deliberative effect, producing higher levels of
conversation in those who participate. The framework thus incorporates the two-step
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flow model of communication as part of the process of deliberation (Katz & Lazarsfeld,
1955). Importantly, the two-step flow model defines “central” individuals as those most
interested in a certain communication stimuli, be they opinion leaders found to be most
interested in politics (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948) or individuals otherwise
centrally located (Weimann, 1982). With regard to deliberation, then, at least one of two
potential realities must hold. First, those who participated in deliberation are opinion
leaders of a communal polity or, within deliberation, those who are most frequently the
givers of opinions (see Robinson, 1976) will be most likely to create a two-step flow. In
the first instance, one will find a main effect for participation in deliberation on further
political conversations. In the second instance, an interactive effect will occur similar to
those found in the knowledge gap literature such that those higher in prior political
conversation (the opinion givers) will be most likely to increase their levels of
conversation as measured after deliberation takes place.
Although the original conception of the two-step flow argued for the former
definition, there is also much empirical evidence supporting the latter (Allen, 1969;
Mendelsohn, 1964; Nafziger, Engstrom, & McLean, 1951). Allen, for one, defines these
individuals as high in “gregariousness” while Weimann (1982) again calls them
“opinion-givers.” Prior research has shown that the distinction between givers and
receivers are small, especially in comparison to others (Robinson, 1976). In these
comparisons, both receivers and givers were found to be much more likely to consume
news media and participate in politics. Regardless of the term employed, the present
study only has survey items that measure levels of political conversation with friends,
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family, and others, and does not distinguish whether individuals are opinion leaders,
givers, or receivers. While the survey has no formal measure of opinion receiving,
conversation with friends, family, and others is a useful proxy to giving opinions, as one
cannot give opinions without speaking. As such the present study defines the opinion
givers in deliberation as those highest in frequency of political conversation.
The hypothesis that deliberation produces a two-step flow leads to the
expectation, again, of a potential interaction between prior political conversation and
participation in deliberation. A significant effect in this regard would constitute a
“communication gap” similar to knowledge gaps found in prior research. Indeed, a
number of scholars have suggested that such effects potentially exist. Rogers’ call for
further research on the knowledge gap hypothesis centers around the inclusion of “the
differential effects of interpersonal communication” (1976, p. 233, also Gaziano, 1983).
In testing whether conversation can affect knowledge gaps, potentially “closing” them,
Tichenor et al. (1980) found that high levels of community discussion lowered gaps on
local issues.
Thus, although the present study cannot make significant contributions to opinion
change due to lack of measurement, and knowledge change because such an effect has
already been tested (Labrie, 2000), it is capable of testing the potential effect deliberation
has on political conversation. Given the literature reviewed above, the main hypothesis
of this study is as follows: That political deliberation creates a “diffusion effect” on
political conversation, at least temporarily increasing its level above and beyond those
that did not participate in deliberation. This effect may be direct, but it may also be
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interactive with prior conversation. Evidence for either would support the claim that
deliberation produces a two-step flow of communication from the participants to others in
society and lends credence to the communal/conversational framework of deliberation.
The following sections deal with the data, methods, and results of this hypothesis.
Data and Method
The data for this project are of course the pre- and post-panel waves of data
gathered around the Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact project. This chapter will
report the results on bivariate and multivariate analyses using change in conversational
levels from before to after deliberation and a post-panel wave measure of political
conversation as the primary dependent variables of interest, controlling for, of course,
prior political conversation and a number of other variables. These other variables will
be determined by what literature and additional research using the present data find
significantly associated to conversation in multivariate analyses. The cases included in
the analysis are the same as those in the first chapter’s analyses, that is, participants in
deliberation plus those who were given the opportunity to deliberate but declined.
Given that political conversation alone has been subject to increased scholarly
inquiry recently, there are a number of models predicting conversation. Many of these
have been reviewed in earlier chapters. To briefly review, Scheufele (1999) found that
political talk was associated with political knowledge. In addition, opinion expression, a
form of conversation less formal than political talk, was significantly related to age,
education, and opinion climate.
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Conversation has also been found to be associated with news media use. Gabriel
Tarde (1889/1989) and James Bryce (1888/1973) both posited that newspaper readership
stimulates the individual to engage in conversation. This has since been supported by
Kim, Wyatt, and Katz (1999). Controlling for a number of related variables, these
scholars found that newspaper readership was significantly associated with political
conversation, although television use was not. Similar findings have been reported by
others (McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy 1999; Burstein, 1972; Straits, 1991).
In a more recent study of political conversation, Waldman found similar
predictors, namely, a battery of demographics plus television news (but, in contrast to
Kim, Wyatt, and Katz, 1999, not newspaper readership), ideological strength, political
interest and knowledge.
Using data from the present study provides confirmation that for this specific analysis we
are controlling for variables that might relate to political conversation. Results of this
analysis are presented in table 6a below.
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Table 6a: Political Conversation
(C onstant)

B

S.E

1.07***

.1 7

.05

.0 6

G en d er
Race

.18**

.0 6

E ducation

-.0 6 *

.02
.00

Age

-.01***

Political K now ledge

.1 7

.25
22 ***

.0 6

.16***

.04

A tten tion to T elevision News

.0 7

.04

Ideological S tre n g th

.0 6

.0 6

Political In te re st
A tten tion to N e w sp ap ers

N

890

F

***18

R2

.16

p < .05, ** p < .01. *** p < .001

Similar to the literature reported above, political conversation in the present data
is significantly predicted by demographic variables as well as newspaper exposure and
political interest. Knowledge, interestingly, was not a significant predictor. The present
study will include this variable, however, as well as ideological strength and television
news exposure given both their important role as control variables and their significance
in at least one of the studies reported above.
The variables that will be used in the present study remain the same that were
constructed for previous chapters (see Appendix A). As such, only variables not
previously reported will be detailed here. This analysis will include four models based
on a 2 x 2 design. That is, the models will differ through the use of two different
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dependent variables, post-panel political conversation and a difference score in
conversation between pre- and post-panel waves of the survey, and they will also differ
by reporting either main effects or interaction effects.
Post-Panel Political Conversation: A scale mirroring the one used in the pre
panel wave, this measure is an average between frequency of political conversation with
family and friends, and with others (Chronbachs alpha = .60, M = 2.49, SD = .96, Range
= 4).
Difference Score in Political Conversation: Post-political knowledge scale minus
the pre-panel wave scale. (M = -.05, SD = 1.21, Range = 8).
Participation in Deliberation: Scored from zero participation to full participation
(four events) (M = .6, SD = 1.13, Range = 5).
Participation x Conversation (and Participation x Conversation Difference): The
interaction terms for the models (M = .10, SD = .96, Range = 11.45). The measure was
computed by taking the main effect variables, subtracting their means, and then
computing the interaction score. This process maintains the same coefficients as a
normal interaction score but decreases the amount of multicollinearity between the main
effects and the interaction term in the model. See Appendix A for more details on all the
measures in the models.22

22 Statistics in the above descriptions are based on individuals who answered both pre- and post-panel
waves. Differences between groups that did and did not provide responses in the post-panel wave will be
discussed shortly.
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Results
Table 6b reports the results of a bivariate analysis on the two dependent variables
of interest. Of course, these relationships will not provide too much insight into what a
multivariate setup might reveal, since controlling for prior political conversation in a
multivariate setup on time-two conversation will in all likelihood change the coefficients
of the other variables significantly. Nevertheless, the bivariate associations do provide
some interesting results. First is the surprisingly low (yet still substantively significant)
relationship between time-one and time-two conversation. While we might expect these
measures to be more strongly associated, these numbers are encouraging because they
hint at substantive individual change in conversational levels over time.
The second interesting finding is the general lack of predictors of time-two
conversation. As was evident in the regression analysis presented in table 6a, time-one
conversation, at least in a multivariate analyses, was significantly predicted by a host of
variables, relative to time-two conversation. Finally, it is interesting to note the strong
negative associations between the conversation difference score and political
conversation, interest, newspapers and television news. These relationships provide
initial evidence of a ceiling effect, in that individuals high in these variables already had
ceiling-level scores on time-one conversation and could not advance as much as
individuals who reported lower time-one conversational levels. Finally, the partial
correlations of the dependent variables and the conversation - participation interaction
term provide some initial evidence of a significant participation effect.
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Table 6b: Bivariate Associations
Political

D ifference Score:

C onversation

C o n v ersatio n Tim e

T im e Two

Two - T im e O ne

G en d er

-.0 9 *

- .0 6

Race

.0 6

-.0 5

Age

.09*

.14**

E ducation

- .0 8

- .0 4

Political C onversation

.14**

-.6 2 * *

Political K now ledge

- .0 4

.13**

Political In te re st

.03

-.1 7 * *

A tten tio n to N ew spapers

.0 7

-.1 5 * *

A tten tio n to Television News

.03

-.1 3 * *

Ideological S tren g th

-.01
-.01

-.0 9 *

.10**

.10**

Participation
T alk x P articipation In teractio n 3
p < .05, ** p < .01. *** p < .001

-.0 5

a A partial c o rre la tio n w ith tim e - o n e c o n v e rsa tio n a n d p a rtic ip a tio n a s c o n tro l v a ria b le s

O f course, these results are preliminary and possibly even misleading in that they do not
control for other variables and most importantly prior political conversation. To do this,
we must look at the data in a multivariate analysis. Results of the four regression models
are reported in table 6c.
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Table 6c: Regression Analysis, Argumentativeness

P o st-D e lib e ra tio n

C o n v ersa tio n D ifference Score

C o n v e rsa tio n
B

SE

B

SE

B

2.04**

.28

1.99**
*

.2 7 9

1 .66**

- .0 7 3

.08

- .0 7 0

.081

.001

.08

.015

E ducation

- .0 2 6

.03

Age

.006*

.00

A ttn, t o N ew sp ap ers

.010

A ttn, t o Television

.0 0 4

In te rc e p t
G e n d e r (1 = m ale)
Race (1 = black)

P artisan S tren g th
Political K now ledge
Political In terest
Political

SE

B

SE

.281

1.62**

.2 7 9

- .0 7 3

.082

- .0 7 0

.081

.0 8 7

.001

.0 8 8

.015

.0 8 7

-.0 3 1

.0 3 7

- .0 2 6

.0 3 7

-.0 3 1

.0 3 7

.006*

.003

.006*

.003

.006*

.003

.06

.0 1 7

.061

.010

.061

.0 1 7

.061

.05

.011

.0 5 6

.0 0 4

.0 5 7

.011

.056

- .0 7 8

.08

-.0 8 3

.0 8 2

- .0 7 8

.083

-.0 8 3

.082

-.5 4 7 *

.25

-.5 8 4 *

.2 5 4

-.5 4 7 *

.2 5 6

-.5 8 4 *

.254

.081

.08

.0 8 8

.0 8 6

.081

.0 8 6

.0 8 8

.086

.146**

.04

.169**

.0 4 8

-.8 5 * *

.0 4 8

-.83**

.0 4 8

.0 1 5

.03

-.002

.0 3 8

.015

.0 3 8

-.002

.0 3 8

.142**

.0 4 3

.142**

.043

C o n v ersatio n
P articipation in
D eliberation
C o n v ersatio n x
P articipation
N

578

57 8

57 8

578

F

2.3**

3.1**

35**

27**

.05

.0 6

.42

.44

R2
p < .05, ** p < .001.

The data indicate that while there is no main effect for participation on postdeliberative conversational levels, there is a strong and substantively significant
interaction between pre-deliberative conversation and participation. Other significant
measures in the main effects models include knowledge and age. With these data,
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knowledge is substantively predictive of political conversation but was not predictive of
conversational change. The models fit extremely well and account for up to half the
variance in the dependent variables.
To get an accurate idea of what the interactions show, graphs were constructed
and appear below as figures 6a and 6b.

Effect of Prior C onversation &
Participation on C onversation
Conversation Time 2

4

3

2
Low

High
Conversation Time 1
Participation
■■None «-Full

Figure 6a: T h e Effect o f C onv ersatio n
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Effect of Prior C onversation &
Participation on C onversation
Conversation Difference Score

2

1

0

•1

■2
Low

High
Conversation Time 1
Participation
" N o n e " F u ll
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The graphs show strong evidence of a deliberation effect on conversation.
However, this effect is modified through prior political conversation, such that only those
high in political conversation display deliberative effects. Overall, individuals low in
time-one conversation increased their conversation scores as compared to those high in
time-one conversation. This may be due to a ceiling effect in that those high in time-one
conversation had little room for improvement in their time-two scores. Despite this
ceiling, those who participated in conversation and scored high in time-one conversation
managed still to slightly increase their scores on political conversation, while those who
participated with a low time-one conversational score actually talked less after
deliberation. The important thing to note above all in these graphs is the strong split
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produced by participation for those already high in conversation, since the levels of
conversation change for high time-one conversationalists may not significantly differ
from zero, a fact perhaps not surprising again given the strong likelihood of a ceiling
effect.
Discussion
The analyses presented in this chapter give strong evidence for a two-step flow of
communication produced by deliberation, but only for those already highly conversive on
politics to friends, family, and others. In a sense, deliberation produces a “conversation
gap” in that deliberation widens the gap between the degree to which individuals
converse based on prior levels of conversation.
It is interesting that the main effect of prior political conversation on the change in
conversational levels between time-one and time-two is negatively signed. Overall, those
low in conversation dramatically increased their level of conversation between time-one
and time-two compared to individuals high in conversation, regardless of deliberation.
Again, however, there is a strong chance this effect is due to a ceiling effect. By
definition, those high in conversation at time-one, that is, those who say they talk politics
“three or four times a week” (3 out of 4 on the scale) or “everyday” (4 out of 4) could
only increase their score by a maximum of one point, if at all, while those low in timeone conversational levels were able to move up four entire spots. As such, overall levels
of conversation change for high and low time-one conversational measures; that is, the
main effect of conversation on conversation change, must be taken with a grain of salt. It
is also important to keep in mind the timing of the study, namely, that it occurred during
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the 1999 Philadelphia Mayor’s race. The first wave of the panel was taken in January
1998 and the post-panel wave was conducted in November of 1999, just after the general
election. Given the expected election “bump” in political conversation as shown by
Waldman (2000), it is even more difficult to know what the overall main effect of timeone conversation is on time-two conversation, as we do not have data to show where the
mean level of conversation was for any given day.
The important relationship for the present study, regardless of conversation’s
main effect on further conversation, is the difference produced by deliberation on further
political conversation. If one assumes that those high in conversation are defined as the
primary opinion givers, it would appear that deliberation stimulates these individuals to
greater conversation than less conversive citizens. Why deliberation would not produce
an effect for less conversive individuals as compared to non-participants is not clear. It
may be the case, again, similar to the evidence found in the knowledge gap literature, that
as individuals high in political conversation are naturally more practiced at conversation,
deliberation allows such individuals to acquire more fuel for their conversive fire as
compared to individuals unaccustomed to high levels of conversation.
Again, the measures of political conversation were created by scaling two
separate questions. This produced a rather low reliability score with the time-two
measure (Chronbachs Alpha = .60). As such, models were constructed and tested with
separate measures rather than with the scaled item used in the analyses reported in this
chapter. There were no significant differences in coefficients for the separate items as
compared to one another and the scaled item.

234

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The finding that opinion givers were positively affected by deliberation is a
hopeful one. If deliberation can and does stimulate greater levels of conversation—
especially in the context of an election—then nonparticipants close to the participants
may also enjoy the benefits conversation provides even though they did not actually
participate in the deliberations themselves. If political discussion indeed is the keystone
in the formation of public opinion as many suggest (Lowell, 1914; Price, 1992; Price and
Roberts, 1987), then deliberation can aid in the formation of public opinion, for both
participants and for those who come into contact with the participants.
Coupled with other political “stimulants,” deliberation is much like both political
discussion and media exposure. They are indeed complimentary to one another (Chaffee,
1986). Because greater access to any of these channels leads to greater knowledge
acquisition based on those channels (Chaffee, 1986), deliberation can be viewed as a
superior direct and indirect producer of political knowledge: It helps to produce a
citizen-defined politics (Price and Roberts, 1987) and a truly “public” opinion.
The analysis presented in this chapter provides evidence that deliberation is not an
end, but part and parcel of the ever continuing process of public opinion formation. Seen
in the context of an election campaign, deliberation acts as a means to become better
informed and helps create higher quality opinions through its direct and indirect effects,
and through the diffusion of political information from participants to non-participants.
In the words of at least one deliberative theorist (Manin, 1987), deliberation may not
produce an outright expression of public opinion afterward. Nevertheless, it still
produces many individual opinions generated through social means. Deliberation does
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this directly, and like a stone upon a pond, by creating ripples of further communication
in the polity beyond the participants themselves.
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C o n c lu sio n
The past decade has seen a blossoming of theoretical knowledge about
deliberation. I have characterized this body of theoretical knowledge as having a
dominant perspective. According to this framework, political participants, ranging from
donators of time or money to participants in a variety of forms of political conversation
are more likely to be knowledgeable, educated, interested, and in some cases, partisan
and civically skilled. Participants discuss public policy in a manner that is rational,
reasoned, argumentative, equal, open, and engaging. Furthermore, this
rational/instrumental framework argues that sophisticated discourse is done by the
educated, knowledgeable, and interested. Finally, the model argues that deliberative
participants will gain knowledge, become more positively efficacious, and shift in both
aggregate and individual opinions, to presumably more stabilized and informed opinions.
Deliberation itself is an instrument with which to establish a representative and informed
public opinion.
In contrast, I offered a communal/conversational framework of deliberation,
arguing that deliberative participants will be characterized by their strong personal
identification to the community, based on the enactment of a life with a civic inclination,
a civic voice, and a local focus. According to the communal/conversational framework,
deliberation will be only obliquely argumentative, public policy focus will only arise
through talk of the community, and the values of the citizen deliberator will be
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widespread. The framework posits that those who are practiced in political conversation,
rather than necessarily “equipped” with a vast array of knowledge and cognitive
capability, will be most pervasively deliberative and deliberatively argumentative.
Finally, deliberation is not an instrument of reasoned public opinion, but instead part of
the politico-conversational environment, catalyzing the polity with higher levels of
conversation, in conjunction with greater information gains by the participants
themselves.
The Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact project in civic deliberation provided
a wealth of data with which to investigate the tenability of these two expectation
frameworks, and in the process, gain a broader understanding of deliberation itself. To
meet these two ends, four primary research questions were developed:
RQ1:
RQ2:
RQ3:
RQ4:

Who participates?
What do they say and how do they say it?
Who says what?
How does it affect them?

These four questions provided a theoretically and empirically justified set of focal
points, paving the way for an understanding of deliberation and validation of the
frameworks. Each question was explored in its own chapter, whose major findings are
summarized below.
1.

Participation in deliberation is a function o f political sophistication and civic

identification. Regression analysis found significant relationships for all three “political
sophistication” variables, education, political interest, and political knowledge. In
addition, the analyses found that participants had significantly higher levels of political
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conversation, the use of news for engagement purposes, and a desire to stay in
Philadelphia rather than move to the suburbs. Within the typology of political
participants presented by Verba and Nie (1972), the pattern of these variables’
relationships to political participation fit best with the communalist. These “civic
identifiers” were similarly explored in Bellah et al.’s (1985) classic study of the
American identity. These authors found a voice of self-interest and individualism
throughout the American populace, including the civic-minded citizen. But in contrast to
other citizens, civic-minded citizens were also found to have a “second language of social
commitment,” exhibiting a sense that public commitment is “fun,” where “a long term
commitment to the community has led them to define their very identity in terms of it”
(p. 175). Other scholars have made similar arguments. In short, that participating or
committing to one’s community is, for such individuals, a formative identity-building and
identity-reifying activity (Rimmerman, 1997; Teske, 1997). The findings in this
dissertation link this identity with the likelihood of participating in deliberation.
2.

Participants spoke in the language o f the communalist. While the findings

from the regression analysis and the communalist patterns of the variables therein were
suggestive, further support for the communal framework came by way of a qualitative
analysis of the data. Supportive findings included the frequency with which participants
gave indications of a positive efficaciousness, directed toward the city and its residents
specifically, as well as toward their schools and neighborhoods. Collectively and very
nearly as if with one voice, the participants defined two terms over and over again:
accountability and responsibility. Throughout the deliberations these values were found
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to be at the heart of citizens’ political talk. Government was accountable to the citizens.
Principals were responsible to the parents. Criminals should be accountable and thus did
not deserve the privileges of citizenship. Police were accountable to the people on their
beat. Wherever one turned in the text, citizens were enunciating a localized polity where
power ultimately, and very nearly always, resided in the individual citizen. Should we
privatize city services? Should we support “three strikes and you’re out?” Should we
advocate charter schools? Should the city hire exclusively from within the city limits?
All of these questions had the same answer: whatever makes the situation most
accountable to citizens, and whatever creates the strongest tie of responsibility from the
actor (the principal, the criminal, the policeman, the mayor, the courts, etc.) to the citizen.
This civic language was pervasive and in conjunction with the regression analysis offers
strong evidence for the power of the civic identity to motivate citizens toward
deliberative participation and talk.
Perhaps it is not so surprising that deliberation would be so strongly characterized
by the language of communality or that civic identifiers were deliberation’s avid
participants. From a gratifications perspective, deliberation seems tailor-made to the
civic identifier. Specifically, deliberation provided for these citizens a) the fulfillment of
a responsibility of stewardship to the city and those in it, b) help in determining the
responsibilities of the polity, c) enjoyment in engaging with others politically, d) a belief
that they can make a difference, e) an opportunity to hear other opinions more so than
having their own heard, and most importantly, f) a chance to take part in the search for
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the public good. Deliberation served individuals as a vehicle of communal political
contact.
3.

Deliberation satisfies the principles o f openness/engagement and equality. I

have argued against many different aspects of the rational/instrumental framework. Still,
the project found the principles of equality and openness— both central to the
instrumental framework—to be widely prevalent in deliberation. After the deliberative
events, participants most often remarked that the process was very helpful as an
opportunity to hear others’ opinions, experiences, situations, and needs. Many openly
admitted that they had changed their minds on a number of issues. The vast majority of
utterances were directed toward prior statements, engaging citizens together in political
conversation. When an individual asked for more information or justification from
others, there was clear evidence that respondents gave it their best, although nearly half
of the time they were not able to elaborate. Openness was not only a principle of
deliberation, but rather, in many cases, it was the only possible course o f action. In fact,
on numerous occasions participants seemed to be exploring issues for the first time
without any previously held positions.
The equality principle was tested with both bivariate and multivariate analyses
with a variety of dependent and independent variables. With regard to political
minorities, gender differences, and racial differences, there were no significant
differences in the overall amount of speaking, the number of topics discussed, or the
number of arguments made in deliberation. Indeed, few inequalities were found in other
variables except with respect to political conversation and to a lesser extent, interest.
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Given that on average these two variables are often skewed toward men and whites, it
was encouraging to see that even in bivariate relationships gender and race did not
account for significant differences in deliberative talk.
4.

On average, citizens exhibited a generalized, mostly unexceptional ability to

create reasoned arguments on public policy. Citizen-generated political argument was
framed in the language of community and personal experience. Again, participants used
the deliberations to enact a communal identity, to share stories from the community and
discuss with one another politics through the normative communal framework of
accountability and responsibility. The discussion first defined reality and then offered
solutions based on shared experiences. Communal values spread beyond purely local
matters to questions of public policy. Thus, public policy solutions were assessed
ultimately by whether they might help politics become more accountable and responsible.
Communality served to produce a kind of consensus. This consensus did not extend
beyond basic values. Arguments on public policy did not result in unanimous policy
positions but did result in unanimity on the value-laden grounds for which such policies
should be formed. But mostly, issues were brought down to the street level. Experiences
and local information were shared with similarly concerned individuals. Both
argumentation and the subjects of or argument were colored by the communal identity, its
values and concerns. The discussions were dominated by narratives o f local experience.
The participants shared their own stories, spreading information and experiences across
communities.
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As for the ability of citizens to argue effectively, the news was both good and bad.
In many cases, participants were not particularly coherent. On many occasions they were
not able to add more to their own argument when prompted to do so. However, it would
be inaccurate to describe the discourse as wholly uninformed and poorly argued.
Generally, participants were far more knowledgeable about politics than the average
Philadelphian. Participants spread their knowledge to other participants. The ability of
individuals to effectively argue and reason seemed to be widely varied in the discussions.
On average, the deliberative capabilities to argue and to reason were themselves average.
Aggregate numbers furthermore support this finding. The deliberation exhibited a low
ratio of claims to linked information. There was also a low ratio of self-continuations to
elaborations as well as a low overall number of secondary argumentative statements,
especially disagreements. For the most part, individuals were evidentiary generalists.
Over 84 percent of information linkages were general or experiential while 16 percent of
them were global or specialized. Only twelve percent of primary argumentative elements
were at the policy level; 68 percent were at the street or structural level. There were more
primary argumentative elements at a vague or generalized level as compared to the policy
level.
5.

Prior frequency o f political conversation prepares one to deliberate, leading to

a greater number o f claims on a wider variety o f topics and with more argumentative
elements. Political sophistication measures had little impact on these three dialogic
characteristics. Throughout the analyses of chapter three, bivariate or multivariate,
political communication was a strong predictor of all three dependent variables. On the
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other hand, political knowledge and education had no impact on these variables, although
interest was positively associated with both the number of topics and the number of
arguments made by each individual. In general, without knowing how to fire the
weapon, discussants were not able to load it: Without conversational practice, knowledge
did not matter. Indeed, the only significant fit of the data required knowledge to affect
deliberative qualities through conversation, but not directly.
6.

Citizens high in prior political conversation showed the most positive effects o f

deliberation. Although there was no significant main effect for participation on further
conversation, the interaction between prior conversation and participation was
substantively significant. This indicated that those who already had high levels of
conversation were energized by deliberation to produce a greater levels of further
conversation, over and above what nonparticipants at the same level of prior conversation
produce. This has important consequences, for it illustrates that deliberation has effects
beyond those who participate, in that those who do participate talk politics more to those
who do not, creating the possibility of a two-step flow of political communication. As
such, participants high in conversation act like opinion leaders, diffusing conversation to
the general populace.
The research undertaken in this dissertation sheds new light on deliberation at
every step, increasing our understanding of not only who is most likely to show up to
such events, but, also of what is said, how it is said, and with what effect. The research
holds strong implications for the larger domain in which deliberation resides, namely,
democracy and public opinion. The outcomes of the analyses indicate that the
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rational/instrumental and communal/conversational framework have some validity as
models of deliberation.
Future research should continue to study the argumentative and conversational
natures of deliberation, incorporating new coding elements with individual level
measures. Hopefully, at some point scholars will get more serious about the issue of
representativeness. Unfortunately, the designs used by both Fishkin (1996,1999) and the
present project exhibit the degree to which participants are unrepresentative of the overall
population. Fortunately for this project, these differences did not extend into
demographic measures, except for the interactive and moderate main effect of age (see
Chapter 3). How would deliberation differ for a representative group as opposed to the
more elite groups of participants used by both Fishkin and this project? This may be the
most important unknown regarding research on deliberation.
Frameworks of Deliberation
Although the chapters in this dissertation represent different analyses with slightly
different data, they do provide an overall picture o f the road to and from deliberation. All
along, this project has pit two different “candidates” against one another in a battle to see
what would matter most: the rational/instrumental framework and its main components of
knowledge, interest, education, reasoned argument, equality, engagement, and
representative opinion-situated public policy, and the communal conversational
framework, based upon the importance of civic identification and political conversation.
In the first test, the rational/instrumental framework was afforded strong support: All
three factors of political sophistication were positively associated with participation in
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deliberation. However, I argued that the pattern of these variables, in conjunction with
other variables, mirrored the pattern of communalists as described by a number of
scholars (Milbrath, 1972; Bames & Kaase, 1979; Verba & Nie, 1972). Nevertheless, the
weights of the sophistication variables, in comparison to political conversation, held far
steeper slopes at substantively more significant values.
However, from the point at which citizens began to deliberate, the effect of
variables highlighted by the rational/instrumental framework virtually disappeared. At
the same time, conversation took charge as the primary factor contributing to actual
dialogue. Finally, both variables at the end carried near equal weight in being the
receiver of deliberation’s positive effects (knowledge as shown in Labrie, 2000, and
conversation here in chapter six). Overall, then, the rational/instrumental framework and
the communal/conversational framework both play key roles, but at different points in
time.
There is a rich tradition of research on the schemas or frames produced by the
news and other communication stimuli (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Iyengar, 1991;
Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Gamson, 1992; Gamson and Modigliani, 1987; Kinder and
Sanders, 1990). As reported throughout the dissertation, the frame in which citizens
spoke was primarily a communal one. Without more data on the participants, the source
of this frame is not entirely clear. There are, however, a number of suspects. Prior
scholars have detailed the development of the civic identity in individuals (Funk, 1998;
Youniss, McLellan, & Yates, 1997; Smith, 1999; Verba et al., 1995). This development
may lead to the use of a communal frame in everyday conversation. Here, such
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individuals would learn to talk about the values of accountability and responsibility. If
deliberation affords the opportunity to talk politics, then these citizens will talk politics in
the way they are most comfortable, as an experiential, communal discussion, never
straying too far from the values to which they hold.
A different possibility is that the participants talked politics from experience— at
the local level and with a strong value-laden framework—because it was the only way
they knew how. With a relative lack of political knowledge, any nonspecialists will have
no choice in a situation like political deliberation other than to revert to other ways of
speaking (Lippmann, 1922). Given that the communal framework differed little from
group to group, regardless of the topic, the moderator, or the size of the group, it is safe to
say that the framework was pervasive. What is not known, specifically, is why it was
there.
The communal frame again challenges the notion that deliberation is about
discussing public policy and attains, if not absolute consensus, then consensus on where
people disagree (Knight & Johnson, 1994). Deliberation is not largely about public
policy qua political issues. Deliberation is a workshop for opinions. Forming opinions is
less an end goal and more the process of opinion formation itself; that is, gaining
knowledge, listening, learning to keep an open mind, coming into contact with a
multitude of perspectives, experiences, ideas, and attitudes. In this setting, it is alright to
have unformed opinions. Participants in deliberation are rarely if ever going to provide
any serious input into matters of public policy. But they can reify the values under which
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participants and nonparticipants alike should judge policies. In this regard, deliberation
strongly reflects the communal/conversational framework.
Deliberation In Aggregate
Deliberation, like other kinds of political conversation, produces “sociological
intelligence” (Dewey, 1954). Deliberation is in every sense a team effort. In comparison
to other types of political conversation, deliberation is a group activity, creating a more
fruitful setting for the creation of sociological intelligence and public opinion. The more
participants, the more likely someone will disagree, will know the answer to a question,
or will have the necessary knowledge for that particular issue at that particular moment.
Greater numbers (of course, within reason) increase the likelihood that someone will
have had relevant personal experience and that misinformation will be corrected.
Speaking to the advantages of group communication, Cooley argued that “everyone who
has any fact, or thought, or feeling, which he thinks is unknown, and insufficiently
regarded, tries to impart it; and thus not only one mind but all minds are searched for
pertinent material, which is poured into the general stream of thought” (1909, p. 121).
While there were many cases of poor reasoning and misinformation in the project texts,
participants were open to correction. Indeed the text became “argumentative” because of
such instances, as suspect claims underwent the scrutiny of other participants’
knowledge. Corrections were most often rebuttals based on personal experience. The
communal nature of the discussions, therefore, helped to increase the quality of
argument. By staying at the local level, participants could engage each other with
knowledge, experience, and positions based on such knowledge and experience.
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In aggregate, then, deliberation satisfies every one of its principles, including
reasoned argument. Just as voting and presidential preferences, in aggregate, appear
rational (Popkin, Gorman, Phillips, & Smith, 1976; Markus, 1988, Ostrom and Simon,
1985), so too does deliberation, because it is a non-aggregated form of public opinion
(see Herbst, 1993). Thus, the rational/instrumental framework is to some degree
dependent upon the communal/conversation framework.
Public opinion is a process. Deliberation facilitates this process by being a
method within the process and a catalyst to produce further opinion formation. Price and
Roberts (1987) suggest that “a public is not organized in any fixed fashion until forced to
communicate in resolving an issue” and that “public opinion is decidedly not the
distribution of opinions within a public, but is instead a complex function of processes
where disparate ideas are expressed, adjusted, and compromised” (p. 784). Public
opinion, in other words, is impossible without communication. Based on the findings of
this dissertation, deliberation is a model communicative activity for stimulating the
process of public opinion formation.
Deliberation in Democracy
As reviewed in the introduction and elaborated in chapter one, democracy holds
to a number of key principles, including vocal equality among citizens through free, fair,
and frequent elections, the freedom of expression, alternative information, associational
autonomy, and inclusive citizenship (Dahl, 1998). Put another way, democracy is built
upon self-determination, free speech, press, association, and voting equality (Barry,
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1979). Deliberation can provide democracy a vehicle with which individuals can
associate, express themselves, and, in essence, become citizens.
Of all the definitions of deliberation put forward by theorists, perhaps the most
accurate is provided by Dryzek (2000), when he stated that deliberation is
“communication that induces reflection upon preferences in non-coercive fashion” (p. 2).
While deliberation has been characterized with much greater complexity, and given
powers far beyond what Dryzek included in his definition, it is “reflection upon
preferences” that deliberation does best, and it is “reflection upon preferences” that
democracy needs most.
A number of political theorists have consistently found that Americans’ political
knowledge is widely dispersed over a generally low mean. These findings have caused
great concern that citizens do not possess the knowledge with which to make informed
judgments, including, importantly, voting decisions. Overshadowed in the concern over
low knowledge has been another concern raised by a wide range of scholars. These
scholars call, not for increased information as panacea to democracy, but more
conversation. Lasch, as mentioned, has on more than one occasion called on more
conversation to convert “half-formed” opinions into real positions (1995). In more
empirical terms, conversation reduces cognitive inconsistencies (Zaller, 1992) leading to
higher quality arguments (Kim, Wyatt & Katz, 2000; Kuhn, 1991). As Dewey succinctly
put it, “no man or mind was emancipated merely by being left alone,” (p. 168). For
Dewey this required the “improvement of the methods and conditions of debate,
discussion, and persuasion” (p. 208). Given the argument that “modem society has
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divorced the pressure to have an opinion from the pressure to be informed; it has kept one
and eroded the other” (Lane and Sears, 1964, p. 63), it makes sense to be more concerned
about the lack of political conversation than a lack of political knowledge. “When people
have information and discussion they will have a will,” argued Cooley, “and this must
sooner or later get hold of the institutions of society” (1909, p. 86). Deliberation is a
beginning rather than an ending of this process. Democracy begins with conversation
(Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 2000). And, deliberation is an effective tool in the democratic
process.
In local elections and beyond, deliberation can be used to infuse the polity with
greater interest in and attention paid to its campaigns. Deliberation not only serves as the
catalyst for future conversation, it frames these conversations in the very language
theorists had hoped for. Rather than argue in self-interest, deliberation is about putting
on one’s public face (Bohman & Rehg, 1997). This occurs not just because public
argument-making by its very nature encourages talk about the public interest (Elster,
1997), but instead because of the willingness of people to frame discussions with the
public or community’s interest in mind. Whether through direct intervention, further
conversation, or media coverage, deliberation can help spread what democracy seems to
have lost: a sphere of public interest and a more informed and stable public opinion.
The Citizens Voices / Philadelphia Compact project illustrated that when citizens
gather to talk politics, they do not carefully weigh alternatives of public policy in a
rationalistic, deliberative manner. Rather, they talk about politics as it affects them, their
communities, and their values. It is important to note that the deliberative event was
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described by the organizers to the participants in specific terms, namely, as an event
where citizens would a) gather together to set the agenda about what matters to them, and
b) create clear lines of thought with regard to a number of public policy issues, in line
with other deliberative projects conducted by the National Issues Forum and the
Kettering Foundation. The citizens relished in the first goal, to gather together to talk
about issues as they mattered to them, and for once, to set the political agenda. The
problem arose in connection with the second task, whittling down their concerns to clear
public policy issue frameworks. This was because the organizers of the project were
allowing citizens to actually decide whether or not they wanted to do so. Nevertheless,
the Inquirer published a set of issues frameworks despite the fact that many of the citizen
groups never truly got to that stage of talking politics. The first goal simply took and
kept the citizens’ agenda, for that is the way, as this study has shown, citizens are most
comfortable talking politics.
What does this say about democracy? Are citizens incapable of providing clear
guidance for public policy through argument and debate? The data gathered for this
project do not provide a definitive answer to this question, but given what this
dissertation has found, I would argue that rationalistic, argumentative public policy
discussion is the remarkable exception rather than the norm. The truly important
question is, do citizens talk politics well enough? Again, the outcome of the project
seems to underscore the argument made by Ladd (1996). Before insisting that citizens
talk with a high degree of sophistication about public policy or provide clear, citizen
generated public policy options we ought to consider what they can do best: Namely,
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stating broad, guiding values, asserting the need for politicians to consider these values,
namely accountability and responsibility to citizens, and explicating how policies affect
those on the street, at the job, and in the neighborhood.
Extended beyond a single instance like the Citizen Voices / Philadelphia
Compact, deliberative democracy would draw upon the strengths of what Schudson
(1998) has dubbed “the monitorial citizen.” But this work’s conception of deliberative
democracy extends Schudson’s idea to create two forms of the monitorial citizen. First,
there is the kind described by Schudson, that is, the individual focused on one particular
interest who stands in for other citizens by using her enhanced understanding to filter the
continual influx of information and developments with regard to her interests,
subsequently giving or withholding her approval. Thanks to the Ralph Naders of the
world, in other words, ordinary citizens can stand back from politics and decide whether
politicians are doing the right thing.
But in a deliberative democracy, the monitorial citizen takes on a second
meaning. Here, citizens, preferably all, but at least those motivated by communal
concerns, monitor the influx of political information to reframe it and judge it based on
communal values, local concerns, and the unique perspective of the average citizen.
W hile these citizens may not decide public policy, they do inform one another by
instilling their values in the political process. They provide the democratic process its
ultimate authority (Walton, 1998). And, as Aristotle envisioned, they ultimately create
political guidelines based on phronesis, that elusive “from the ground up” wisdom that
can only be generated through political talk.
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The findings of this research should encourage theorists of deliberative
democracy. While citizens do not attain many of their normative standards, they
successfully deliberated in a way that is equally if not more important to democracy. For
only they, as citizens, could talk politics with such a local, basic, and American frame.
American democracy could only benefit from this communal brand of political talk.
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Appendix A: Survey Items and Scales
Education
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Less than High School
High School
Vocations or some college
College graduate
Post-graduate

Media Attention (Both Newspapers and Television News)
0.
1.
2.
3.

No attention at all
Not too much
Some
A great deal of attention

Neighborhood Description Scale Items
I want to know what your neighborhood is like, so I am going to read some phrases that
might or might not describe (NEIGHBORHOOD).
How about (READ ITEM)? Does that describe (NEIGHBORHOOD) very well,
somewhat or not at all?
A. Close-knit and friendly
B. People respect each other
C. Residents care about the neighborhood
There are lots of active community organizations

Neighborhood Participation Scale Items
W e’re interested in people's local or neighborhood activities. Do you ever personally
participate in?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

A Town Watch program
Neighborhood events like block parties or picnics
Any club or recreation center for boys or girls
A Home and School organization
A group associated with a church, synagogue, or mosque
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News Use Scale Items
Here are some reasons why people follow local elections, like the mayor’s race, in the
media. Please tell me whether each reason applies to you a lot, sometimes, or not at
all. First/next, I follow election news.
Does this apply to you a lot, sometimes, or not at all?
News Use: Engagement
To have something to talk about with other people
To use as ammunition in arguments with others
To enjoy the excitement of an election race
News Use: Spectacle
To learn who is ahead and who’s behind
To judge what local political leaders are like
To help make up my mind how to vote in an election

Political Conversation Scale Items
How often, if ever, do you discuss problems affecting Philadelphia and its neighborhoods
with your family or your close friends? Every day, 3 or 4 times a week, once or
twice a week, or less often than that?
Now what about outside your family and close friends, for example, acquaintances at
work or other places? How often, if ever, do you discuss problems affecting
Philadelphia and its neighborhoods with these people? Every day, 3 or 4 times a
week, once or twice a week, or less often than that?

Political Efficacy Scale Items
Next, I’d like to read you some things people tell us when we interview them. For each
statement I read, please tell me whether you strongly agree with it, somewhat agree,
neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with it.
A.
B.
C.
D.

The city government is generally run for the benefit of all the people.
When city government runs something, it is usually inefficient and wasteful.
Most city public officials are trustworthy.
City officials don't care much what people like me think.
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E. Sometimes city politics and government seem so complicated that a person like
me
can't understand what is going on.
People like me don't have any say about what the city government does.

Political Interest
Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of
the time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested.
Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the
time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?
What about local affairs? Some people are very interested in city government and the
upcoming race for mayor, while others are not that interested. Would you say you are
very interested in the upcoming race for mayor, somewhat interested, not too interested,
or not at all interested?

Political Knowledge Scale Items (Baseline Survey)
Here are a few questions about government in the state and the city. Many people don’t
know the answers to these questions, so if there are some you don’t know just tell me and
we’ll go on.
Who is Tom Ridge?
Turning now to the city, do you happen to know the name of the city council person who
represents your neighborhood?
Why is Ed Rendell not running for Mayor in this election? Is it because polls show he is
unpopular, because he is running for another office, or because he is not eligible to run
for another term?
What percent of Philadelphia’s budget comes from the wage tax? Is it closest to: 10%,
20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, or 60%?
Which state has the least restrictions regarding the sale of hand guns: Pennsylvania,
Delaware, or New Jersey?
About what percent of the city budget goes for police? Is it closest to 10%, 20%, 30%,
40%, or 50%?
I’d like to get your feelings towards some city leaders and local people who have been in
the news. I’ll read the name of a person and I’d like you to rate that person using
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something called the feeling thermometer. You can choose any number between 0 and
100. The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward that person;
the lower the number, the colder or less favorable. You would rate the person at the 50
degree mark if you feel neither warm nor cold toward them. Some of these people are
not that well known. If we come to a person whose name you don’t recognize, just tell
me and we’ll move on to the next one.
1.
Lynn Abraham
2.
John Timoney
3.
David Hombeck
Interviewer’s Feedback: Respondent’s overall level of knowledge (3 codings)

Appendix B: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Coding Instrument

Factor Analysis o f Thought Statement Types
Rotated Principal Components Analysis
1
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Solution Q uery
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3

F uture Vision
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Problem
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Reality Claim
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4
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5
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Appendix C: Topics Analysis Charts
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Appendix D: The Coding Instrument Codebook
Coding Sheet, TS Level Coding Dataset
1. Orderall: Order of all thought statements (1 - 4346) in all conversations (ordered 112).
2. Ordergrp: Order of thought statements in each conversation.

3. Text:
1 = deliberative element of each conversation
2 = reflections stages of each conversation

4. Conversation:
1 = Education Harris
2 = Education Jane
3 = Education Michelle
4 = Government Mike
1
5 = Government Tina
7 = Jobs Rosa
8 = Neighborhoods Dave
9 = Neighborhoods Julie
10 = Neighborhoods Louise
11 = Crime Bob
12 = Crime Ellen

5. Subject
1 = Education
2 = Crime
3 = Jobs
4 = City Government
3 = Neighborhoods

6. Coder ID
3 = David
2 = Lisa
3 = Leah

7. Speaknum: Number of each participant given during the April forum, matches
“Apnumb” in Survey.
8. Pagenum: Page number in which the text is located.

9. Uttnum: Number of the consecutive utterance found by the same speaker on the
same page.
10. Tsnum: Thought Statement number in each utterance.
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11. Utter: The count of each utterance made for each speaker separately (blank after each
first thought statement in the same utterance).
12. Utter2: The count of each utterance made for each speaker separately (no blanks).
13. Topic: Textual topic of each utterance
14. Topic 2: Secondary topic in each utterance if applicable.
15. Topicnum: Numeric designation of each topic:
Education:
1 = accountability
2 = adult programs
3 = afterschool programs
4 = busing (1)
3 = charters / vouchers
6 = choice framework
7 = class size
8 = community involvement
9 = curriculum
10= curriculum standards
11 = dropouts (1)
12 = drugs (1)
13 = equality between schools, inter-city
14 = equity (equality between schools, suburbs vs. city)
15 = funding issues
16 = home schooling (1)
17 = leadership
18 = loans/scholarships (2)
19 = mission (the mission of schools)
20 = national priority of schools (3)
21 = parental involvement
22 = principals
23 = residency requirements
24 = resources
23 = rights
26 = school board / taxing authority
27 = school violence (3)
28 = standards, academic
29 = state control of city schools
30 = teacher role / policies
31 = unions / teacher turnover
Crime:
100 = abandoned housing (1)
101 = accountability
102 = alternative sentencing
103 = auxiliary police
104 = bench warrants (2)
105 = budget
106 = charter change
107 = collective bargaining/unions
108 = commissioner's power
109 = community involvement
110 = community organizations
111= community police (incl residency)
112 = corruption / political patronage / fair advancement
113 = death penalty (3)
114 = drugs
113 = early intervention / education as prevention / raising kids
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116 = fluidity (connection between departments)
117 = get tough
118 = gun control
119 = jobs for excons (5)
120 = mandatory sentencing
121 = mapping
122 = media
123 = merit selection (incl elect commissioner)
124 = operation sunrise
125 = parental involvement
126 = police accountability
127 = police training
128 = prison quality o f life
129 = privatization
130 = recreation programs
131= redeployment (4)
132 = taxes (2)
133 = technology and police effectiveness
134 = tougher judges
135 = unions
136 = victims
Jobs:
200 = better service / efficiency
201 = big business incentives
202 = business model
203 = city business plan (2)
204 = city charter
205 = city hall (ease of starting a new business)
206 = clean city
207 = deregulation
208 = education (1)
209 = incentives
210 = infrastructure
211= marketing / image of Phila.
212 = mentoring
213 = privatization
214 = regional
215 = relation (Harrisburg and Philadelphia)
216 = small business incentives
217 = streamline
218 = taxes
219 = training
220 = unions
City government:
400 = 2 party system (1)
401 = abandoned houses (3)
402 = accountability
403 = business and neighborhoods (1)
404 = business model
405 = campaign finance
406 = charter change / mayoral appointments
407 = committee structure (3)
408 = community involvement (incl comm and civics)
409 = corruption (incl deregulation)
410 = ease o f service standards
411= employee qualifications (1)
412 = equality between neighborhoods
413 = fluidity
414 = homelessness (2)
415 = incentives (3)
416 = political leadership
417 = poverty (2)
418 = privatization
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419 =
420 =
421 =
422 =
423 =
424 =
425 =
426 =
427 =
428 =
429 =

referendum (6)
regional (incl sprawl)
relation
residency
streamline
sunshine
taxes
training
unions
voting machines
zoning (1)

Neighborhoods:
500 = abandoned houses (vacant)
501 = accountability
502 = big business incentives
503 = cc vs neighborhood issues
504 = city contact / govt connection to citizens / govt contact / city responsiveness (incl contact w/...)
505 = city planning
506 = civic associations
507 = civility (2)
508 = community centers
509 = community development
510 = community involvement / responsiveness / investing people...
5 11= community leaders (3)
512 = community planning
513 = community voices
514 = economic development
515 = economic incentives in neighborhoods (incl empowerment)
516 = eminent domain
517 = equal access across neighborhoods
518 = funding neighborhood improvements
519 = government role
520 = greenery
521 = job training
522 = local neighborhood jobs
523 = media representations (2)
524 = minimum wage (2)
525 = mom and pop
526 = office of neighborhoods
527 = oversight (1)
528 = people matter (1) 999
529 = politicians and neighborhood improvement
530 = property ownership / taxes
531 = quality of neighborhoods
532 = race
533 = regional
534 = regulations
535 = resources for community involvement
536 = safety (1)
537 = self planning of neighborhoods
538 = small business assistance / startup
539 = stadium
540 = sunshine
541 = taxes
543 = tension between neighborhoods
542 = zero tolerance / graffiti / clean neighborhoods / neighborhood cleanliness
544 = zoning

16. Utttype: Utterance Type
1 = Initial (Agenda Setting)
2 = Response to Moderator
3 = Response to Adjacent Other(s)
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4 = Response to Prior Other
5 = Interruption / Continuation
0 = n/a

17. Topicold: Old textual topic
18. Gender:
l=M ale
2 = Female
0 = n/a

19. Careert: textual career
20. Commrole: secondary pertinent organizational membership
21. Career: numeric career:
1 = school teacher
2 = retired teacher
3 = child care
4 = school administration/general education
3 = private industry/business
6 = student
7 = city employee, blue collar
8 = media
9 = city employee, white collar

22. Org: secondary pertinent organizational membership, numeric:
1 = home or school organization
2 = community organization
3 = rail organization
4 = park volunteer
5 = block captain
23. Coher: Coherence of utterance 1-10
24. Relevanc: Relevance of utterance 1-10
25. Specific: Specificity of each utterance 1-10
26. Role: Role in each utterance
1 = Stewardship / RTP
2 = Efficacy
3 = Accountability
4 = Representativeness
0 = n/a

27. Line: Lines of text for each utterance.

28. Type
1 = Relevancy Statement
2 = Reality Claim
3 = Problem Definition
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4 = Future Vision
5 = Solution
6 = Linked Information
7 = Deliberative Meta-Talk
8 = Choice Framework Meta-Talk
9 = Informational Query
10 = Solution Query
11 = Agreement
12 = Disagreement
13 = Qualifier
14 = Self-Continuation
15 = Elaboration
16 = Agree/Disagree w/ Moderator’s Summary
17 = Other
0 = Nothing

29. Aggto
1 = Prior Reality Claim
2 = Prior Problem Definition
3 = Prior Future Vision
4 = Prior Solution
5 = Prior Information
6 = Option Provided only by Choice Framework
0 = n/a

30. Linktype
1 = Specialized
2 = Experiential
3 = Generalized
4 = Global
0 = n/a

31. Linkedto
1 = Reality Claim
2 = Problem Definition
3 = Future Vision
4 = Solution
0 = n/a

32. Focus
1 = Value / Vague Action
2 = Street / Individual
3 = Management / Structural
4 = Policy
5 = Other
0 = n/a

33. O ther: Notes
34. Uttct: Dichotomous designator of new utterance
35. U tt.ord: Consecutive count of utterances, all conversations in order
36. U ttl-10: Used for aggregation purposes only
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Appendix E: Coding Rules
1999 Mayor’s Race Deliberative Forums
Introduction: The practice sheets are designed to hold all codes for each participant,
although we will be using the computer to enter our data and we will enter our data at the
level of each individual utterance. The text will be unitized into thought statements.
Each thought statement can potentially reflect one type of central statement (reality
claim, problem definition, query, etc.). In addition, each thought statement can, but does
not have to, contain information beyond but linked to the central statement. Each central
statement and its respective information furthermore range in complexity and orientation.
Details of these codes and instructions for coding are provided below.
Utterance num ber: denotes the simple order of utterances made by each speaker. Each
utterance is of a specific Type: Mark a 1 for an utterance that does not respond to a
previous utterance of any kind. These include initial problem defining statements as well
as potentially other types of statements. Mark a 2 for responses to the moderator, defined
as any statements whose only reason for being made is because the moderator said
something immediately prior to such statement and the participant felt compelled to
respond. Mark a 3 for a response to the immediately adjacent and prior statement of
another participant, and, mark a 4 for any utterance that responds in some way to a
remark made by a participant not adjacent but prior. Finally, mark a 5 for any statement
which is incomplete but is continued in a latter utterance, and 6 for any other type of
utterance. This is most often the case for interruptions. The most difficult decision to be
made, then, is between an “initial” and a “response to previous” utterance. Mark a 4 if
the participant is making a statement that in any way a) overtly appears to be a response
to another statement or b) is clearly discussing a topic already brought up by another
participant.
Topic: Although a seemingly simple concept, the concept of topic is muddied by the fact
that topics fold into each other. Within the “topic” of education is the “topic” of school
voucher under which is the “topic” of the rightness of using public money to pay for
religiously affiliated schools. Of course, we are not interested in the overall topic. The
rule here is to be comprehensive: if a topic moves from school vouchers down to the
rightness of using public money, the write down “school vouchers (public funds for
religious schools).”
Statement Type: Each thought statement can be of a specific type:
Reality Claim: A statement defining present or past reality without any explicit
definition of such a reality being a problem that must be fixed. Reality claims are
informational only.. .they contain no explicit claims of anything beyond the assertion that
their reality is true.
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Problem Definition: A statement defining present or past reality with an explicit
definition of such a reality being a problem that must be fixed. As such, problem
definitions are extensions of reality claims and thus one should not code both.
Future Vision: A statement that defines a normative political reality. Such
statements generally contain one element and lack another: 1) should contain future tense
and a sense of attainment (“we should get more jobs in the city”), but such a statement
should point toward a future reality, not action (that is, the speaker will not be, in this
example, advocating a way to get more jobs, simply that we should get more jobs, the
former being a solution, the latter, a future vision). Future visions also include personal
visions, of where one might want to end up professionally or personally.
Solution: A statement that provides a solution to a problem already given by the
participant or another participant. In some instances, solutions are given where problems
are never really defined but are rather assumed. In such cases, mark the solution code but
not the problem code.
Guidelines:
1. Present or past tense indicates a reality claim or problem definition; future tense
indicates a future vision or solution.
2. Is there a valence (indication of support or opposition) in the utterance? If not, and if
there is no clear indication of tacit agreement to a previous utterance’s support or
opposition, the statement must be either a reality claim or a future vision.
3. What is the future solution the statement is trying to solve (or value attained)? If you
can answer this question to a statement of future tense, then the statement is a
solution. If not, it is a future vision.
4. Is there an action verb in future tense? If so, the statement is likely a solution.
5. An answer to a query is most likely either a claim (response to informational query)
or a solution (response to a solution query).
6. Often, participants will make a claim, give some info to support it, then restate the
claim. Do not code the restatement as anything.
7. Not sure if it is a solution? Ask, is the action designed to fix a problem.
8. Code as a reality claim claims that something doesn ’t exist.
9. Often participants will reiterate an already defined problem and then offer a solution
to that problem. In such cases, do not code the restatement of the problem as
anything, just code the solution as a new solution.
10. If no valence is given in one statement, but then a solution is offered later in the
utterance, by definition the first statement is a problem definition.

Category
Initial: When a participant raises a topic not yet discussed in the deliberation.
Often, the topic will pertain to a larger overall topic (that is, the participant is moving to a
new, more specific level of topic). In such cases the utterance is still considered a new
topic, as no prior participant has brought up such specific arguments/information.
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Elaboration: Continuance of an already raised subject. In some cases, the speaker
may be elaborating on his/her own prior utterance. In such cases, mark elaboration only
if there is something additional within the statement: a different type of information, etc.
Agreement: agreement with a prior thought statement of another speaker.
Disagreement: disagreement with thought statement of a different speaker.
Qualifier, neither agreement nor disagreement but a modification of the truth,
validity or utility of a previous statement (e.g., a solution that would only work in x case
or instance). Basically, use whenever there is no clearly determinable agreement or
disagreement to an utterance made by a different speaker.
Self-continuation: Used only when a speaker repeats an already supplied
statement by him/herself without adding any new information or argumentative elements.
If there is new information, code as an elaboration.
Guidelines:
1. Disagreement is can be provided on a number of grounds, including “it can’t be
done” statements as well as “bad idea” statements.
2. Agreement / disagreement / qualifier must be toward an already coded central
statement, or an explicit call for agreement to an central statement provided by a
moderator. For example, the word “yes” used to agree with a moderator query of
whether something should be put up on a sheet or a moderator’s query as to what a
speaker is referring to is not agreement.
3. Agreement / disagreement / qualifier is only coded when one can point to a specific
word that indicates such agreement / disagreement / qualification.
4. Agreement / disagreement / qualifiers are designed as “combination codes,” meaning
they are a type of response to an already established claim - if a solution, for
example, has not already been established by someone, even though the topic has
been ongoing, then it is a new solution.
5. Often agreement will be tacit (“that’s a good point”): still code as an agreement.
Simple reiteration is also agreement.
6. Agreement / disagreement / qualifiers to information use in a prior utterance is coded
as agree/ dis/ qual to a reality claim.
7. Disagreement can also be implicit, as when a participant tells a story that points to an
opposite conclusion than that made in a prior utterance.
8. The word “but” often will point to a qualifier of a prior statement.
Focus: Focus denotes the level at which the statement is being made: this can generally
be conceptualized as ranging from value claims to specific policy claims:
Value: a statement type that remains at the value level (“we need more
accountability in the schools”).
Street: a statement type that discusses things at the street level, that is, at the level
of individuals acting as individuals with no official managerial or policy role, or of things
generally (and literally) at the street level. Examples include the individual actions of
police, teachers, government workers, etc. This code is generally a “not” code in that you
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can usually distinguish the street level because it is NOT a value or some sort of
problem/solution/reality/vision that focuses on managerial or policy concerns.
Management/Structural: a statement type that discusses things with regard to
management or the structural level. A solution to a problem where a change in
managerial policies or style will result in the solution (a problem defined as something
managerial, etc). Too many cops in administrative roles; principals that can do x to
improve the operation of their schools; training for city workers to help them interact
with the public; managerial denotes arguments for rule changes that do not require new
legislation.
Policy: a statement type that discusses things at a level where legislative action is
required: changing the mayor’s control over the school board; change in the city charter;
basically anything that would require some sort of law change voted on by any type of
legislative body. Has to be an explicit mention of policy.
Information Type: Used to denote the type of information linked to a particular
statement type. Note that there does not have to be any information linked to a statement,
and as such this code gives measure to the amount of information used and with what
kind of statement.
Specialized: Any use of specialized information, that is, information that contains
facts or statistics, that derives from the particular specialized experiences of an
individual, or that makes particular claims as to “specialized” information (for example,
talk of specific legislation, rule or guidelines)
Experiential: Information generated from personal or 3rd person experience.
Generalized: information that makes general claims that are not completely all
encompassing and do not reflect any specialized or experiential information.
Global: The more non-specific type of information: can include maxims, common
sayings, platitudes, and information claims that use terms like “all” or “every.”
Globalized statements make no exceptions.
Guidelines:
1.
Is the speaker referring to things “on the books,” proper nouns, specific policies,
people, historical events, or is the speaker just talking about the way things are?
If so, rule out global as an option.
2.
What is information linked to a claim of reality? If the speaker is giving evidence
that something exists, that evidence is considered information linked to that
reality claim. Similarly, a reality can be a causality (because we have this, we
also have this). In these cases, code the causal statement as the central reality
claim and other information as linked information.
3.
Not sure if a comment is one whole claim or a claim plus info? Ask, does one
comment give reason or support to another? If so, it is a claim plus info.
4.
One key indicator of information use: statements that “bolster” another statement.
Info use often sets up, contrasts, even implicitly, a separate claim.
5.
When a participant makes a claim that contain qualifiers that muddy the certainty
of the statement, that statements focus will most likely be generalized.
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6.

Experiential must contain a referent, either “I,” “me,” “us,” “a friend,” etc. And
the event had to happen to that referent (so, “I read in the paper x happened” is
not experiential).

Other Codings
Meta-talk: Talk about the deliberation itself, or about the lists being created by the
deliberation. If this item is checked for a particular thought statement, no other items
should be checked (that is, even if people are making arguments about the process or the
lists being created, do not check any argument codes like problem definition, etc.: just
meta-talk). Meta-talk can either be about the deliberative process or about the choice
frameworks being discussed.
Queries'. Check once per thought statement for any number of questions that are
asked. Code either as queries for information or for solutions.
Role: Role has four different elements. Check one only if such an element is
explicitly provided in the text.
Self-Efficacv: Check if the participant gives any evidence of feeling
empowered to solve problems.
Accountability: check if participant explicitly argues for increased
accountability of citizens or a person in the role of citizens (3), a person in
a role of his/her professional, non governmental position or of a non
governmental institution (4), or a government official or governmental
institution (5).
Career / Extra-curricular role: Write down when a participant reveals either of
these two codes. Example of extra-curricular roles would be as block captain, pta
member, soccer coach, etc.
Gender: Some participants joined after we conducted baseline surveys; as such
we have no info on them: code male or female (duh!), but only if a name is given that is
clearly gendered.
General codine m ethod: Read the entire utterance first! For each utterance, first
determine the number of thought statements within the utterance. Although it is difficult
to define, it is relatively straightforward to figure out different thought statements. They
are essentially defined as explicit changes of topic. Second, try to determine if the
thought statement has any problem definitional and solution statements. If so, mark these
and move on to determine its/their categories, whether it/they are accompanied by
information, and so on. If not, determine whether there are reality claims or future
visions, and continue coding from there. Be very specific as to where information is
being used if there are multiple elements in a thought statement.
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Additional notes fo r Coding Rules.’

As for the coding of agreements, disagreements, and qualifiers:
In most cases we have discussed how person A defines a problem and gives
information on that problem. You must be careful to code the agreement here depending
upon what the person is agreeing with: the problem of the information linked to the
problem. If it is the latter, then code it as agreement with a reality claim. Example:
person A says cop training is a joke and provides as information the fact that, in essence,
cops are running scared. Person B a few utterances later says “I agree with you, the
police are outgunned on the street.” This is agreement with the prior reality claim, not
with the problem on training.
As to the hypothetical situation:
The hypothetical situation we discussed (“if I were a cop on that beat, I’d be
scared too,” to paraphrase) should be coded as an agreement with the former reality claim
just mentioned above. Technically, it could be described as an agreement based on this
person putting himself in the cop’s shoes. For our purposes, we are just interested in the
fact that the “in your shoes” strategy is just another way of agreeing with person A.
On qualifiers:
People can often make a statement and then realize it needs some sort of
qualification later. In this case, mark the statement as a qualifier.
As for querying and offering the sides of an issue:
This is the infamous example we all got stumped on. Here is my thinking:
Although it is not direct, this person is ultimately raising problems of a more issue related
kind...that is, most problems we come across in the text are real world problems, as in
the street are dirty and need to get cleaned. This person is raising “issues”, not problems.
But it is clear that the issues assume an underlying problem. As such we are going to
take a leap and say that problems are being raised here. Specifically, the participant is
raising three separate problems, and offers information that is linked to the second and
information linked to the third.

Coherence Guidelines:
1. A highly coherent statement will likely make a claim and support it with information
that is clearly relevant to the claim being made. The claim will go beyond a black
and white perspective of the world. Often people will present the way a good speech
is presented: make a claim, offer information supporting it, possibily offer more
information that qualifies when or how the problem / solution exists, or why the
information is pertinent, and then provides a restatement of the claim.
2.
Poor coherence clues: 1) when you can’t figure out why a person brought
up a particular bit of information (e.g., you have a hard time linking it to anything) 2)
Where points begin to be made but are never finished 2) Where a number of claims
are made with little connection between them and little or no linked information. 3)
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Where it is difficult to figure out what the referents (“that,” “they,” “them,” etc.) refer
to.
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Appendix F: Regression Analyses Assumptions
1. Univariate distributions
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2. Regression assumption analyses
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Star
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ANOVA: Tests o f Regression Assumptions

Residuals and Predicted Values (Non-linearity test)
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Appendix G: Missing Cases Analysis
1. Missine cases N
Table 1: N um ber o f Cases fo r Dialogue Study

Total num ber of "April Numbers” in transcript
N "April Numbers" in transcript but not survey

189
53
24
9

• Successful “Hand Matches" of erroneous transcript cases to survey cases
• Probable court reporter typographical errors
• Probable unaccounted cases
Estimated valid A/from transcript

175

Total num ber of cases in survey with an "April Number"**
• Cases with transcript data and no survey data
• Cases with survey data and no transcript data

181
42
14

VALID CASES: Both survey and transcript information

125

20

2. T-test o f differences between missing cases and included cases
Means Comparisons: Transcript Cases with
and w ithout survey data
F

t

Mean
D ifference
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1.9

1.5

.15
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.4 6

.41

Ratio o f S ta te m e n t Types

4 .1 2

.7 7

.59

(No te s t ach iev ed sta tistic a l significance)
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3. Multiple imputation analysis
M ultiple Im putation Param eter Estimates
Lines
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Appendix H: Panel Bias

Means Test, Cases With and W ithout Post-Panel Wave Data
L evene's T e s t
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